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Abstract 
 
In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence. It was a highly controversial move 
that divided international opinion. While the United States and many EU members 
quickly recognised the new state, many other countries, including Russia and China 
and several EU members, did not. Even today, Kosovo remains a contested state. 
 
Although Germany recognised Kosovo quickly, it nevertheless expressed concerns 
over the failed international efforts to reach an agreement. This thesis analyses 
Germany’s decision to recognise Kosovo as independent despite the multilateral 
disagreement. It traces the position of Germany on Kosovo from the early 1990s until 
recognition in 2008. It pays particular attention to the final months of negotiations, 
when Germany represented the EU in the ‘Troika talks’ that also involved the US and 
Russia. 
 
In 2008 Germany was less committed to a Kosovan state than its close allies in the 
Quint – a five state group that also included the United States, Britain, France and 
Italy. Domestically the coalition parties had different approaches towards the status 
question. Also the international division on the status in the EU and the United Nations 
Security Council were a significant obstacle for the German leadership to accept a 
unilateral declaration of independence. The acceptance of this international divide 
came when domestic actors were persuaded that the Troika negotiations had exhausted 
all possibilities for a resolution.  
 
From a theoretical standpoint, Germany’s decision to recognise is examined in regards 
to its Civilian Power identity and specifically to intervention and multilateralism. It is 
argued that Germany recognised Kosovo due to its long-standing involvement in the 
intervention in the conflict and due to concerns that an unresolved status would bring 
greater instability to the Western Balkans. Germany’s recognition was therefore built 
on a rationale of conflict management and expectations of an increasing role of the 
European Union in this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   4 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am indebted to my supervisors Dr Spyros Economides and Dr James Ker-Lindsay, 
who have been a source of great support and guidance in all aspects of the PhD. I 
benefitted greatly from their expertise on the topic of this research, their help with my 
fieldwork, their support in the writing process and encouragement to make it through 
these four years.  
 
Dr Tomila Lankina was my adviser for this thesis and has been very supportive, 
particularly in the early stages of the PhD. She and Professor Chris Alden were on my 
review and upgrade panels and I benefitted very much from their constructive 
feedback. I am also grateful to Professor James Gow, who supervised my Masters 
thesis and encouraged me to continue my research. 
The completion of this thesis depended to a very large extent on the fieldwork and the 
collaboration of interviewees. I am very grateful to them for the time they took to 
speak to me and for the information they shared. Not all interviews were used in the 
final version of the thesis but they all enriched my understanding of the research. I 
would like to thank particularly Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger and his office, 
especially Mrs von Máriássy. I am also very grateful to Mrs Brigit Kmezik at the 
archives of the Auswärtige Amt and to the Deputy Head of the Western Balkans 
Division, who assessed stacks of files for this research. 
For my fieldwork I received support from many friends and colleagues who assisted 
me throughout the process, particularly Julia Alfandari, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Gëzim 
Krasniqi, Dr Katarina Lezová, Dr Leon Mangasarian, Dr Julia Muravska, and Tena 
Prelec. Generous friends have hosted me during my research trips and I am especially 
thankful to Brenda, Leonor, Marie-Emerence, and Meena. 
 
I thank the LSE International Relations Department for its funding of this research 
with studentships and travel grants. I am very grateful for all the support from the 
department given to us PhD students by Martina Langer, Romy Mokogwu, Hilary 
Parker and Gabrielle To. 
 
Feedback provided in the PhD workshops of the IR department has been invaluable 
and many members of the faculty took the time to read and review my work, including 
Professor Chris Alden, Dr Mark Hoffman, Dr George Lawson, Professor Margot 
Light, Professor Iver Neumann, Professor Karen Smith and Dr James Strong. 
 
In the final eighteen months of the PhD I worked as a Research Associate at the LSE 
IDEAS Dahrendorf Forum. This was not only a great intellectual stimulation but also 
a wonderful team to work in and always such a positive change from the isolation of 
the PhD. I am especially grateful to Robert Cooper and Louise Ingledow for their 
support and understanding during the intense time of the PhD write up. 
 
Although writing a PhD is a lonely endeavour, I have been lucky to have a wonderful 
cohort of fellow PhD students. I thank Andrew, Bugra, Cora, David, Daniel, Heidi, 
Inez, Joanne, John, Kinga, Lukas, Martin, Nawal, Sophie, and William for reading the 
many, many drafts of this thesis, for their candour, encouragement and their 
friendship.  
	   5 
 
My family’s help has been essential in the entire process. I thank my parents Chiara 
and Robert and my brother Marcus for their continuous affection, their encouragement 
and also their financial help.  
 
Finally, without Gaetano, I would not have written this thesis. I would not have had 
the courage to apply to the program or the strength to finish it. I thank him for the 
many hours of reading and discussing my work, for motivating me to continue, for his 
interest, and his patience. 
 
 
 
I dedicate this thesis to Nonna Lalla and Oma Annemie.  
 
 
 
 
 6 
Contents  
  
Abbreviations  9 
Introduction  11 
 
Chapter 1:  The Recognition of New States as Conflict Management   
1.1. Introduction 33 
1.2. Secession and Recognition 34 
1.3. Territorial Integrity, Self-determination and Secession  35 
1.3.1. Internal and External Self-Determination  37 
1.3.2. Decolonisation and Self-Determination  38 
1.3.3. Dissolution at the End of the Cold War  40 
1.4. Declaratory and Constitutive Recognition Theories  43 
1.5. International Relations and Recognition Theories  45 
1.6. Recognition as Conflict Management  51 
1.6.1. Internationalisation of the Conflict  55 
1.6.2. Conditional Recognition  56 
1.7. Recognition as Intervention and Foreign Policy  59 
1.8. Conclusion  61 
 
Chapter 2: Germany as a Foreign Policy Actor  
2.1 Introduction  64 
2.2 Domestic Actors in German Foreign Policy  67 
2.2.1. Foreign Policy by the Executive  68 
2.2.2. The Chancellor  68 
2.2.3. The Kanzleramt  69 
2.2.4. The Cabinet  70 
2.2.5. The AA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Other Ministries 70 
2.2.6. The Legislative  72 
2.2.7. Political Parties  75 
 2.2.8. Non-Governmental Actors  79 
2.2.9. Public Opinion and Media  81 
2.3 Civilian Power Germany  83 
2.4 Post War Germany  91 
2.4.1. Anchoring Germany in the West  91 
2.4.2. Ostpolitik  93 
2.4.2.1. Domestic and International Debate over Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik  95 
2.4.3. NATO Double Track Decision  97 
2.4.4. German Unification  99 
2.4.5. Post-War Germany – More than a Civilian Power  100 
 7 
2.5 Germany Post-Unification  103 
2.5.1. Germany’s Recognition of Croatia  106 
2.5.2. Military Interventions: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq 110 
2.5.3. Continuity or Change? The Academic Debate on           
Intervention and Multilateralism in German Foreign 
Policy 
121 
2.6 Conclusion  128 
Chapter 3: Germany’s position on the status of Kosovo 1989-2007  
 
3.1. Introduction  132 
3.2. Kosovo in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia  134 
3.3. Leading up to the War of 1999  140 
3.4. German multilateral diplomacy and the Fischer Plan  144 
3.5. Political Settlement and UN Resolution 1244  146 
3.6. German position on Kosovo post-UNSC 1244  148 
3.7. The early UNMIK years  150 
3.8. Ethnic Violence of 2004 and the Eide Report  153 
3.9. Vienna Talks and Ahtisaari Process  156 
3.9.1. German position before Ahtisaari  156 
3.9.2. Beginning of the talks  158 
3.9.3. Progress of the Ahtisaari Process  159 
 3.9.4. Germany’s multilateral role and position during the 
Ahtisaari Process  161 
3.9.5. The Ahtisaari Proposal  165 
3.9.6. EU position during the Ahtisaari Process  168 
3.10. Conclusion  170 
 
Chapter 4: The Troika negotiations and Germany’s recognition   
4.1. Introduction  174 
4.2. German position after Ahtisaari  176 
4.2.1. Position in the Auswärtige Amt  177 
4.2.2. Position of Political Parties in the Bundestag  179 
4.3. Set up of the Troika  183 
4.3.1. Role of the Troika Chair  185 
4.3.2. Positions of the Serbian and Kosovan delegations  186 
4.3.3. Troika Proposals  190 
4.3.4. End of the Troika negotiations  195 
4.4. Searching for Consensus within the EU  196 
4.4.1. Responding to the Lack of EU Consensus  202 
4.5. The German domestic position during the Troika negotiations  205 
4.5.1. Position of Political Parties in the Bundestag after the 
Troika process  207 
 8 
5.5.2. Germany’s position on the Troika  210 
5.5.3. Final Bundestag Debate and Recognition  211 
4.6. Conclusion  218 
 
Conclusion 223 
 
Bibliography 
 
252 
 
Annex I Travel Report of German Green Party Members of the Bundestag 
to Macedonia and Kosovo 27-28 July 1999, ‘Kurzbericht Reise nach 
Mazedonien und Kosovo 26. 28.7.99’. 
 
 
 
280 
Annex II Travel and Meeting Log of EU Troika delegation 30 July - 12 
December 2007. 284 
Annex III Travel Report of German Green Party Members of the 
Bundestag to Serbia and Kosovo December 2007 296 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1: German participation on military interventions 1999-2003 112 
Table 2: Overview of political party positions on the question of Kosovo 
status, 21 June 2007 182 
Table 3: Overview of political party positions on the question of Kosovo 
status, based on the recognition debate 20 February 215 
	  
	   9 
Abbreviations 
 
 
AA Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office) 
BMVg Bundesverteidigungsministerium (German Minstry of Defence) 
BMZ Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung (German Minstry of Development) 
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands  
(Christian Democratic Party) 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
COREPER 
II  
Committee of Permanent Representatives (EU) 
COWEB Council of the EU Working Party on the Western Balkans of 
the European Union 
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) 
DS Demokratska stranka (Democratic Party) 
DSS  Demokratska stranka Srbije (Democratic Party of Serbia ) 
EC  European Community 
EPC European Political Cooperation 
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy 
EU European Union 
EULEX European Union Rule od Law Mission 
EUMS European Union member states 
EUSR  European Union Special Representative 
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) 
FRY  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IR International Relations 
KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO) 
	   10 
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army 
MdB Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages (Member of Parliamet) 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PDS Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Democratic Socialist 
Party) 
SCR  Security Council Resolution 
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic 
Party) 
UCK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (See KLA) 
UDI Unilateral declaration of independence 
UK  United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
UNMK United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
UNOSEK  United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
UNSG United Nations Secretary General 
US  United States of America 
WB  World Bank 
WEU Western European Union  
 
	  
11 
	  
Introduction 
On 20 February 2008, Germany recognised Kosovo. It was the tenth country to do so 
amid international controversy. In his speech following the decision of the German 
government to recognise Kosovo, German foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier 
made it clear that the decision to recognise was considered problematic among German 
policy makers: 
 
“[…] The people of Kosovo have to understand that we Europeans look at 
their new country with mixed feeling and concern. We have seen the 
burning Albanian flags in Mestrovic and the violent demonstrations and 
tear gas in Belgrade. […] The people in Kosovo have to understand our 
mixed feelings because from our perspective we want borders in Europe to 
lose their dividing effect. 
 
[…] I have read in many editorials in the past days: Maybe this small state 
in the Western Balkans was not originally the wish of the world community. 
All those who say this, are right. But I remind you: We have sought a 
consensual solution. Everyone would have preferred consensual 
agreement rather than the procedure we are facing now. But it was not 
possible.  
 
[…] We now have to live up to the responsibility in this situation in which 
we can not retire into abstinence, even if some wish we did. We have to try 
with all our efforts to support Kosovo and its people and - and I say that 
even though I know what kind of situation we are coming out of there- to 
make the best of it. The best means: To create a democratic state and rule 
of law, to achieve European values in Kosovo, not only there but in the 
whole of the Western Balkans. I say it again: Only this is the foundation 
for stability and a fair balance in the whole region, not just in Kosovo. 
 
12 
	  
[…] This is why the federal government took the decision in the cabinet 
meeting today, to recognise Kosovo as an independent state.” 
 
Frank Walter Steinmeier, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany,  
20 February 2008, Bundestag debate following the unilateral declaration of 
independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008.1 
 
As can be seen, Steinmeier stressed German fears of a return to conflict and concerns 
about the divide in the international community on the status of Kosovo. An 
examination of other statements in response to the unilateral declaration of 
independence (UDI) shows this divide in the international community on recognition 
clearly. US President Bush welcomed the independence openly saying that, “the 
Kosovars are now independent, this is something that I have advocated in my 
government.”2 He was also quoted as saying that there is ‘a disagreement [on 
recognition] but we believe as many other nations do that history will prove this to be 
the correct move’.3 Russia, the most prominent opponent to Kosovan independence 
after Serbia, underlined the need to re-establish the territorial integrity of Serbia and 
called on the international community to reject the UDI. President Putin also claimed 
that the UDI increased the potential risk for an escalation of violence in the region.4  
 
Even the larger member states of the EU, although all recognising Kosovo, differed in 
their attitudes towards the secession. France was the first European Union (EU) 
member to recognise Kosovo with President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Kouchner 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Translation from German by the author, Deutscher Bundestag (2008c) Plenarprotokoll 16/144. 
Stenographischer Bericht. 144. Sitzung 16. Wahlperiode. Berlin, 20 February 2008, p. 15189. 
2 ‘France, Germany and UK to Recognize Kosovo’ Der Spiegel Online, February 18 2008,  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/suspense-is-over-france-germany-and-uk-to-recognize-
kosovo-a-536119.html (last accessed 25 September 2016). 
3 ‘Bush salutes Kosovo independence’ BBC News 19 February 2008.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7252033.stm (last accessed 25 September 2016). 
4 ‘Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo’ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation 17 February 2008,  
http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/sps/041C5AF46913D38AC32573F30027B380  
(last accessed 25 September 2016). 
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at the time welcoming a “new page” in the history of France and Kosovo.5 British 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown used more careful language and admitted “there are 
sensitive issues that we understand in Serbia but we believe that Serbia is committed 
to and we are committed to Serbia's European future. We are also satisfied that Kosovo 
is taking the steps that are necessary to protect the minorities within its country.”6 Italy 
also used cautious wording, stressing that its recognition should not be interpreted as 
a hostile act against Serbia and that Italy was highly committed to the integration of 
Serbia into the European Union. Foreign Minister D’Alema also referred to the Italian 
troops stationed in Kosovo and that continued Italian and EU involvement in Kosovo 
was in the interest of the region as well as in Serbia’s interest.7 The objections from 
EU members who did not recognise Kosovo - Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and 
Spain -  did not go as far as the Russian criticisms, but cited more generally 
international law and the risk of setting a precedent for separatist movements in other 
multi-ethnic societies.8 
 
Kosovo’s statehood was therefore contested as it lacked the collective or de jure 
recognition from the international community.9 (Even now, it has only been recognised 
by about 112 of the 193 UN Member states,10 and has not joined the United Nations – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ‘Kosovo: la lettre de Sarkozy’ Le Figaro 18 February 2008 
 http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/02/18/01003-20080218ARTFIG00666-kosovo-la-lettre-de-
sarkozy.php (last accessed 25 September 2016), ‘Paris reconnaît le Kosovo’ L’Express 19 February 
2008, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/paris-reconnait-le-kosovo_470294.html (last accessed 25 
September 2016). 
6 ‘KOSOVO: Independence declaration: Statement by Prime Minister Gordon Brown’ ITN Source, 18 
February 2008 http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist/ITN/2008/02/18/R18020806/?v=0 (last accessed 25 
September 2016). 
7 ’L'Italia riconosce il Kosovo, la Serbia richiama l'ambasciatore’ I Sole 24 ore, 21 February 2008 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/SoleOnLine4/Italia/2008/02/kosovo-riconoscimento-
italia.shtml?uuid=ABgRD8L&refresh_ce=1 (last accessed 25 September 2016); ‘L'Italia riconosce il 
Kosovo Belgrado ritira l'ambasciatore’ La Repubblica, 21 February 2008 
http://www.repubblica.it/2008/02/sezioni/esteri/kosovo-
indipendenza/riconoscimento/riconoscimento.html (last accessed 25 September 2016). 
8 ‘Spain says won’t recognise Kosovo’ Reuters, 18 February 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL18645227 (last accessed 25 September 2016). ‘Romania, Cyprus 
Adamantly Oppose Independent Kosovo’ Sofia news agency, Novinite, 1 February 2008 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/89973/Romania,+Cyprus+Adamantly+Oppose+Independent+Kosov
o (last accessed 25 September 2016). 
9 For a definition of contested statehood see Goldhuys, D. (2009) Contested States in World Politics, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 9. 
10 The latest count of recognitions of Kosovo is updated on the website Kosovo thanks you 
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a widely understood indicator of ‘universal recognition’.11) The most significant 
divisions on the status of Kosovo developed between three different groups of actors: 
firstly, between the two conflict parties Kosovo and Serbia; secondly, among EU 
member states; and, thirdly, within the United Nations Security Council. Accounts of 
Kosovo’s path to its unilateral declaration of independence usually focus on the 
international negotiations, the changing positions between the conflict parties, Serbia 
and Kosovo, and mainly on those states who have not recognised Kosovo.12 By 
focusing on Germany’s position, this thesis will provide an account of a state which 
recognised Kosovo, but which does not appear to have done so unconditionally. 
Germany’s position is also significant from its geopolitical position between the 
United States and Russia, its growing leadership role in the European Union and its 
central role in the final negotiations, the Troika negotiations. These negotiations led 
by the EU, US and Russia were chaired by German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, 
the EU’s representative. They were the last attempt to reach an agreement before the 
impending UDI and will be a main focus of this thesis. In the three months of the 
negotiations, German diplomats attempted to reconcile divisions in the international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ (last accessed 25 September 2016). However, this figure is 
contested as it includes Nigeria and Uganda, which are now widely understood not to have recognised 
Kosovo. See ‘Dispute Arises Over Kosovo's 98th Recognition’, Balkan Insight, 10 January 2013. 
11  To become a UN Member state, admission must be approved by the UN General Assembly after a 
recommendation from the UN Security Council. ‘The admission of any such state to membership of 
the United Nations will be affected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation 
of the Security Council.’ See Chapter II Article 4.2 (1945) Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 
1945, 1 UNTS XV, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html (last accessed 8 
April 2017 September 2016); ‘If the Council recommends admission, the recommendation is 
presented to the General Assembly for consideration. A two-thirds majority vote is necessary in the 
Assembly for admission of a new State. Membership becomes effective the date the resolution for 
admission is adopted.’ United Nations website, ‘About Membership’ 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-un-membership/index.html (last accessed 8 April 
2017). 
12Weller, M. (2009) Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, Oxford University 
Press; Ker-Lindsay, J. (2009) Kosovo: the path to contested statehood in the Balkans, I.B. Taurus, 
London, UK on the negotiations overall and on the position of Slovakia for example Lezová, K (2013) 
The Notion of Kosovo as a Precedent and the Impact of the Hungarian Minority Issue on Slovakia's 
Policy towards Kosovo's Independence’ Europe-Asia Studies, Jul2013, Vol. 65 Issue 5, p. 965-991. and 
on Romania Csergő, Z. (2013) Kosovo and the Framing of Non-Secessionist Self-Government Claims 
in Romania’ Europe-Asia Studies. Jul2013, Vol. 65 Issue 5, p 889-911. 
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community, among the conflict parties and domestically in Germany. It is thus of 
particular interest how Germany approached these divisions and when it finally 
adopted a position to recognise. Therefore, this thesis traces Germany’s evolving 
position within this divided international community towards recognition and how it 
came to the decision to recognise. It will approach the question of recognition as a 
foreign policy decision and therefore consider it in light of German contemporary 
foreign policy.  
The Kosovo Conflict 
The focus of this thesis is Germany’s approach towards the status of Kosovo after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. It will therefore consider the conflict mainly in the context 
of the creation of an independent Kosovan state in post-Cold War history, therefore 
focusing on its status in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Serbia and Montenegro and within the 
Republic of Serbia. The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia is often cited as 
historically rooted in imperial conflict over control of the Western Balkans. There are 
many comprehensive historical accounts of the origins of the conflict in the literature,13 
but these are beyond the scope of this thesis. The following is therefore intended to 
provide only a very brief review of historical developments pertaining to Kosovo’s 
status to provide some background to the more comprehensive discussion of the 
conflict over its status since the dissolution of the SFRY.  
 
Albanian claim to have settled in the region more than 4000 years ago.14 The Serbian 
Kingdom began to control the area in the 1200s. The Ottoman Empire tried for several 
centuries to seize control over Serbia and the Balkan region as a whole. In 1389 the 
Serbs lost the Battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of Blackbirds) against the Ottoman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Malcolm, N. (2002) Kosovo: A Short History, London: Pan Books; Vickers, N. (1997) The 
Albanians: A Modern History, New York: Tauris and (1998) Between Serb and Albanian: A History of 
Kosovo, New York: Columbia University Press; Mazower, M. (2001) The Balkans: From the End of 
the Byzantinium to the Present Day, London: Phoenix; Fisher, B.J. eds. (2002) Albanian Identities: 
Myths and History, London: Hurst. Pavlowitch, S.K. (2008) Hitler’s new Disorder: The Second World 
War in Yugoslavia, London: Hurst and (1999) A History of the Balkans, 1804–1945, London, New 
York: Longman; Jelavich, B. (1983) History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, II, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
14 Ker-Lindsay (2009) p. 8; Weller (2009) p. 25. 
16 
	  
Empire.15 This battle, which took place in Kosovo, remains a central reference for 
Serbian nationalism and adds to the Serbian claim over Kosovo’s territory. In 1459 the 
Ottoman Empire asserted its control over the whole of the central Balkans.16 Serbia 
achieved greater autonomy within the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and, after 
the Congress of Berlin, Serbia and Montenegro gained independence in 1878.17 
Kosovo remained under Ottoman rule with the new Serb Kingdom threatening 
expansion into the region. In the first Balkan war of 1912, Serbia gained control over 
Kosovo and Albania. In an attempt to restrain Serbia’s power in the region, the London 
conference established the independent state of Albania, while Kosovo remained under 
Serbian control.18 After the end of the First World War, Kosovo again remained part 
of the new Yugoslav Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.19 During the Second 
World War, first Italy and then Germany occupied Albania and Kosovo, thereby 
cutting them off from Serbian rule. After Italy’s capitulation and the loss of the war by 
Germany, Kosovo was reintegrated into Serbia as an autonomous region within the 
new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.20  
 
These continuous changes of rule over the Kosovan region were characterised by 
significant violence among ethnic groups and persecution. During the Ottoman rule 
significant numbers of Serbs left the region, whilst some Serbian nationalists organised 
violent revolt towards the end of the Ottoman Empire. By 1912, Kosovo Albanians 
had organised politically and called for independence in an uprising.21 During the 
Balkan Wars and the First World War, Serbs persecuted and repressed Kosovo 
Albanians were resettled in Kosovo.22 Under the Fascist and Nazi rule of Greater 
Albanian, Serbs were persecuted and driven out of the territory in acts of revenge.23  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Weller (2009) p. 25; Ker Lindsay (2009) p. 38.  
16 Weller (2009) p. 25 
17 Ibid, p. 26. 
18 Ker-Lindsay (2009) p. 9. 
19 Ibid and Weller (2009) p. 27. 
20 Weller (2009) p. 28 and Ker-Lindsay (2009) p. 9. 
21 Weller (2009) p. 27. 
22 Ibid and Ker-Lindsay (2009) p. 9. 
23 Weller (2009) p. 27. 
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Yugoslavia consisted of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Kosovo Albanians were considered a 
people with an external homeland, Albania. Therefore, they did not gain status as a 
nation, but were instead described as so-called nationalities and, therefore, considered 
a minority.24 This was used as justification of not granting republic status to Kosovo 
as a region. After nationalist uprising in Pristina, Kosovo gained significant autonomy 
under providence status with the new constitution of 1974, which stopped short of 
allowing republic status. Calls for republic status continued, driven by the Kosovan 
student movement in the early 1980s. At the same time, Belgrade observed a decrease 
in the number of the Serb minority in the region and from the mid- 1980s, parts of the 
Serbian leadership sought to reintegrate Kosovo fully into the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia.25 The new Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic removed the enhanced 
autonomy of Kosovo in the new constitution of Serbia in 1990. In the wake of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, Kosovans responded with a declaration of independence in 
1992.26 
 
Within the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Kosovo’s status received little attention in the 
international response to the reordering of the Western Balkans. Within the main body 
of this thesis I will review in detail the status of Kosovo from this period onwards; 
therefore, here I will only briefly review Kosovo’s status developments. While the 
former Republics of Yugoslavia were granted independence, Kosovo was excluded 
from this process and remained part of what became Serbia and Montenegro. During 
the wars in the Balkans throughout the 1990s, the focus of the international community 
was on containing Milosevic and further ethnic violence. The status of Kosovo 
received little attention. However, the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia escalated 
at the end of the 1990s and greater international efforts were put into negotiating a 
settlement. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ker-Lindsay (2009) p. 9-10. Other minorities included Hungarians, Slovaks and Italians. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Weller (2009) p. 29. 
18 
	  
In 1999, after a failed attempt to reach an agreement, the NATO operation in Kosovo 
and Serbia against Milosevic’s forces led to a Serbian retreat from Kosovo.27 Further 
international negotiations led to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, 
which established the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to oversee the 
governance of Kosovo until a resolution to the status question was reached. The UN 
therefore headed the international civil presence, provided an interim civilian 
administration, and authorised the security presence under NATO command in 
Kosovo. UNMIK would act under a status neutral mandate, which would not favour 
either the independence of Kosovo or its reintegration into Serbia until a new status 
had been decided with a new UN Security Council Resolution.28 Progress under 
UNMIK was very slow and ethnic violence returned in 2004. This triggered new 
efforts to negotiate a settlement between Pristina and Belgrade on the future status of 
Kosovo.29 The so-called Vienna talks took place under the auspices of UN Special 
Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. These talks lasted from 2006 until the Spring of 2007. They 
resulted in a comprehensive proposal on Kosovo formulated by the Special Envoy that 
established a new settlement for political representations, minority rights, the justice 
system, security and economic policy.30 This ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ was however rejected 
by Serbia, as well as by Russia in the Security Council. Therefore, following a G8 
meeting in the summer of 2007, new talks were initiated to be held under a Troika of 
the European Union, the United States and Russia. These talks lasted from August to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This period is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three 3.2 Kosovo in the Dissolution of 
Yugoslavia with reference to Weller (2009); Friedrich, R. (2005) Die deutsche Außenpolitik im 
Kosovo-Konflikt, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 29-33 and Krause, J. (2000) 
Deutschland und die Kosovo-Krise, in Teuter, J. and Clewing, C. (eds) Der Kosovo-Konflikt Ursachen, 
Verlauf, Perspektiven, Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, pp. 396-410. 
28 See Chapter Three, 3.5 Political Settlement and UN Resolution 1244 and Weller (2009) p. 171 and 
United Nations (1999b) UN Security Council, ‘On the situation relating to Kosovo’ Resolution 1244 
(1999) S/Res/1244, 10 June 1999 
 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement 
(last accessed 8 April 2017). 
29 See Chapter Three, 3.3.5 Ethnic Violence of 2004 and the Eide Report; Yannis, A. (2002) 'The 
international presence in Kosovo and regional security: The deep winter of UN security council 
resolution 1244', Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2: 1, pp. 173- 190, p. 176; Meurs, van, W. 
(2004) 'Kosovo's fifth anniversary—on the road to nowhere?', Ethnopolitics, 3: 3; pp. 60-74, p. 68; 
Weller (2009) p. 185. 
30 See Chapter Three 3.9.5 The Ahtisaari Proposal; United Nations (2007a) UN Security Council, Letter 
dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council 
(Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's Future Status), S/2007/168, 26 
March 2007). 
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December of 2007 and were chaired by German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, 
who led the EU Troika delegation. The talks were considered a last opportunity to 
either find a solution between the conflict parties or to reach an agreement between 
the United States and Russia for a new Security Council Resolution, which would 
allow for a new status for Kosovo. After the talks concluded, the Troika announced 
that no new agreement had been found but that the parties had committed to a peaceful 
resolution and European integration. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia 
unilaterally on 17 February 2008.31 
 
Germany’s recognition of Kosovo - Issues and Controversies 
Germany’s decision to recognise Kosovo came after the breakdown of the Troika talks 
and with no consensus among international actors. From the statement quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter by the German foreign minister, it seems clear that the 
decision to recognise was highly controversial from a German foreign policy 
perspective. Whilst Kosovo is not the only territory to have been partially recognised 
by UN member states,32 in comparison to other such cases, contestation of Kosovo has 
publically split the international community and the European Union to an 
unprecedented extent. Although the international community, and particularly the 
United States and Russia, had been able to collaborate and manage earlier crises in 
Kosovo, for example the war of 1999 and its aftermath, this multilateral consensus 
broke down as the new unilateral declaration of independence was nearing and no 
agreement had been found.33 
 
This thesis approaches the question of Germany’s recognition within the framework 
of foreign policy literature on Germany. Additionally, it considers the question of 
Kosovo’s status within the process of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The establishment of the Troika and the negotiations are discussed in Chapter Four in greater detail. 
See also Weller (2009) pp. 221-229 and Ker Lindsay (2009) from p. 81-102 for a discussion of the talks.  
32 For example, Taiwan and Palestine are recognised by some UN members, Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Northern Cyprus have also few but UN member recognitions. 
33 The international negotiations on the status of Kosovo are discussed in detail in Chapter Three, 
specifically in 3.3 Leading up to the war of 1999.  
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began in the early 1990s. This process has generated significant discussion in the 
International Relations literature in regards to recognition practices and the 
management of the dissolution by the international community.34 For a more policy 
focused reading of recognition of this case, authors, such as Caplan as well as Zaum, 
developed the notion of recognition as an act of intervening and managing a conflict. 
In contrast to more legal and sociological approaches, their approach analysed the 
practice of internationalising a conflict through recognition, thereby allowing for 
greater international intervention.35 Recognition, following this interpretation, is used 
by recognising states as a tool to change the power relations in a conflict, by giving 
the group which seeks to secede international recognition and, therefore, statehood, 
transforming conflict from intra-state to interstate. This, therefore, allows for greater 
intervention into the conflict from the international community. On the other hand, 
recognition raises issues in regards to the territorial integrity of the parent state and the 
carefully established balance between internal and external self-determination.36 For 
the case of Croatia, Caplan has argued that the rationale behind using recognition as a 
conflict intervention depended on understanding Serbia as the aggressor against 
Croatia. By promoting the internationalisation of the conflict, the international 
community was then able to intervene with greater capacity in the conflict of the 
former Yugoslavia.37 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Chapter One 1.3.3 Dissolution at the End of the Cold War. 
35 Chapter One provides an overview of the legal approaches; Particularly relevant is 1.5 International 
Relations and Recognition Theories: issue of secession and discussion within the International Relations 
literature. Fabry, M. (2010) Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New 
States Since 1776, Oxford, Oxford University Press; Coggins, B. (2014) Power Politics & State 
Formation in the 20th Century: The Dynamics of Recognition Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
provide the most comprehensive reviews of the position towards recognition in IR; Crawford, J. (1999) 
State Practice and International Law in Relation to the Secession, British Yearbook of International 
Law (1998) 69 (1): 85-117; Lauterpacht, H. (1947) Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Cassese, A. (1995) Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press discuss the legal debates. 
36 In Chapter One I describe the tension between internal and self-determination in detail, see 1.3.1. 
Traditionally international law has supported internal self-determination to overcome claims of 
secession, i.e., providing greater political control over the territory within the existing parent state 
through constitutional arrangements, such as autonomy. 
37 Caplan, R. (2005) Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia, Cambridge: University 
Press and Zaum, D. (2007) The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International State 
building, Oxford: Oxford University Press are discussed in Chapter One 1.6 Recognition as Conflict 
Management. 
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The second main aspect of Caplan’s reading of recognition is the conditionality 
imposed on the new emerging states seeking recognition. In the case of the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia, European Union members used conditionality in an unprecedented 
way, thereby exerting significant influence on the shape of the governance of the new 
states.38 Acknowledging the conflict management nature of recognition and the 
political controversy of a recognition of a contested state, against the will of the parent 
state, facilitates one in examining the tensions which arise from recognition in foreign 
policy. In this thesis, I will therefore demonstrate how the concept of recognition can 
be applied to the case of Kosovo as well. 39 
 
The foreign policy decision by Germany to recognise in a contested environment is 
particularly striking in light of expectations of Germany to behave as a Civilian Power, 
in foreign policy terms. The Civilian Power role describes Germany after the Second 
World War as an international actor committed to economic rather than military power 
with a strong commitment to multilateralism and international institutions, implying 
also a commitment to international law.40 Although there are strong critics of such an 
approach, most authors subscribe to the description of Germany as a ‘different’ kind 
of international actor. Most stress its commitment to its international alliances and that 
it is less likely to act in a coercive or Realpolitik manner.41 For this thesis, the 
characterisation of Germany as a Civilian Power will be particularly relevant since its 
expected commitment to a multilateral approach appears to have created tensions in 
the context of the contested statehood of Kosovo. In the case of the recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia in the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the European Union eventually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 These were established through the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, 
mostly referred to as the Badinter Commission. A discussion of this is provided in Chapter 1.3.3 
Dissolution at the End of the Cold War. 
39 Ibid and particularly 1.6.2 Conditional Recognition. 
40 Maull, H.W. (1990) 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', Foreign Affairs, Vol.69., and 
discussed in Chapter Two 2.3 Civilian Power Germany. 
41 For instance, Katzenstein, P. (1996) The Culture of National Security, Norms and Identity in World 
Politics’ New York: Columbia University Press; Rittberger, W. (1999) Deutschlands Außenpolitik nach 
der Vereinigung, Zur Anwendbarkeit theoretischer Modelle der Außenpolitik: Machtstaat, Handelstaat 
oder Ziviltaat, in Bergem,W., Ronge, V., and Weißeno, G. (eds.) Friedenspolitik in und für Europa, 
Opladen: Leske und Burich, pp. 83-108; Ash, T. (1996) Germany’s Choice’ in Mertes, M., Muller, M. 
Winkler, S. In search of Germany, New Brunswick: Transaction; Aggestam, L. (2000) ‘Germany’ in 
Manner, I and Whitman, R. eds. The Foreign policies of European Union Member States, Manchester: 
University Press. 
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agreed on a recognition policy, however, Germany was considered the driving force 
behind this process. Many states, at the time were not willing to recognise the former 
Republics of Yugoslavia as independent states until the conditions posed to them were 
fulfilled. Germany recognised Croatia and Slovenia a month before the remaining 
member states. Although consensus was reached, Germany’s pressure to recognise 
was strongly criticised by its close partners and its Civilian Power role was put into 
question.42 The case of Kosovo is equally if not less controversial as it remains a 
contested state and the division in the international community has included the UN 
Security Council. Nonetheless, after the failed talks and the breakdown in agreement 
in the international community, Germany recognised Kosovo. It thereby found itself 
in the midst of significant divisions between its closest allies in the European Union, 
Russia and the United States. This raises questions about how Germany reconciled the 
division among its allies and within the international organisation with its assumed 
tradition of committing to institutions and multilateralism. When considering the 
recognition of Kosovo, I will focus on Germany’s approach towards intervention in 
Kosovo and its role as a multilateral actor in light of the international divide. Particular 
attention will be paid to its role in the final Troika negotiations. Here, Germany’s 
relationship to the two conflict parties, to the United States and Russia and to its fellow 
EU member states will be explored in detail. 
 
A second aspect of my analysis of Germany’s position towards the status of Kosovo 
concerns domestic actors in Germany. Within the Civilian Power description of 
Germany, adherence to the principles of multilateralism is often explained with the 
strong conviction of domestic political parties and their influence in foreign policy. 
For instance, political parties have developed distinct foreign policy identities and 
foreign policy receives a proportionally larger attention from the public than does other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Maull, H.W. and Stahl, B. (2002) ‘Durch den Balkan nach Europa? Deutschland und Frankreich in 
den Jugoslawienkriegen’ Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 43. Jg. (2002) Heft 1, S. 82–111; Augter, S. 
(2002) Negotiating Croatia’s recognition: German foreign policy as a two-level game, PhD in 
International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science; Crawford, B. (1996) 
Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition, World 
Politics 48.4 482-521; Glaurdic, J. (2011) The Hour of Europe. Western Powers and the Break-Up of 
Yugoslavia, New Haven: Yale University Press; Caplan (2005). 
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policy areas.43 Furthermore, in the case of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, 
the policy for recognition by Germany was influenced strongly by German domestic 
actors. Particularly, a consensus among political parties to recognise Croatia and 
Slovenia had put pro-recognition pressure on the German government. Politicians, 
using a language of managing the conflict, argued for self-determination after 
communist and socialist rule, justifying it with the recent positive experience of the 
unification of the two Germanys at the end of the Cold War.44 Thus, recognition gained 
significant attention among domestic actors in Germany in the early dissolution of 
Yugoslavia: Domestic actors then are likely to have played a significant role in the 
shaping of German policy on the status of Kosovo. When discussing Germany’s role 
as a Civilian Power I will also engage with  the domestic contestations and changing 
approaches towards it. Particularly differing approaches towards multilateralism 
which can co-exist in Germany among domestic actors will be relevant as they created 
conflict within the grand coalition government in 2008. This thesis will therefore also 
explore the domestic positions on recognition or non-recognition and how these 
influenced the position of the German government. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of four chapters. These explore the questions raised by Germany’s 
recognition of Kosovo from different angles. Chapter One will elaborate on conceptual 
issues in regards to secession and recognition, exploring the controversy surrounding 
recognition in International Relations and International Law. It will review the 
different approaches with which the international community has attempted to balance 
the tension between the concepts of territorial integrity on the one hand and calls for 
self determination and secession on the other. It will also highlight differences in the 
legal approaches towards recognition found in the International Relations literature. 
This chapter will also introduce the concept of recognition as conflict management. 
Building on the case study of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the 
recognition of Croatia, the chapter will discuss how conditional recognition and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The role of the German Bundestag is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two 2.2.6 The Legislative. 
44 Augter (2002) p. 235; Crawford (2007) p. 70; Glaurdic (2011). 
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use of the internationalisation of a conflict through recognition has been described by 
some authors as a conflict management approach. It will then discuss how this 
approach is compatible with a foreign policy approach. 
 
This thesis approaches the decision to recognise as a foreign policy decision by 
Germany. Therefore, Chapter Two provides a review of the foreign policy literature 
on the question of multilateralism and participation in international interventions. 
Chapter Two introduces German domestic foreign policy actors and the concept of 
Germany as a Civilian Power. It introduces the literature on role theory in foreign 
policy and how it related to the German case. It will provide a critique of this 
understanding of Germany, particularly in regards to the assumption of a consistent 
national consensus on foreign policy and the German approach to multilateralism. For 
this critique, it will discuss Germany’s post-war foreign policy and then foreign policy 
after unification. The literature on the changing approach toward multilateralism and 
international interventions from domestic actors and pressure from international 
partners will be discussed in particular. The Civilian Power role and Germany’s 
multilateralism in the context of the EU will also be discussed. This chapter, therefore, 
provides the background to Germany’s foreign policy up until the period of the main 
case study set in 2007.  
 
The next two chapters discuss the German position on the status of Kosovo. Here, the 
thesis will consider particularly the domestic positions within Germany on the status 
of Kosovo and the role these played at international level in different negotiations. 
Chapter Three discusses Germany’s position from the dissolution of Yugoslavia until 
the end of the Ahtisaari process in the Summer of 2007. Here it will be evident that, 
although Germany may have supported Kosovan independence in the early 1990s, it 
held little sway over its allies, amongst whom support for independence was weak. By 
the time of the Kosovo war in 1999, German support for independence had diminished 
and so it followed the general NATO and EU policy on Kosovo, which was primarily 
focused on containing Milosevic. Germany was central in providing a European 
perspective on the Western Balkans states, including on Serbia and Kosovo, and its 
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role in the international community grew considerably. After the conflict of 1999, the 
international community agreed on the status neutrality of the UN mission to control 
Kosovo. With the changing leadership in Belgrade after Milosevic, German domestic 
actors became more sympathetic to the Serbian position. Among western allies, 
support for Kosovan independence grew in the early 2000s. The Ahtisaari process 
resulted in a recommendation of self-governance for Kosovo, with independence 
supervised by the international community and a greater role of the European Union 
in managing this new status. However, the Ahtisaari Process was rejected by Serbia as 
well as by Russia and left Kosovo’s status unresolved.  
 
While in this context most close allies of Germany were willing to support Kosovo’s 
independence, despite Serbia’s refusal to grant it, Germany supported extending the 
talks. In a new format of negotiations, the EU, the United States and Russia would 
form a Troika to lead a last effort to bring a solution between Pristina and Belgrade. 
Chapter Four focuses on these negotiations, which lasted from August to December 
2007 and were chaired by German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, who was 
seconded by Germany to the EU delegation of the Troika. The Troika process also 
ended without a resolution of the conflict between Pristina and Belgrade. Nonetheless, 
Kosovo declared independence on February 2008. This chapter explores firstly the 
negotiations between the conflict parties, the positions of the different Troika members 
and the role of the Troika in changing the positions on recognition among EU members 
and within Germany. Between the conflict parties, however, the Troika process did 
little to change their positions. Kosovo was unwilling to accept anything short of 
independence, while Serbia was willing to extend greater autonomy but, in all of its 
proposals, stopped short of allowing secession. However, the Serbian delegation 
considered the efforts of the Troika more genuine than those of the Ahtisaari process, 
as a greater array of options were tabled. This wide-ranging approach generated trust 
in the process of the Troika negotiations and also affected the position of EU members 
and domestic actors in Germany. Within the EU many member states were unwilling 
to recognise Kosovo, considering the risk of its contested statehood particularly for the 
EU mission, which was due to be deployed. By the end of the Troika process, EU 
member states still disagreed on the status, although a clear majority had agreed to 
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support a UDI. Despite divisions on the status, EU member states agreed to deploy a 
status neutral mission. These developments affected Germany’s position significantly. 
In Germany, at the beginning of these negotiations, domestic actors were still calling 
for a new UN resolution and a united EU position on the status before a recognition of 
a potential declaration of independence. By the end of the talks, almost all political 
parties considered independence very likely and supported recognition by Germany 
and the increased role of the EU in the future of Kosovo. Chapter Four therefore 
analyses the negotiation from the point of view of Germany’s multilateralism, asking 
how domestic actors and policy makers accepted the lack of international agreement 
on the status question and how this was managed within the German foreign policy 
context.  
 
The concluding chapter will draw on the empirical evidence, considering it in light of 
the conceptual issues raised in Chapters One and Two. The conclusion will review 
whether the recognition by Germany can be considered in the conflict management 
approach as described by Caplan focusing on internationalising of the conflict as well 
as conditional recognition. It will then consider the shift in the German domestic 
position on the status question and the review Germany’s multilateral role in the 
process, with particular attention to the context of the European Union.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis is primarily based on qualitative research and provides a process tracing of 
the case of Germany’s recognition of Kosovo. The case study is framed within a 
conceptual framework of recognition as conflict management for German Foreign 
Policy. The first two chapters therefore build mainly on existing literature, while 
Chapters Three and Four use mainly primary sources. To introduce the conceptual 
framework, I provide a discussion of both Law and International Relations literature 
relevant to the questions of secession and recognition for foreign policy. To discuss 
the background to Germany’s foreign policy I rely on History and International 
Relations texts. Thus, the first two chapters provide the framework for the case study 
and set the historical, legal and foreign policy contexts.  
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Chapters Three and Four will process trace the position of Germany towards the status 
of Kosovo. Process tracing is a widely used qualitative research method that allows 
the examination of intervening causal processes. This method considers a case study 
along a chronological order and by examining observable implications.45 This thesis 
will scrutinise the German recognition of Kosovo through examining developments 
involving a variety of domestic and international actors and internal and external 
influences on the policy. Process tracing allows the researcher to consider the 
interaction of different factors, at different levels and by different actors, thus implying 
a non-linear causality.46 It is therefore particularly suitable for this study. The scope 
and focus of the process tracing is established in Chapters One and Two, in which I 
set out the conceptual focus and the considerations of the multilateralism of Germany 
in the context of the recognition of Kosovo. Therefore, the actors and levels of analysis 
will be set out in these chapters. For the general timeline and narrative of the 
negotiations in Chapters Three and Four, I will build on secondary literature as well 
as reportage on the negotiations from international print and online media. The 
advantage of exploring a case study through process tracing is the greater depth and 
detail. To do this I will build to a large extent on the use of primary sources into trace 
Germany’s position towards the status of Kosovo. I used several categories of sources, 
as follows.  
 
Elite interviews with policy makers involved in the status negotiations have been used 
for the empirical evidence of this thesis. The use of interviews for Social Science 
research brings some risks but also great advantages. The bias of the interviewer and 
author or the ‘naïve’ assumption of the rationality of the interviewee are limits to the 
value of the data obtained from interviews.47 However, no other research method 
allows for as much data to be collected or the opportunity to target very specific areas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 George, A. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, pp. 206-208. 
46 Ibid, p. 208. 
47 Rathbun, B.C. (2008) Chapter 29 Interviewing and Qualitative Field Methods: Pragmatism and 
Practicalities in Box-Steffensmeier, J.M., Brady, H.E. and Collier, D. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Methodology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 685. 
28 
	  
while also responding to those who provide the data in an interview.48 Within process 
tracing, elite interviews provide a unique opportunity to understand political processes, 
as the researcher receives insights from those involved in the processes described.49 
At the same time, such interviews require a particularly analytical approach toward the 
data and flexibility from the interviewer to overcome the practical and intellectual 
obstacles in obtaining reliable data from interviewees. 
 
The criterion for choosing interviewees was that they be policy makers involved in the 
negotiations on Kosovo, particularly with experience of the Troika negotiations. 
Among German policy makers, I focused on the main negotiator Wolfgang Ischinger, 
but I also interviewed members of the civil service involved in the Troika negotiations 
or positioned in the Auswärtige Amt (the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Other 
German interviewees included experts who have worked on the Kosovo question in 
party political positions. However, no Members of Parliament were willing to be 
interviewed in regards to the topic of this thesis. Other interviewees were selected 
mainly for their experience of the Troika negations outside of the German context. 
These included EU officials in the Commission and Council who had access to Contact 
Group meetings and worked directly with EU High Representative Javier Solana. 
Also, representatives of EU Member States in the COREPER II (Committee of 
Permanent Representatives) and COWEB (Council of the EU Working Party on the 
Western Balkans of the European Union) were interviewed. These participants 
provided insights into the coordination around the Kosovo status at EU level and the 
perception of the German position by its allies. Finally, important interviewees were 
the representatives of the delegations of Serbia and Kosovo. Some additional 
interviews with journalists, members of the European Parliament and politicians in 
Belgrade and Pristina were also held for background information and context. The elite 
interviewees were considered to be those who had exclusive access to negotiations and 
confidential government information, and who also held expert knowledge and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid. 
49 Rubin, H.J. and Rubin, I.S. (2005) Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, 2nd edn, 
London: Sage Publications, p. 3.  
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experience on the question of the status of Kosovo.50 Interviewees were provided with 
a catalogue of questions prior to the meeting and interviews were conducted in a semi-
structured manner. Some of these interviews had to be held via phone and, in 
exceptional cases or as follow up, interviewees provided answers via email.  
 
The interviews for this thesis focussed mainly on the three-month Troika process in 
late 2007. This collection of primary data is the main empirical contribution of this 
research, as it provides a detailed recollection of this period of negotiations. In some 
cases, depending on the expertise of the participants, historical aspects of the Kosovo 
status were discussed. The focus of all interviews was thus on a very specific period 
which allowed me to verify the details, facts, and accounts of different interviewees. 
Contrasting information from different interviews provided an opportunity to evaluate 
the diverse perspectives of actors on the process. To overcome the potential biases of 
both interviewer and the interviewee, I triangulated the information where possible. 
Here, it was particularly important to compare the position of the Troika Chair 
Ischinger, representing the EU as chief negotiator, with that of the German government 
representatives and the EU Council position, as well as the perception from member 
states. To additionally verify the accounts given in interviews, my research was 
supplemented  by additional primary and secondary sources, which will be discussed 
below. 
 
Some official German government documentation from the archive of the German 
Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes) has been used to confirm 
the timeline already established in other secondary literature on the negotiations. 
However, due to access restrictions, most of the internal correspondence of the 
German government held in the Politische Archiv will not be released publicly until 
2038. However, I have been able to access some confidential documents regarding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 A discussion of the identification of Elites for interviews can be found in Burnham, P., Gilland Lutz, 
K., Grant, W., and Layton-Henry, Z. (2008) Research Methods in Politics, 2nd edn London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. See also Odendahl, T., and Shaw, A. M. (2002) ‘Interviewing Elites’, in Gumbrium, J.F. 
and Holstein, J.A eds. Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method, London: Sage, pp. 299-
316.  
30 
	  
negotiations through private files of participants in the negotiations. Therefore, this 
research also relies partly on access to this documentation that was confidential at the 
time of the negotiation, including personal notes and documents made available by 
some of the interviewees. Additionally, the Public Library of US Diplomacy compiled 
and made available confidential documents, mainly diplomatic cables, to the online 
database, WikiLeaks. These documents are somewhat limited in their helpfulness 
because of the unverified nature of the cables and a lack of clear context for the 
correspondence. Documents taken from this database were therefore primarily used 
for the purpose of confirming the information provided in interviews and secondary 
sources, as well as for additional detail and external perspectives on the German 
position. 
 
Finally, a key primary source are the minutes of debates on the status of Kosovo in the 
German Parliament, the Bundestag. In Parliament, the committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Auswärtiger Ausschuß) is closed to the public and minutes are currently not released 
publically. Therefore, plenary debates are the main forum in which party political 
positions on foreign affairs are expressed and from which divisions between political 
parties become evident. The parliamentary minutes therefore provide an insight into 
the changing party political positions and provide central empirical evidence in the 
tracing of domestic positions on the question of Kosovo’s status in Germany. The 
positions of each party have therefore been traced in detail and compared over the 
years to describe the shift in domestic positions towards the status of Kosovo from the 
early 1990s until recognition in 2008. The positions of each party have therefore been 
traced in detail and compared over time to describe the shift in domestic positions 
towards the status of Kosovo from the early 1990s until recognition in 2008. To trace 
the positions of the different political parties in each relevant debate, positions by each 
parliamentary party were recorded and mapped throughout the nearly 20-year period. 
This allowed for a detailed record of the key aspects defining party positions and the 
changes over the years. Particular attention was given to the connection made by 
parliamentarians between the unresolved status and the risk of eruption of conflict, the 
need for multilateral solutions, the approach towards Serbia as an aggressor in the 
conflict, and the specific proposals brought forward by different political parties on 
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how to resolve the conflict or how to respond to the multilateral deadlock. Debates 
considered relevant were specifically on the Kosovo status or related to German 
participation in the NATO operation in Kosovo (which was debated regularly in the 
Bundestag). The diversity of arguments put forward in the debates in parliament 
provided evidence for the clear contrast to the position of Germany’s closest allies in 
support for a UDI after the failed Ahtisaari Process. 
  
Contribution 
The contribution of this thesis to the existing literature on International Relations is 
threefold.  
Firstly, it will provide a more detailed academic investigation into the multilateral 
negotiations on the status of Kosovo prior to the UDI. The academic literature has 
mainly focused on the Ahtisaari process in the past. This process was a two-year 
process lead by the United Nations Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari in close 
collaboration with the Contact Group consisting of the United States, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. This focus from the literature was due 
to the process resulting in the Ahtisaari Plan. This plan was rejected by the Serbian 
authorities, however, it later became the basis for the Kosovan authorities to declare 
independence. In this thesis, I will discuss the Ahtisaari process, however, the focus 
will be on the final three-month period from August to December 2007, or the so called 
Troika negotiations. Other authors have discussed these talks, however, in lesser detail 
or with a different focus.51 The account in this thesis will discuss the role of the chair 
of the Troika, a detailed discussion of the different options discussed in the talks and 
the multilateral role of the Troika particularly on its relations with the EU and among 
its members. It therefore provides additional insight into the international coordination 
in the lead up to the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. 
 
Secondly, the thesis provides a systematic review of Germany’s position on the status 
of Kosovo after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. For this, I was able to build on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Weller (2009); Ker-Lindsay (2009); Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2012).  
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existing literature on Germany and the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Germany’s 
position towards the military intervention in Kosovo in 1999. However, to provide an 
overview of Germany’s position on Kosovo and its role in the status negotiations, I 
combined existing secondary literature with primary sources and a review of the party 
positions from the early 1990s until the recognition in 2008.  
 
Finally, the conceptual contribution of this thesis is the development of the concept of 
recognition as conflict management. This concept was used in regards to the cases of 
the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by Caplan, as well as by Zaum.52 Caplan 
identified the use of recognition to internationalise a conflict and the use of conditional 
recognition on a new state entity as the key aspects of using recognition as conflict 
management. In this thesis, I examine to what extent these aspects can be applied to 
the rationale behind Germany’s recognition of Kosovo.  
 
Other authors have explored the interventionist nature of state building by the 
international community in the Western Balkans in general and Kosovo in particular.53 
In this thesis, I provide a specific focus on the recognition question. By doing this, I 
demonstrate of the conceptual understanding of recognition as conflict management 
can be applied in the wider post-Yugoslav context of the Western Balkans.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Caplan (2005); Zaum (2007). 
53 Bieber, F. (2011) Building impossible states - State building strategies and EU membership in the 
Western Balkans, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, no 10, December 2011, 1783-1802; Noutcheva, G. 
(2009) Fake, partial and imposed compliance: the limits of the EU's normative power in the Western 
Balkans, Journal of European Public Policy, 16:7. 
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Chapter 1: The Recognition of New States as Conflict Management  
 
1.1  Introduction 
In the introductory chapter, I outlined the puzzle of Germany’s recognition of Kosovo. 
This chapter will consider in greater detail recognition in the Legal and International 
Relations literature to contextualise the political and legal debate around recognition 
of new states.  
 
The key principles central to the issue of recognition are territorial integrity and self-
determination. I will outline the interpretations of the principles and tensions which 
have arisen, as the relationship between these principles has developed, particularly 
over the course of the 20th century. In doing so, I will discuss the process of 
decolonisation, the cases of the Åland Islands and Quebec and the dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia. Throughout this discussion, I will also review the development 
and application of the distinction between internal and external self-determination, 
which implies domestic political control in the former and independence from a parent 
state in the latter sense. From this discussion, it will become evident that throughout 
these political developments the principle of territorial integrity and a reluctance to 
facilitate secession, particularly unilaterally, has prevailed. However, we cannot speak 
of an explicit prohibition of secession. Thus, political independence claims remain a 
challenge to the legal approach.54 
 
I will then move to the legal theoretical debate between declaratory and constitutive 
theories on recognition. In my review of how International Relations (IR) literature 
has considered recognition, I will point out that most IR schools take a constitutive 
approach. I will review the different international relation approaches towards 
recognition including Rationalists as well as Constructivist and English school 
approaches. As described in the Introduction this thesis takes a foreign policy approach 
towards recognition and consider Germany’s recognition of Kosovo this particularly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Fierstein, D. (2008) Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident Analysis of Legality, Policy 
and Future Implications. Boston University International Law Journal 26.2 (2008): 417–42; p. 440. 
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in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. For this I will introduce the concept of 
recognition as conflict management, which was developed in the case of the European 
Union’s policy towards the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.55 Both Caplan and 
Zaum have described the recognition of Croatia as a conflict management tool.56 The 
main evidence for their conclusion is the EU’s internationalisation of the conflict 
through recognition, and the conditionality attached to the recognition of post-
Yugoslav states.57 I will describe these two aspects in greater detail and explain how 
through this approach provides a lens to analyse the political and foreign policy aspects 
of recognition. 
 
In the recognition process of Croatia, the foreign policy aspect has been discussed in 
the literature and particularly in reference to Germany’s approach. I will therefore 
point out the specific aspects in which foreign policy of recognition influenced the 
conflict management approach towards recognitions: The interpretation of the conflict 
by Germany, the support for self-determination of Croatia among German domestic 
actors and policy makers, and Germany’s role and approach in the multilateral 
negotiations on the coordinated recognition by European states.  
 
1.2  Secession and Recognition 
The recognition of acts of secession has been controversial in the international 
system.58 In its broader definition, secession refers to the creation of a new state on 
territory of an existing state, often referred to as a ‘parent state’.59 Although territories 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Note that in the period discussed in this chapter the European Community was renamed the European 
Union. To keep the description in this chapter consistent I will refer to the EU or European Union 
throughout, including for events which took place before the name change. 
56 Caplan, R. (2005) Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia, Cambridge: University 
Press; Zaum (2007) The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International State building, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
56 Note that Croatia and Slovenia were recognised at the same time. However, in the literature and 
political debate on recognition, their recognition usually refers mainly to Croatia. For this reason, and 
for brevity, I therefore only refer to the recognition of Croatia in this thesis. 
57 Caplan (2005); Zaum (2007). 
58 Ker-Lindsay (2011) Not such a ‘sui generis’ case after all: assessing the ICJ opinion on Kosovo, 
Nationalities Papers, 39:1, p. 1. 
59 Definition taken from Peter Radan discussed in Pavkovic, A. and Radan, P. (2011) The Ashgate 
Companion to Secession, Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 3. 
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that have seceded with permission are generally accepted, there is a deep aversion to 
recognising states that declare independence without the consent of the ‘parent state’. 
The territorial integrity of states remains the fundamental principle for coexistence 
among states. Codified in the UN Charter is the principle of the prohibition of threats 
by other states to territorial integrity, including the use of force, or undermining 
political independence.60 States are therefore reluctant to recognise the existence of 
contested states and thereby appear unwilling to undermine the territorial integrity of 
the ‘parent state’ or enable processes that facilitate secession of a territory.61 This 
reluctance is also evident from the fact that new states emerging from acts of unilateral 
secession have not been admitted to the United Nations.62 Thus, the international 
community is averse to encouraging or condoning secession action against the will of 
the former ‘parent state’.63 Nonetheless, new states do emerge. Secessionist 
movements, decolonisation and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the former 
Yugoslavia have all led to the creation of new independent states. In the following 
section, I will outline how international law has approached these developments. 
 
1.3  Territorial Integrity, Self-Determination and Secession 
The traditional approach towards statehood in customary international law was 
codified in 1933 in the Montevideo convention.64 This set the criteria for a state as: (1) 
holds a permanent population, (2) has a defined territory, (3) has a government, and 
(4) has the capacity to enter into relations with other states.65 The implication of these 
criteria is that a state would then be eligible for recognition. However, the Convention 
also states, in Article 3, that the existence of the state is independent from any external 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Mainly in Article 2, particular 2(4) as ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ United Nations (1945) Charter of 
the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
61 Crawford, J. (1999) State Practice and International Law in Relation to the Secession, British 
Yearbook of International Law (1998) 69 (1): 85-117, p. 87. 
62 Crawford, J. (2007) The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford Scholarship Online, p. 390. 
63 Ker-Lindsay (2011) p. 7. 
64 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec.26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 
19 
65 Ibid Article 1. 
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recognition.66 These criteria indicate a commitment to de facto statehood and give a 
priority to the control over a territory, which was very much in line with thinking on 
secession during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.67 The criteria, however, 
do not address the questions of legitimacy or self-determination of states, nor the issue 
of whether a state’s existence may infringe on the territorial integrity of another or 
what effect recognition or non-recognition would have on this state. These are 
questions which have been central to the theory and practice on secession and 
recognition by states. Additionally, the emergence of the political principle of self-
determination has affected notions of the legitimacy of a state in the post-War era. 
 
It was not until the 19th century that self-determination became part of the romantic 
nationalist notions of statehood, as populations sought to establish national identities.68 
Legally, these nationalist notions of self-determination had been excluded in the early 
to mid 19th century, although they then gained significant support politically in Europe 
by the end of the century.69 With new Leninist and Wilsonian ideas of self-
determination and the dissolution of the European empires, the aftermath of the First 
World War saw an increasing rise in movements characterised by romantic nationalist 
approaches, and thus a rise in challenges to traditional statehood.70 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Article 3 discussed in Fierstein (2009) p. 439. The theoretical implications of this will be discussed 
below in 2.4 in regards to declaratory and constitutive theories of recognition.  
67 Fabry (2010) Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 
1776, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 69. 
68 Koskenniemi, M. (1994) National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43 (1994): 241–69, p. 249-250. 
69 Ibid, p. 253. 
70 Ibid, p. 254. Cassese summarises political claims for self-determination, which differ significantly 
from claims based on legal interpretations, as including: first, the right to territorial changes after a 
plebiscite, second, the democratic election of rulers (the Wilsonian approach), third, the emancipation 
from colonial rule, or fourth, secession by minorities. An in depth discussion of this literature is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. It is however important to note the progressing political debate on this subject 
since the French Revolution in 1789, while the legal approach considered self-determination only a 
political principle and prioritised territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Cassese, A. (1995) Self-
Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 32. 
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1.3.1   Internal and External Self-Determination  
In the interwar period, the League of Nation responded to secessionist claims by 
establishing and encouraging legal settlements and processes rather than embracing 
nationalism.71 In this period, the difference between internal and external self-
determination clarified the meaning of self-determination as a legal principle. External 
self-determination implies independence from outside political control, hence an 
independent state, while internal self-determination refers to the domestic political 
self-determination of a population and can include constitutional measures that give 
greater autonomy or increased rights to minorities.72  
 
The League of Nations established this distinction in the interpretation of self-
determination in the case of the Finnish Åland islands in 1920. In response to the 
Swedish minority’s claim for independence, the League of Nations established a 
Committee of Jurists, which presented their opinion in 1921. This decision provided a 
discussion of self-determination in international law in the aftermath of the first World 
War. The Committee highlighted that although during the first World War claims for 
self-determination had increased and become central to political debate, the League of 
Nations did not mention this principle in its charter.73 It stated that while there was no 
legal principle of self-determination or right of secession, there was one of territorial 
integrity and that only a state could decide to shed part of its territory or give 
independence to a territory, one possibility being to let a population vote in a 
plebiscite.74 Should, however, a state actively suppress a part of its population, this 
may be a matter in which the League of Nations should intervene. The committee 
clearly stated that this appeared not to be the case for the Åland islands.75 To balance 
the principle of self-determination with that of territorial integrity in cases of claims 
of secession, the committee suggested measures that would strengthen the internal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Koskenniemi (1994) p. 254. Cites specifically the arrangements for the Saar Region, Danzig Upper 
Silesia and Aland islands. 
72 Lauterpacht, H. (1947) Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 289. 
73 League of Nations (1920) Report of the International Committee of Jurists, League of Nations Official 
Journal, Special Supplement No. 3, p. 5. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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freedom to self-determination granted to minorities.76 The creation of this distinction 
between internal and external self-determination demonstrated the reluctance for 
allowing unilateral secession despite the emergence of the political principle of self-
determination.77 
 
1.3.2   Decolonisation and Self-Determination 
The principle of self-determination was included in the UN Charter of 1945.78 The 
principle cited in this context was, however, one of external self-determination, hence 
referring to the rejection of external influences into domestic affairs.79 The 
decolonisation process began in the 19th century, but in the 20th century, the United 
Nations coordinated the process, which was framed mainly as being one of recognising 
the external self-determination of former colonial territories from European empires. 
Decolonisation, as set out in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, facilitated the liberation of territories from 
colonial subjugation, which was deemed irreconcilable with the UN charter.80 Thus, 
in the case of decolonisation, self-determination referred to external not internal 
aspects: its purpose was to emancipate territories from colonial rule rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Ibid p. 6. 
77 Fierstein (2009) p. 426; Crawford (1999) p. 93. 
78 United Nations (1945) Art 1(2) ‘To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace’. Art. 55 ‘With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. higher 
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural 
and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’ 
79 Fierstein (2009) p. 427; Higgins, R. (2003) ‘Self-Determination and Secession’ in Dahlitz, J. eds. Self 
Determination and Secession and International Law, New York: The United Nations, p. 23. 
80 United Nations (1960a) UN Resolution 1514(XV) Declaration On the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples Adopted by General Assembly 14 December 1960 U.N. Doc. A/4684. 
Some provisions for decolonisation had been made previously in the Covenant of the League of Nations 
Art 22 and Chapter XI of the UN Charter. (Crawford (2007) p. 603) See also United Nations (1960b) 
General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) A/RES/1541(XV) Principles which should guide members in 
determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e 
of the Charter (Dec 15 1960). 
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introducing external self-determination as a legal principle for other territories.81 
 
The priority of external self-determination was upheld through the principle of uti 
possidetis [lat. as you possess] as the underpinning legal concept.82 Uti possidetis in 
this context meant that new states were able to declare their independence within 
previously existing colonial administrative boundaries. It had first been applied to self-
determination claims in the cases of Latin American states claiming independence in 
the 19th century.83 Fabry has provided an in-depth historical analysis of 19th century 
practices, which took into consideration both de facto control of a territory and 
introduced political requirements for recognition, such as ‘standards of civilisation’ as 
expressed in the Treaty of Vienna. In the period of decolonisation, Latin American 
states were recognised by Europeans to avoid largely unrecognised former colonial 
territories, despite the fact that in certain cases the de facto criteria had not been 
fulfilled.84  
 
The principle of uti possidetis was applied again to the decolonisation of African states 
in the 20th century. Here the borders to be maintained were those between different 
colonial powers, rather than former administrative borders.85 Uti possidetis was not 
used to the exclusion of other practices of establishing postcolonial borders. In some 
cases, agreements were negotiated between colonial powers, but uti possidetis was the 
underlying framework.86 Those applying uti possidetis sought to provide order to the 
breakup of colonial territories and prevent contested or unclaimed territories; 
application of the principle also prioritised the external self-determination from 
colonial powers over internal self-determination.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 The concept originated from Roman Law to decide on legitimate ownership in property disputes. The 
doctrine was changed from private property to apply to state sovereignty to facilitate the decolonisation 
process. Cassese (1995) p. 74. 
82 Ibid 
83 Ratner, S.R. (1996) Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Oct. 1996) pp. 590-624 p. 593. 
84 Fabry (2010) p. 69 and Caplan (2005) p. 52. 
85 Ratner (1996) p. 596. 
86 Ibid, p. 599. 
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The UN and its member states reinterpreted the principle of internal self-determination 
after decolonisation, giving it greater importance.87 The UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, and Cultural Rights in 1966 refer 
specifically to self-determination in the internal sense.88 The 1970 Declaration on 
Friendly Relations89 was interpreted as expanding the meaning of self-determination 
to include aspects of internal self-determination. However, it also included a so-called 
‘saving clause’, which reiterated the importance of the territorial integrity of states.90 
While it does not explicitly refer to secession or prohibit it, the declaration emphasises 
the importance of states adhering to the obligations set out in the declaration and the 
territorial integrity of those who do so.91 The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 also explicitly 
stated the validity of upholding self-determination outside of the decolonisation 
process.92 The priority remained, however, on territorial integrity and the act did not 
establish a principle of right of secession.93 
 
1.3.3   Dissolution at the End of the Cold War 
The break ups of the East European communist and socialist regimes, including the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, were approached as a dissolution of 
unions rather than as secessionist claims based on self-determination.94 However, they 
did reinforce certain principle that shape international approaches towards secession, 
not least of all the principle of uti possidetis. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Koskenniemi (1994) p. 241. 
88 United Nations (1966a) UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 Art 1; United Nations (1996b) UN 
General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, General Assembly (1966b) Art. 1.; Ratner (1996) 
p. 612. 
89 United Nations (1970) UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV) 
90 Crawford (1999) p. 113. 
91 United Nations (1970); Ratner (1996) p. 611. 
92 Ratner (1996) p. 612. 
93 Koskenniemi (1994) p. 242; Cassese (1995) p. 289. 
94 Fabry (2015) p. 501. A discussion of the EU policy towards the Republics of the former Soviet Union 
other than the application of EU conditionality is beyond the scope of this but discussed in greater detail 
in Ibid, p. 181-189. 
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In the case of Yugoslavia, the European Community established the Arbitration 
Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia consisting of five presidents of 
European constitutional courts under the presidency of Robert Badinter (hereinafter 
the Badinter Commission). The Commission was tasked with establishing legal 
guidelines on the recognition of the states emerging from the dissolution, which was 
initiated by secessionist claims from some of the former constituent republics. 
However, the Commission interpreted the process as one of dissolution, and thus did 
not consider the independence claims under the self-determination justification. The 
Commission oversaw, the management of the dissolution of the Federal Republic, 
rather than any consideration of self-determination claims.95 The Commission 
therefore applied uti possidetis by granting recognition along the formerly established 
federal borders between the former Republics. The European Community then 
established conditions for recognition, which included the provision of protection of 
minorities in the new independent states, thus encouraging internal self-
determination.96 The principle of uti possidetis was intended to avoid further 
breakaways from groups such as Serbian minorities in Croatia, Kosovo Albanians in 
Serbia, or Serbian minorities in Kosovo.97 Below, I will discuss in detail the political 
aspects of the use of uti possidetis in this particularly recognition process, a legal 
analysis of which shows a continuing reluctance to embrace secessionist movements 
and contested states: instead, the international community framed the case of 
Yugoslavia as a dissolution. This commitment can also be seen in the fact that the 
former Republics became members of the United Nations only once they had all 
declared independence, including Serbia and Montenegro, and recognised each 
other.98  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Crawford (1999) p. 100. 
96 Ibid, p. 103.  
97 Caplan (2005) p. 77. 
98 Crawford (1999) p. 102. The case of Montenegro’s secession from Serbia in 2006 is an example of a 
secession approved by the former parent state. In 1992, Montenegro joined with Serbia in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), although it would have qualified for independence under uti possidetis. 
A referendum was held of which the democratic process was questioned. [Friis, K. (2007) The 
Referendum in Montenegro: The EU’s ‘Postmodern Diplomacy’ European Foreign Affairs Review 12: 
67–88, 2007] However, in the early 2000s, domestic support for the independence of Montenegro grew. 
The EU brokered the Belgrade agreement between Serbia and Montenegro in 2003 and approved a 
referendum to take place three years later. [Friis (2007) pp. 69-78] The FRY was renamed State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro in this three-year period. The referendum resulted in a pro-independence 
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Despite these developments regarding the self-determination principle since the 
Second World War and decolonisation, legally there has not been increased support 
for greater external self-determination or a right to secession. The case of the 
secessionist claim of Quebec from Canada is a key example that highlighted this 
continuity. In this case, the Constitutional Court ruled in 1998 that Quebec’s self-
determination was fulfilled within the State of Canada and that there was no support 
for a claim for external self-determination. The court justified its decision referring to 
the facts that the Quebecois are not a repressed or colonised people and have access to 
political rights within the Canadian state.99 Using similar arguments to the case of 
Åland islands, the court reiterated the importance of internal self-determination rather 
than external self-determination. However, while the court concluded that secession 
would not be justified legally, it did point out that de facto secession would be 
impossible to prevent under international law.100 Thereby, the decision acknowledged 
the tension and limits within international law in providing clarity to claims of 
secession, and thus the political implications of secessionist movements.101  
 
The legal situation remains unclear. Whilst, international legal documents do not 
explicitly forbid or establish clear sanctions against secession, territorial integrity 
remains the priority. Moreover, there is also no clear process for secession and no 
institutions exist that might facilitate any potential secession. The closest 
approximation to a framework for managing secession was the that used during 
decolonisation; however, the legal framework that successfully managed 
decolonisation emerged from a very specific historical context and did not embrace 
internal self-determination, as independence was framed by uti possidetis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vote. [Fawn (2008) The Kosovo- and Montenegro - Effect’, International Affairs 84: 2 (2008) pp. 269–
294, p. 276] The Belgrade agreement had defined a minimum of 55% majority as a requirement for 
independence. Montenegro was quickly recognised by Serbia as well as the EU and all UN Security 
Council members. [Fawn (2008) p. 275; Friis (2007) p. 83] 
99 Crawford (2007) p. 411; Supreme Court of Canada (1998) Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 
2 S.C.R. 217 No 61 para 155, 115 ILR 537, 595. 
100 Crawford (2007) p. 389; Supreme Court of Canada (1998). 
101 Fierstein (2009) p. 440. 
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Support for self-determination as a justification for secession has been weak unless in 
cases of specific historical dissolutions of former empires or federal states, such as 
decolonisation or the end of the communist or socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. An 
example in which a unilateral declaration was supported by the international 
community is the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan, in which case 
humanitarian issues were given as a justification. However, even in this case, 
Bangladesh was only admitted to the United Nations after its recognition by Pakistan 
in 1974.102 Despite the humanitarian considerations in the Bangladeshi case, these 
have not been applied to other cases: often cited examples are Iraqi Kurds or Sri 
Lankan Tamils.103 Thus, the concept of ‘remedial secession’, through which states can 
claim independence based on injustice inflicted upon them through persecution or even 
genocidal acts by the ‘parent’ state and thereby triggering some form of stronger self-
determination case has been weak historically. However, I will demonstrate in this 
thesis such arguments have been used in supporting the independence of Kosovo, 
 
1.4  Declaratory and Constitutive Recognition Theories 
Above I have discussed the issue of secession and how the emergence of new states 
has been facilitated by the international community. A related issue, touched on in this 
Chapter above is that of recognition by other states. What role does recognition play 
and can states exist without being recognised by the entire international community? 
From a legal perspective, there are two broad approaches to this question. These are 
the declaratory and constitutive theories. Declaratory theory argues that the 
declaration of independence in itself is, and should be, central to the process of gaining 
independence. in contrast, the constitutive approach concentrates on the importance of 
achieving recognition from other states.104 As I will discuss below, while international 
law has been dominated by declaratory theory, the IR literature has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Crawford (2007) p. 180; Fierstein (2009) p. 437; Fabry (2015,) p. 502. 
103 Ker-Lindsay (2011) p. 233; Fierstein (2009) p. 431; Crawford (1999) p. 108. 
104 Eckert, A.E. (2002) Constructing States. The Role of the International Community in the Creation 
of States Journal of Public and international Affairs, 13 pp. 19-39, p. 21-23. 
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predominantly based on constitutive theory and particularly those authors who focus 
on norms and values have taken the political issue of recognition into consideration.  
 
From the declaratory perspective, the practices of recognition of new states was 
traditionally treated according to natural law and was based on customs, which 
considered material attributes of states to be the defining feature and refers to the 
Montevideo Convention of 1933. The convention sets out practical de facto aspects as 
the defining features and necessary requirements for a state.105 With this approach, 
states recognise these objectively measurable and material attributes rather than judge 
with normative consideration whether a state should be independent. Recognition in 
itself is not acknowledged: it is explicitly excluded in article 3.106 The declaration of 
independence and the fulfilment of these criteria are sufficient for the state to exist.107 
This approach does not engage with the political aspect of recognition or non-
recognition. It does not discuss the effect of recognition on a declaration of 
independence or the de facto existence of the state.108 The approach emphasises the 
practicalities of a state existing as an independent entity rather than the legitimacy of 
its existence or its government.109  
 
In contrast, constitutive theory rejects the premise of the factual understanding of 
declaratory theory and is based rather on the assumption that for states to exist they 
need to be acknowledged within the international system as a subject. This theory 
emphasises the legal nature of states and their obligations to international society, and 
thus, to be part of this society, recognition from other states is necessary.110 In the legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 (1) permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) a government and the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). 
106 Article 3 specifically excludes the necessity of recognition for a state to ‘defend its integrity and 
independence (…)’ Similarly in the case of Deutsche Continental Gas Gesellschaft, v Polish State 
(1929) AD 11, Art 13 the mixed German-Polish Arbitration Tribunal that recognition is not constitutive 
and that a state does not need to be undisputed in its territory but needs to have ‘sufficient constituency.’ 
Discussed also in Caplan (2005) p. 56. 
107 Eckert (2002) p. 21, Fabry (2010) p. 5. 
108 Crawford, J. (1976) The Criteria for Statehood in International Law British Yearbook of International 
Law 48 (1): 93-182. p. 22, See also Caplan (2005) p. 58-57. 
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literature, Lauterpacht considers it a duty for others to recognise functioning states. 
Müllerson, as well as Hillgruber, points out that recognition can act as a strengthening 
mechanism or even substitute for unfulfilled conditions as set out by the Montevideo 
Convention.111 Thus, while declaratory theory rejects the political process, constitutive 
theory sees it as central to the creation of a state. It does not, however, resolve the 
tensions which arise between the principles of self-determination and territorial 
integrity. 
 
1.5  International Relations and Recognition Theories 
The debate between constitutive and declaratory theories originated from the legal 
literature. In the International Relations literature, the question of whether recognition 
matters, is related to the core issue of our understanding of sovereignty and the role of 
the state. As I will show below, some Neorealist accounts with a more fixed 
understanding of sovereignty of states are implicitly compatible with the declaratory 
approach.112 However, because of the more complex notions of sovereignty and the 
acknowledgement of the social aspects of the international system by schools of 
thought in IR, the constitutive approach has been dominant in International Relations 
literature.  
 
The traditional understanding in the International Relations literature of sovereignty is 
that of Westphalian sovereignty, understood as strong and unshakable sovereignty of 
a state, both through the principles of domestic authority and non-interference.113 The 
Westphalian reference comes from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. However, 
Krasner points out that this is historically incorrect as this system was only in place in 
the late 1700s.114 The acceptance of European states of each other’s sovereignty and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Lauterpacht (1947) p. 6; Müllerson (1994) International Law, Rights and Politics, London: 
Routledge, p. 123; Hillgruber, C. (1998). The Admission of New States to the International Community’ 
9 European Journal of International Law p. 493, discussed in Caplan (2005) p. 59-60. 
112 This will be discussed in regards to Waltz in particular.  
113 Coggins, B. (2014) Power Politics & State Formation in the 20th Century: The Dynamics of 
Recognition Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 20. 
114 Krasner (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
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the consequent assumption of anarchy in the international system, is usually associated 
with a Westphalian system and embraced by structural realism.115 Waltz’s structural 
realist, or Neorealist theory, defined a generation’s understanding of IR in the 20th 
century. It described the international system in a state of anarchy and attributed the 
sovereignty of states to the absence of a higher authority.116 Waltz translated the 
philosophical tradition of Machiavelli or Hobbes into a resolute systemic theory for 
the international. States were understood as sovereigns acting in their self-interest. 117 
Alternative and more traditional realist notions of sovereignty, such as those of Carr, 
who considered sovereignty as an inherently and increasingly blurred concept, were 
not incorporated into the Neorealist approach.118 The Westphalian model of 
sovereignty is an assumption that underpins Neorealist and Neoliberal theories, as well 
as some Constructivist concepts. Such approaches can accept the declaratory theory of 
recognition as they take sovereignty to be a finite and measurable concept. However, 
most schools of IR take a more complex view of sovereignty.  
 
In his critique of the traditional understanding of sovereignty, Krasner pointed out four 
ways in which it has been conceptualised within International Relations. These are 
Westphalian sovereignty, mainly defined by non-interference from other actors, Legal 
Sovereignty, which refers to the recognition of states by others, Domestic Sovereignty, 
the internal authority and legitimacy of a state and, finally, Interdependence 
Sovereignty, a state’s ability to control its interaction with other states.119 Krasner 
claims that these assumptions of sovereignty are legendary rather than based on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Coggins (2014). For a comprehensive discussion see Coggins from p. 21in relation to recognition 
practices. She provides a historical discussion of the emergence of the principles in relation and its 
importance for the international system. 
116 Biersteker, T.J. and Weber, C. (1996) The Social Construction of state Sovereignty in Biersteker, 
T.J. and Weber, C. eds. State Sovereignty as Social Construct; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 5. 
117 Structural Realism is fundamentally defined by five assumptions: Firstly, states are the main actors 
in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system, secondly, states possess some offensive 
military capabilities, thirdly, the security dilemma which is defined by state’s uncertainty about the 
intentions of others, fourthly, state survival is the key goal of the state and, finally, states are rational 
actors [Mearsheimer, J. (2006) ‘Structural Realism’, in Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. eds. 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Oxford: University Press, p. 74]. 
118 Bierstecker and Weber (2011) p. 5; Carr, E.H. (1964) The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939. New 
York: Harper & Row, p. 229.  
119 Krasner (1999) p. 4, specifically ‘Neorealism begin with the assumption that Westphalian sovereign 
states are the constitutive actors of the system.’  
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empirical evidence. Particularly relevant, in view of the legal debate on internal and 
external self-determination, Krasner argues that Westphalian Sovereignty has been 
compromised by external intervention and Domestic Sovereignty has been weak. 
According to him the assumed fundamental aspects of ‘territory, recognition, 
autonomy and control’, do not reflect state practice.120  
 
As already mentioned above, even among Realists and Rationalists, more nuanced 
approaches to sovereignty have been developed. Neoliberalism shares the anarchical 
assumption of the international system with Neorealists. However, Neorealists 
consider International Relations to be institutionalised to some extent to mitigate the 
effects of anarchy.121 Regime theory focuses specifically on the relationship between 
international law and International Relations from a rationalist perspective and has 
developed within Neoliberalism, while it has also received some traction among 
Neorealists. Regime theorists argue that on specific issues states collaborate and work 
with ‘common principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures’ by building 
regimes.122 Regime theorists are divided on the degree of formality of such regimes or 
the effectiveness of implementing sanctions against states that do not act according to 
regimes. Depending on a realist, liberal, or constructivist approach, regime theorists 
also disagree on whether the basis of their approach towards regimes should be power, 
interest or knowledge. 123 Regime theorists therefore acknowledge shared rules in the 
international system, the role of international institutions and a more complex 
interrelationship with sovereignty than in the traditional Westphalian definition. 
Caplan argues that the rules, norms and institutions established around recognition up 
until the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be understood as a regime. He argues this, 
despite the fact that legal principles have been contested at times, as in the case of the 
tension between the principle of self-determination and territorial integrity. For regime 
theorists, regimes exist as long as they serve the interests that are reflected in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Ibid, specifically spelled out in p. 8 and p. 220. 
121 Caplan (2005) p. 81, Keohane, R.O. (1989) International Institutions and State Power: Essays in 
International Relations Theory Boulder, CO: Westview, p. vii. 
122 Krasner (1982) p. 185. 
123 Caplan (2005) p. 84. 
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principles. Thus Caplan points out that the recognition regimes which allow a state to 
gain independence reflect the interest of the recogniser.124  
 
The discussion of recognition has been particularly compatible for IR schools that 
follow social approaches. Constructivists or authors of the English School consider 
sovereignty less of a given assumption but analyse the interaction of states’ behaviours 
with the norm. For the English school, the Westphalian model represents a norm 
accepted within International Society.125 Overall, it considers the rules and norms that 
states establish amongst themselves and guides state behaviour.126 English School 
authors have tried to explain the discrepancies between the Westphalian system and 
reality but have sought to do so by explaining shared ideas. Criticising this approach, 
Krasner argues that leaders are able to choose between material and ideational 
resources rather than being led mainly by norms and values.127 Due to its inclination 
to engage with legal debates through a normative lens, the English School is the 
theoretical approach in IR that has engaged more comprehensively with the question 
of recognition of new states in international society. Fabry highlights that, for most 
English School authors, mutual recognition is a fundamental aspect of a functioning 
International Society.128 A debate thus emerges in regards to the origin of the state and 
the question of whether a state can exist without recognition. Manning and James 
argue that sovereignty is possible without recognition. In contrast, Wight argues that, 
since sovereignty is defined by international law resulting from shared norms, one 
cannot claim sovereignty outside the recognition of this community of states. He thus 
spells out the rationale for a wholly constitutive approach to recognition.129  
 
Constructivism in International Relations has also considered recognition in great 
detail. Constructivist approaches have focused on changing interpretations of 
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125 Krasner (1999) p. 44. 
126 Coggins (2014) p. 26. 
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129 Ibid, p. 3. 
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sovereignty.130 Both Systemic and Social Constructivists consider the construction and 
external aspect of sovereignty as being central to recognition. Social Constructivists 
highlight changing norms towards sovereignty and criteria for membership in 
international society. They are interested in change in the international system and thus 
challenge the, in Ruggie’s words, reproductive logic of Neorealism, which is unable 
to explain change in the international system. 131 Thus, any change in the interpretation 
of sovereignty is also inherently connected to the issue of recognition. Constructivists 
consider sovereignty a social construct and recognition of such sovereignty is a central 
aspect in the creation of the state itself.132  
 
Among Constructivists there is general agreement on the social construction of 
recognition. Wendt’s Systemic Constructivism also accepts the social construction of 
states.133 He offers an alternative view of the anarchical system, in which states not 
only strive for security, as in the neorealist logic, but also for recognition in the 
international system. Thus, in a clear constitutive interpretation of recognition, he 
argues that states seek to become part of an international society and to be recognised 
as a unit within this system.134  
 
Other Constructivists go further and also consider aspects of statehood, such as 
territory, population and authority to be socially constructed.135 Those who engage 
with the concept of recognition rejected the rationalist explanation, which assumes the 
state as a rational actor, and instead have focused on recognition though identity 
building.136 Such accounts have focused on the interaction between the recognising 
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state and the recognised or unrecognised state. 137 Authors have borrowed mainly from 
sociological and psychological literature on recognition; Such authors have offered an 
affective dimension to the interpretation of recognition, which challenges the 
traditional more rationalist approach.138 To what extent application of these theories 
originally developed to account for individual behaviour can be applied to the 
psychology of the state remains a debate in this specific literature.139 The literature has 
also moved beyond considering only states and formal interaction as part of the 
recognition process. Some consider acts of recognition beyond formal diplomatic or 
legal recognition practices, taking into consideration informal and social acts of 
recognition.140 This has included consideration of actors beyond the state who seek 
recognition.141  
 
Critical theorists have sought to move away from the psychological emphasis towards 
examining normative implications of recognition that take into consideration relations 
of power. This approach builds on the tradition of questioning the origins and 
normative approach of international law.142 The negative consequences of recognition, 
such as its exclusive nature or the reproduction of social injustices, have been central 
to sociological discussions of recognition in normative political theory. The literature 
in International Relations has also begun to engage with theses questions more 
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recently.143 Finally, with greater attention to the issue of recognition, the practice and 
implication of non-recognition has also emerged in both the rationalist and 
constructivist approaches.144 
 
Thus, while, declaratory theory is a conventional concept in the legal debate on 
recognition, it is applied only by a minority of IR schools of thought, such as by some 
authors of the English School, and it can be considered to be a consequence of 
Neorealist logic. However, authors who apply declaratory theory do not engage with 
the issue of recognition to a great extent. Above, I have briefly outlined the thinking 
of schools of thought that have discussed recognition with a constitutive assumption 
and the recent developments in the literature. 
 
Below I will explore the interpretation of recognition as intervention to manage a  
conflict. This approach has been applied in both rationalist and constructivist 
approaches and can be applied to the EU’s recognition policy during the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia as a conflict management tool.  
 
1.6  Recognition as Conflict Management  
With a constitutive approach comes therefore a consideration of the the political 
aspects of recognition it this is also applicable to an analysis for recognition as a 
foreign policy decision. Above I have outlined how the international community has 
attempted to provide legal guidelines and rationales for recognition, facilitate this 
complex process, and balance new claims of independence with the territorial integrity 
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of existing states. From this the tensions between the practice of recognition through 
pure de facto and measurable understandings of statehood on the one hand and the 
political considerations of recognising states on the other are evident. Here I will set 
out how specifically the approach of understanding recognition as conflict 
management provides a framework for the political considerations in the process of 
recognition. 
 
Despite the legal principles established, the Montevideo Convention or uti possidetis, 
political aspects have played an important role for recognising states throughout 
history. Above I have mentioned that in the 19th century some Latin American states 
were recognised prematurely as independent, as they had not fulfilled the de facto 
criteria.145 At the same time, normative conditions were applied, too. For example, 
Britain demanded that Brazil abolish slavery as a condition for its recognition. This 
shows the clear influence of normative considerations of recognition.146 I have 
discussed how the decolonisation of African states in the 20th century is generally 
understood as an application of the principle of external self-determination to facilitate 
independence from colonial powers. The recognitions of these new states have also 
included normative aspects. Some states, such as the Congo, were recognised before 
fulfilling the de facto criteria; however, Rhodesia, remained unrecognised as the 
international community boycotted the racist white minority regime.147 Ultimately, the 
process of recognition was driven by international actors and former colonial powers 
rather than being defined by those states gaining independence. Coggins therefore 
points out the importance of considering the interests of recognising states in the 
process. She highlights the top-down social influence in the creation of new states and 
the necessity for International Relations literature to engage with this political aspect. 
She argues that states seek to establish themselves in regards to the conventional 
Montevideo criteria as independent and pursue international recognition at the same 
time.148  
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Thus, authors have engaged with the political and strategic aspects of the process of 
recognition. Such approaches have build the conceptual understanding based on the 
case of the recognition of the post-Yugoslav states. Such an analysis of the process 
takes a constitutive approach. Above I have briefly outlined how, in the case of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, the international community set out a legal and political 
process for recognition. Uti possidetis was applied in regards to drawing out the border 
of the newly independent states in the Western Balkans. The Badinter Commission 
treated the process as the dissolution of Yugoslavia and hence saw the recognition of 
the new states as a matter of managing this change. Independence was not granted 
based on self-determination claims.149 Additionally, the European Union applied 
conditions for these new states to be recognised, which focused mainly on minority 
protections and aspects of the rule of law.150  
 
In reference to the dissolution of the SFRY, Caplan and Zaum have described this 
process as one in which recognition was used as an intervention in the conflict.151 
Caplan has described the recognition of Croatia by European states, thus, as a conflict 
management and intervention strategy.152 Conflict management implies an interim 
policy from external actors after violence has erupted, thus fighting can no longer be 
prevented, and before a longer term conflict resolution process can be put in place.153 
However, by using the term ‘conflict management’, I refer to the policy undertaken by 
external actors who seek to create the conditions for conflict resolution in the future. 
Since the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were considered mainly of an internal 
nature, conflict resolution would only be possible with the engagement of internal 
conflict parties at a later stage. Conflict management tools, according to McGarry and 
O’Leary, can include variations of new governance structures, which can give specific 
rights and autonomy to specific groups in a territory.154 Thus, similarly to the legal 
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provisions discussed above, these tools are different forms of granting internal self-
determination to minorities or parties of the conflict. Caplan considers recognising 
independence as the internationalisation of the conflict and therefore an elevated 
version of such conflict management.  
 
The other conflict management aspect of recognition is, according to Caplan, the use 
of conditionality attached to recognition.155 He argues that change in the traditional 
recognition regime to the use of conditionality can be explained with strategic interest 
of recognising states, in this case the EU, who sought greater involvement and 
participation in the newly arising state of Croatia.156 
 
Caplan’s rationalist interpretation of the recognition process has also been echoed in 
constructivist approaches. For Zaum particularly conditional recognition represents 
the establishment of further conditions to join a society of states.157 Above I mentioned 
that constructivists consider a consequence of anarchy in the international system to 
be that states seek recognition and that competition for recognition can lead to 
conflict.158 Therefore, the constructivist approach also considers the conditionality 
from the EU as being an involvement in the struggle between the two conflicting 
parties.  
 
Therefore, I will now describe in more detail the interpretation of the recognition of 
Croatia as an interventionist and conflict management policy. I will focus on the two 
core elements, internationalisation of a conflict and conditional recognition.159 
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1.6.1   Internationalisation of the Conflict 
For Caplan, the recognition by EU member states of the former Republics of 
Yugoslavia had a clear strategic aspect and internationalising the conflict was central 
to this logic.160 The EU sought to grant an international legal personality through 
recognition and thereby allow international intervention in the conflict, which 
otherwise would have remained a civil war and an thus internal conflict.161  
 
‘Internationalising’ a conflict by recognition goes to the core of the tension between 
the principle of self-determination for the peoples in the newly arising state, on the one 
hand, and, the territorial integrity of the former ‘parent state’, on the other. As seen in 
case law in examples such as the Åland Islands or Quebec, secessionist claims have 
been mainly considered invalid if using self-determination claims. Instead, courts have 
promoted advanced forms of federalism, political autonomy and provisions for 
minority rights, thereby highlighting the difference between internal and external self-
determination.162 
 
When uti possidetis was applied in the case of the former SFRY, this was done to 
facilitate its dissolution and to prevent any further secessionist claims outside the 
former federal borders.163 The legal concept of uti possidetis was used as a precedent. 
Caplan questions the inevitable use of uti possidetis and considers it a political choice, 
arguing that the EU was not obliged to do so.164 Additionally, he argues, uti possidetis 
was not created to be implemented outside of the decolonisation process and hence 
was to some extent misapplied.165 He emphasises that International Law is not static 
and practice within it changes continuously.166 Thereby echoing Lauterpacht’s point 
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that recognition is not a matter governed by law but a question of policy.167 Zaum 
interprets the use of the EU’s decision to uphold the concept of uti possidetis as a clear 
indication that the international community was unwilling to put the international order 
of the time at risk. Despite the interventionist intention in the conflict the EU intended 
to maintain the existing borders as far as possible.168 Caplan therefore argues that the 
rationale behind the recognition was ‘to mitigate the conflict and prevent further 
expansion’.169 Due to this limits of internationalisation the conflict through uti 
possidetis the conditional recognition constitute the second aspect of the more 
interventionist recognition policy. 
 
1.6.2   Conditional Recognition  
Policy conditionality has long been used by states to influence the policy of others. 
Often conditionality is associated with aid provided on condition of the appliance of 
socio-economic policies, which the receiving state may otherwise not follow. 
Increasingly conditionality by Western states has also included the implementation of 
Human Rights policies, the European Union having increasingly made use of this 
approach.170  
 
Within the context of recognition, Zaum refers to the increased use of political 
conditions beyond those of the Montevideo criteria or universal Human Rights, which 
in the case of the former Yugoslavia focused explicitly on the internal governance of 
the new states in reference to minority rights.171 Such policies also existed in the 
decolonisation era but were exceptions. Conditions included the rejection of certain 
forms of racist regimes or the abolition of specific policies before a new state would 
be recognised.172 This normative approach towards recognition presupposes positive 
sovereignty. With positive sovereignty a state needs to not only fulfil the empirical 
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conditions of statehood, in the Montevideo sense, but also needs to provide politically 
for its citizens. Positive sovereignty exists in contrast to negative sovereignty, defined 
as freedom from external influence. Negative sovereignty is therefore associated with 
the decolonisation era of the 20th century, when external sovereignty was recognised 
by the international community without much conditionality. Although certain cases 
of normative conditions for recognition existed, overall the process was set up with 
few conditions and did not require full empirical sovereignty or political conditions 
regarding the governance of new states.173  
 
For Zaum, the use of conditionality is therefore connected to understanding 
sovereignty as being positive. From this, he deduces that by maintaining the principle 
of uti possidetis, statehood may still be subject to the principle of non-intervention, 
however with the increased use of conditionality, sovereignty may no longer be.174 In 
the case of the former Yugoslavia, the territorial integrity of the new states was 
maintained by adhering to uti possidetis and not allowing further secessions of 
minorities outside of the boundaries of the former republics. However, Zaum argues, 
to mitigate the secessionist claims of remaining minorities, the European Union and 
its member states establish normative political conditions for recognition, aimed to 
influence internal governance of these states. Zaum compares such conditions with the 
Standards of Civilisation of the 19th century, which were imposed on non-western 
states seeking to become part of International Society.175 However, while some states 
and international organisations may have aimed to impose these new standards in the 
20th century, they were not fully implemented or universally accepted.176  
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The following documents were the main instruments established by the European 
Union, with which the breakups of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia were managed and which contained political conditionality towards the 
new states: the Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in 
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union' (16 December 1991), the Declaration on 
Yugoslavia (Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991)177 
and, the opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on 
Yugoslavia (the ‘Badinter Commission’, January 1992). The Guidelines of 1991 set 
out the specific criteria the European Community had established for new states to be 
recognised. Apart from referring to Human Rights agreements, particularly the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, the guidelines also made specific claims 
for the Charter of Human Rights, protection of minorities, inviolability of borders, 
commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, settlement of disputes and non-
aggression. The ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’, published at the same time, set out a 
clear path towards recognition from the European Community and, at the same time, 
the declaration encouraged conflict resolution through the United Nations Security 
Council.178 The Badinter Commission was to evaluate the progress made by the 
independence seeking republics and recommend recognition from the EU if the criteria 
set out in the guidelines had been fulfilled.179 
 
Above, I have discussed the international and European approach towards the 
independence claims of Croatia. However, in the case of Croatia’s independence, there 
was an important foreign policy aspect that came to dominate the debate on the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia with specific reference to Germany. Below I will 
demonstrate how the approach of considering recognition as a tool for conflict 
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management has been approached within the foreign policy literature in the case of 
Croatia.  
 
1.7  Recognition as Conflict Management and Foreign Policy  
The EU’s recognition policy towards Croatia, although a common EU policy was 
defined by the relationship between different member states. Within this case of 
recognition, the literature has discussed the political consideration around the issue of 
recognition in greater detail. A central puzzle for IR literature has been the role and 
foreign policy of Germany in the decision to recognise. Thus, the analysis of Europe’s 
recognition policy towards Croatia has been closely linked to German foreign policy. 
In the literature on this case, it has been debated whether Germany was committed to 
the independence of Croatia from an early stage or whether it supported its European 
partners in maintaining a unified Yugoslavia.180 The discussion has not only been 
about whether Germany supported Croatian independence, and why it may have done 
so, but also on how it went about it. These foreign policy analyses relate closely to the 
two aspects of recognition as conflict management which I have discussed above, 
namely the internationalisation of the conflict and conditionality. A more detailed 
account of Germany’s foreign policy in regards to the recognition will be provided in 
the following Chapter in relation to Germany’s foreign policy generally. Here I will 
point out how the approach towards recognition as a form of conflict management has 
been combined with foreign policy analysis in the case of Croatia. 
 
Although the Badinter Commission provided the legal framework for the recognition 
with uti possidetis, most EU members, particularly France and the United Kingdom, 
were initially not willing to support a breakup of Yugoslavia.181 The timeline set out 
by the European Commission established the deadline for republics to declare 
independence as being 23 December 1991.182 The Badinter Commission was to assess 
claims for independence and evaluate whether the potential new states fulfilled certain 
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conditions. The opinion by the Commission was to be published in January 1992, in 
time to be discussed at the following EU Council on 15 January.183 Germany however 
indicated at the EU Council on 16 December that it would recognise Croatia on the 
day of the deadline, 23 December. It therefore pre-empted the judgement of the 
Commission, which later stated that Croatia had not fulfilled the criteria. The 
remaining EU members followed a month later.184 Despite the legal principle 
established, the coordination among recognising states therefore plays an important 
role in the recognition process. Germany appears therefore to have been particularly 
supportive in the development of interventionist aspect of the policy while it to some 
extent appeared to have undermined the conditionality of the recognition of the new 
states.  
 
From an early stage Germany’s understanding of the conflict was of a ‘war of 
conquest’ by Serbia rather than of a civil war, as others, especially France understood 
it.185 The German interpretation of the conflict shaped the conflict management 
approach towards Yugoslavia, while its close allies continued to consider maintaining 
the territorial integrity of the SFRY. The assumption from Germany was that 
recognition would be an alternative to military intervention.186 The interpretation of 
the conflict by Germany was therefore a fundamental basis behind the use of 
recognition for conflict management . 
 
This more justification for recognition becomes also evident in relation to the 
justification for internationalisation. Above I have described that the Badinter 
Commission framed the break up of Yugoslavia as a dissolution and did not consider 
self-determination arguments for allowing an independent Croatia to secede. Within 
Germany however domestic actors promoted an argument for secession based on the 
right for external self-determination.187 This was despite the controversy over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Caplan (2005) p. 38-39. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Caplan (2005) p. 27 and (2002) p. 165. 
186 Caplan (2002) p. 165. 
187 Crawford (2007) p. 70.  
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territorial integrity of the SFRY. As I have discussed above in international law this 
notion of external self-determination for minorities has been rejected in cases such as 
Quebec and the Åland islands and instead internal self-determination has been 
promoted.188 However, within Germany such arguments were supported by domestic 
actors. Thus although the European policy considered the break up of Yugoslavia a 
dissolution differing views and rationales behind the policy existed among member 
states and were defined by the understanding of the conflict.  
 
In the context of the recognition as conflict management Germany therefore appears 
very committed to the aspect of internationalising the conflict and less enforcing of 
conditionality towards the new states. The conditionality towards the new recognition 
was intended to respond to the issue of lacking minority rights which was considered 
a key source of the conflict. By pre-empting the decision of the Badinter Commission 
and recognising Croatia unilaterally, Germany therefore undermined the process.189 
 
The foreign policy aspect in the coordinated recognition of Croatia is quite evident. 
The need to manage the conflict influenced strongly by Germany’s interpretation of 
the conflict. Also domestic actors played a significant role in framing the policy. 
Through the lens of considering recognition as conflict management and resolution, 
particular foreign policy considerations towards intervention and domestic as well as 
international factors from the recognising state come into play and within this thesis I 
will combine these in reference to the case of Kosovo.  
 
1.8  Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have outlined the tensions and controversies around questions of 
secession and recognition in both the legal debate and International Relations 
literature. By discussing the perceived challenge to the principle of territorial integrity 
with the emergence of greater authority for the principle self-determination, I have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 See discussion above and specifically Fierstein (2009) p. 440. 
189 Caplan (2005) p. 38-39. 
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described the legal responses to these tensions. Considering the IR literature on the 
issue, it is evident that most schools of thought are taking a constitutive approach rather 
than the declaratory approach, which is more common among legal scholars. They 
have focused on the creation and development of norms around recognition and on the 
relationships between recognisers and those to be recognised. As part of this 
constitutive approach within IR, I have introduced the interpretation of recognition as 
an approach of conflict management.  
 
The framework was developed in the case of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the 
recognition of Croatia in 1991. The European Union established clear guidelines for 
the dissolution and the recognition through the Badinter Commission based on the 
principle of uti possidetis and minority rights. Caplan and Zaum described the rationale 
behind this recognition policy to be one of conflict management as it sought to 
internationalise the conflict and imposed conditions for recognition by European 
states.190 Building on the foreign policy literature on this period, I highlighted that the 
origins for this European approach towards recognition were partly in the foreign 
policy of EU member states and particularly by Germany. On the case of Croatia 
therefore the literature has made a close link between the international coordination of 
the process of recognition and foreign policy. The following aspects of German foreign 
policy were identified to particularly influential: The interpretation of the conflict by 
Germany, the support for self-determination of Croatia among German domestic 
actors and policy makers, and Germany’s role and approach in the multilateral 
negotiations on the coordinated recognition by European states.  
 
The notion that the management of the dissolution of Yugoslavia was defined by the 
goal to intervene and manage the conflict by the European Union therefore provides a 
framework with which the foreign policy of recognition can be examined. As I 
consider the case of the recognition of Kosovo as part of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
this thesis will examine to what extent the interventionist approach prevailed in the 
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case of Kosovo and how Germany’s policy can be placed within this. Therefore, will 
consider to what extent internationalisation and conflict management were part of the 
rationale of the recognition of Kosovo. The level of conditionality for recognition will 
also be explored. In regards to understanding the foreign policy decision of Germany 
to recognise Kosovo I will review also to what extent the three aspects identified in 
the case of Croatia - the interpretation of the conflict, support for self-determination, 
and Germany’s role in negotiations - were relevant.  
 
The following chapter examines Germany’s approach towards intervention and its role 
in European foreign policy in regards to intervention. Then, I will move to the 
empirical chapters, which will trace in detail Germany’s role in the recognition process 
and the development of its policy towards the independence of Kosovo. 
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Chapter 2: Germany as a Foreign Policy Actor 
 
2.1  Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I set out the main tensions in the question of recognition and 
how these related to Germany in the recognition of Croatia. I identified three aspects 
which were considered central to the question of German recognition and which will 
guide my analysis of Germany’s foreign policy decision to recognise Kosovo:191 
Germany’s interpretation of the conflict, its support for self-determination, and its role 
in multilateral negotiations on recognition. I demonstrated that the issue of recognition 
was linked to foreign policy. In this chapter, I will provide a in-depth discussion of the 
literature on Germany’s foreign policy. It will introduce the main domestic actors in 
foreign policy making, provide an overview of the literature on German foreign policy 
role and discuss the key policies relevant to the question of multilateralism and .  
 
The first section of this chapter will introduce the actors in German foreign policy and 
the recent changes among these. I will discuss how German foreign policy is driven 
mainly by the executive with a central role of the Chancellery. Nonetheless, because 
German governments are usually coalition governments, in which the junior partner 
holds the position of foreign minister, foreign policy is affected by the relationship 
between coalition parties. The role of parliament is complex as in principle it holds 
little power of control over foreign policy, with the exception of troop deployments. 
However foreign policy is one of the most discussed topics in the Bundestag. Foreign 
policy plays an important role in political debate in Germany and political parties have 
each developed a specific approach to Germany’s foreign policy role. I will thus 
demonstrate that foreign policy is often influenced by party political discussions.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Throughout this research ‘Germany’ refers to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In reference 
to divided Germany prior to 1990 I also refer to it as West Germany. In reference to the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), I also use the term East Germany interchangeably. 
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Beyond the specific actors in German foreign policy and the political divisions among 
these, Germany has been ascribed the foreign policy role as Civilian Power.192 As the 
concept of Civilian Power continues to be used in reference to Germany, I will review 
it in detail in this chapter particularly in regards to the foreign policy literature on role 
theory and the centrality of multilateralism, its relationship to key partners, 
international institutions and the European Union in particular. I will discuss the 
concept in reference to Germany’s post-war foreign policy as well as after unification. 
Civilian Power became to characterise  
 
Germany’s foreign policy as it had adopted a considerably non-aggressive foreign 
policy after the Second World War and integrated into international institutions and 
Europe as a multilateral actor. With a historical review of post-war Germany, I will 
demonstrate that the view of Germany as being inherently anti-militaristic or 
multilateral has been exaggerated. Instead, I will argue that the domestic political 
debates on key policies were more complex and did not fully follow the logic of 
Civilian Power. For example, I will highlight how West Germany sought in the early 
stages of the Cold War and was often in discord with NATO and US policies. Another 
key example is that the Ostpolitik, West Germany’s rapprochement with Communist 
and Socialist countries, was contested domestically. I will thus argue that 
characterising Germany as a Civilian Power presumes a consensus among domestic 
actors, which was not in place in many cases. Although the commitment to the West 
was central to Germany’s foreign policy, domestic actors had quite a diverse view of 
what German foreign policy should look like and how it should act multilaterally.  
 
The debate in the literature has focused on the post-unification period and on whether 
as a consequence of unification Germany became less civilian and multilateral, and 
more militaristic. Here I will review the case of Germany’s recognition of Croatia from 
the foreign policy perspective and discuss the domestic debate and explanations in the 
literature as to why Germany appeared less multilateral in this case. I will then move 
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to discuss the increased occurrence of international military interventions in the 1990s 
and 2000s, with specific reference to the cases of Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 
2001, and Iraq in 2003. From these cases, I will examine how Germany has changed 
its approach to military action and multilateral action. Germany participated in the war 
in Kosovo, although it did not have United Nations Security Council approval. The 
original restrictions on Germany’s military action had been as a result of German 
aggression and genocide in the early 20th century. However, at the time of the Kosovo 
conflict, the German government argued that it was now responsible for stopping such 
actions by other states and thus had a duty to intervene. Nevertheless, military 
intervention remains controversial in Germany. In the case of Afghanistan, Germany 
participated in the NATO mission with United Nations Security Council approval. 
When Germany did not participate in the Iraq war, the decision received domestic 
public support, however, the strain on transatlantic relations had a significant impact 
on policy makers with Germany being accused of undermining multilateralism. The 
three cases of international military interventions highlight the different expectations 
towards Germany which existed both domestically and from its allies.  
 
The literature on German foreign policy continued to circle around the Civilian Power 
characterisation even after unification. The final section of this thesis will discuss the 
literature on Germany as a multilateral actor in the period surrounding Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence in 2008. Since the late 1990s, it has been argued, the 
German public increasingly accepted the use of German troops in joint missions and 
Germany changed its approach to multilateralism. Since then, Germany has appeared 
still to be committed to participating in multilateral action but is less committed to 
consensus in the UN or the EU. I will conclude this chapter, therefore, with a 
discussion of the literature in which some see this approach as indication of a new 
Realpolitik or a de-Europeanization, while others argue it to be a more pragmatic 
approach Germany has adopted to contemporary developments in international affairs. 
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2.2  Domestic Actors in German Foreign Policy 
In this chapter I will focus mainly on Germany as a foreign policy actor and the debate 
around Germany’s multilateralism in particular. However before going into detail on 
specific policies and historical developments, I will focus firstly on the domestic 
process for foreign policy in Germany. The following will thus focus on the different 
actors in the executive branch involved in foreign policy making to highlight the 
increasing role of the chancellor and the different layers in which party politics and 
coalition power balance can affect foreign policy. I will then turn to the complex role 
of the Bundestag, which, with very specific but limited tools to influence foreign 
policy, is a central forum for discussion of foreign policy. Related to the role of the 
parliament is also the role of different political parties and their outlooks on foreign 
politics. As I will make frequent reference to the different parties throughout this 
thesis, I will provide an overview of policy positions. Finally, I will evaluate the role 
of non-governmental actors and the media. 
 
German foreign policy is by constitution, or by its Grundgesetz [ger. ‘basic law’], the 
responsibility of a multitude of actors and, thus, there are a higher number of 
safeguards than in most EU member states. To a large extent, this is due to the post-
World War II efforts to constrain Germany’s foreign policy strength to deter 
aggressive policies. The federal set-up, Germany consists of 16 Länder or “states”, has 
little influence on foreign policy in practice but nonetheless adds an additional layer 
to policy making.193 While German foreign policy processes have been described as 
bureaucratically complicated, they have increasingly become more centralised and 
have moved toward the chancellor and the chancellery.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 As Germany is a federal state, the sixteen Länder have constitutionally the right to establish relations 
with other nation states. The Länder are, as many EU regions, very active in their presence in Brussels 
and in establishing relations with EU institutions. In theory, the Länder can establish relationships with 
other states, or with specific cities in certain policy areas, however, it is rare for Länder to develop fully 
formed foreign policies through the executive branch. Furthermore, constitutionally, federal policy 
takes precedence over any policy of the Länder.  
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2.2.1   Foreign Policy by the Executive 
According to the Grundgesetz, the federal government, the Bund, as opposed to its 
sixteen states, the Länder, holds the authority over Germany’s foreign policy.194 
Foreign policy is often an important marker of the legacy of German chancellors: their 
roles are considered significant in policy development. The position of the minister of 
foreign affairs is traditionally reserved for the junior coalition partner and often 
allocated to the leader of that party. The authority of the foreign minister has in the 
past been highly dependent on the relationship between the coalition parties and their 
leaders.195 This tension is expressed in two key principles of the German constitution, 
the Kanzlerprinzip, the principal influence of the chancellor, and the Ressortprinzip, 
which refers to the expertise and autonomy of ministers. Constitutionally, the 
chancellor’s office however has hierarchical authority over foreign policy and may 
choose to delegate it through different institutions.196 Most commonly these would be 
the foreign office, the Auswärtige Amt (hereinafter AA), and the wider government 
cabinet.  
 
2.2.2   The Chancellor 
While there is no defined hierarchy of the Kanzlerprinzip and the Ressortprinzip, 
Siwer-Probst argues that the tools available to the chancellor in foreign policy put the 
chancellor in the defining position. The chancellor, rather than cabinet ministers, 
defines the general direction of policy, the organisational power and the ability to use 
the constructive vote of confidence.197 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 German Federal Republic (1949) ‘Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der im 
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Gliederungsnummer 100-1, veröffentlichten bereinigten Fassung, das zuletzt 
durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 23. Dezember 2014 (BGBl. I S. 2438) geändert worden ist’ Art. 32(1) 
GG and Art 73(1) GG. See Article 23 Available at Deutscher Bundestag 
https://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg/245216 (last 
accessed 25 September 2016). 
195 Bartsch, S. (1998) Außenpolitischer Einfluss und Außenbeziehungen der Parteien, in Kaiser, K. and  
Eberwein, W.D. (eds) Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik: Institutionen und Ressourcen, München: 
Oldenburg Verlag, p. 178. 
196 Siwert-Probst, J. (1998) Die klassischen außenpolitischen Institutionen, in Kaiser, K. and Maul, 
H.W. (eds) Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik: Institutionen und Ressourcen, München: Oldenbuorg 
Verlag, p. 14. 
197 Ibid, p. 13. 
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There is however also a debate around whether the central role of the chancellor in 
foreign policy is due to the constitutional set-up or due to the historical development 
of the power of the chancellor.198 Certain prominent chancellors, such as Konrad 
Adenauer, who defined the Westbindung, Germany’s alignment to the West in the 
Cold War, or Brandt, who created the Ostpolitik,, are key examples showing the 
important role of chancellors in foreign policy. Moreover, under Kohl the 10-point 
plan to overcome the division of Germany and Europe was kept from the foreign 
minister.199 Although some argue that this Kanzlerdemokratie, in which the chancellor 
controls most policies, may be moving towards a Koordinationsdemokratie, which is 
more inclusive of further actors and, especially in foreign policy, of more government 
branches.200 This, Siwer-Probst argues, is however less likely and instead power in 
foreign policy is likely to concentrate more around the chancellor, which may have a 
negative effect on the transparency of foreign policy making overall.  
 
2.2.3   The Kanzleramt 
The Kanzleramt, the office of the chancellery, has Resorts, internal departments for 
different policy issues, which are coordinated by the Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, a 
key position equivalent to a high profile ministerial post.201 Constitutionally, the 
Kanzleramt does not exist as an independent institution and its main role is to support 
the chancellor. The Resorts mirrors ministries or sectors of government and are, rather 
than dealing mainly with policy content, especially for foreign policy, tasked with 
preventing disagreement among policies, helping coordination and providing 
guidelines. The importance of the foreign policy section, Section 2 of the chancellery, 
depends on the priority a chancellor gives to foreign policy.202 For example, Frank 
Walter Steinmeier was Chief of the Chancellery under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
until 2005; he later became foreign minister in Angela Merkel’s first cabinet of the 
grand coalition of 2005 and again in the second grand coalition of 2013. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Ibid, p. 14. 
199 Ibid, p. 15. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Korte, K.R. (2007) Bundeskanzleramt, in Schmidt, S., Hallmann, G., and Wolff, R Handbuch der 
Deutschen Außenpolitik, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, p. 208. 
202 Siwer-Probst (1998) p. 16. 
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departments of the chancellery represent all the key policy Resorts of Home Affairs, 
Foreign Affairs, Social Policy, Economic and Finance, European Policy and the secret 
services. Foreign policy, development policy and defence are in the 2nd Department of 
the Chancellery and are structurally inter-linked with the AA, this Resort being a key 
area of interest for the chancellery. The department for European policy was 
established by Chancellor Schröder, which diverted responsibility for EU affairs away 
from the Foreign Office and thereby away from the junior coalition partner.203 
 
2.2.4   The Cabinet 
As German governments are usually coalitions, there is an additional layer of policy 
coordination, which is not in itself a constitutional institution but has developed as a 
key committee for many German governments. The Koalitionsgremien (coalition 
committees) are the most formal forums for regular talks among the coalition parties, 
often only attended by party heads rather than ministers. Additionally, during 
parliamentary sessions, and in several informal meetings, coalition parties are 
frequently involved in discussions and coordination, which avoids burdening the 
cabinet with finding consensus. However, at the same time, this has raised questions 
about whether, in a sense, an additional, informal government is operating.204 These 
relationships depend to a large extent on the chancellor in power, however, the role of 
the junior coalition partner has been proven to have a proportionally greater influence 
on foreign policy than on other policy areas.205 
 
2.2.5   The AA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Other Ministries  
The AA is constitutionally the ‘primary source of foreign policy’, in the sense that it 
needs to be informed and included in all forms of the foreign policy of the FGR. As 
other federal ministries also have external relations, much of the AA staff is placed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Müller-Brandeck-Bocqeut, G (eds) (2010) Deutsche Europapolitik – Von Adenauer bis Merkel, 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, p. 243. 
204 Siwer-Probst (1998) p. 20. 
205 Kaarbo, J. (1996) Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior 
Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 
4 (Dec., 1996) pp. 501-530, p. 505. 
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within these ministries for the administration of such relations and the chancellery has 
a structure mirroring the AA’s division of labour on policy and international regions.206  
 
The AA and the German foreign service differ from the British, US or French model 
as their civil servants are trained as Generalisten, meaning they do not specialise in 
specific policy areas or regions, but are mainly highly trained bureaucrats within the 
foreign policy apparatus.207 This is the case for the majority of AA civil servants, but 
the higher-ranking positions within the ministry are political appointments, mainly 
from the coalition parties. This structure reinforces the leadership of the chancellor’s 
office on policy development. The AA therefore administers foreign policy rather than 
shapes it.208  
 
Constitutionally, the AA should be informed of, approve and lead most international 
negotiations.209 Within the EU, however, ministries negotiate directly at Council 
level.210 The foreign policy of the federal ministries is mostly coordinated across 
ministerial channels: Nearly every ministry has units dedicated to coordination at EU 
level and additional units for international coordination.211 Although not of special 
relevance to this thesis, it should be noted that there are also specific ministries that 
have deeply integrated foreign policy. These are, especially, the ministry of defence 
(Bundesverteidigungsministerium, BMVg) or the ministry for international 
development (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung, BMZ).212 International economic relations are divided between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Andreae, L. and Kaiser, K. (1998) 'Die 'Außenpolitik' der Fachministerien', in Kaiser, K. and 
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207 Siwer-Probst (1998) p. 17. 
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211 Weller, C. (2007) Bundesministerien, in Schmidt, S., Hellmann, H., Wolf, R. Handbuch zur 
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international organisations in policy areas: not just the EU but also the UN organisations working on 
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212 Weller, C. (2007) p. 212. The BMZ has traditionally been allocated to the senior coalition partner, 
while the AA is allocated to the junior partner, thereby allowing the senior coalition party to maintain 
control over foreign aid and investment as well as coordination with international organisations over 
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Ministry of Economic Affairs and the BMZ, which is responsible for those states 
classified as ‘developing’.213 The role of the Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium 
der Verteidigung, BMVg) has also developed since unification and greater German 
involvement in international military intervention.214 The Ministry of the Interior is 
controls visa allocation and the Ministry of Economic Affairs leads on economic 
negotiations at international level.215 In the case of overlapping responsibilities, the 
chancellor has the final say on allocation of negotiations on a particular issue or may 
move negotiations directly into the chancellery.216  
 
2.2.6   The Legislative 
Germany has a bicameral legislature, with the Bundestag being the primary legislative 
chamber. Members of the Bundestag (MdBs) are elected directly by their 
constituencies and through party lists. The influence or authority of the Bundestag on 
foreign policy is multifaceted with formal and informal roles. Formally, it controls the 
ratification of international treaties, further integration at EU level, the deployment of 
troops and control of the annual federal budget.  
 
The German Bundestag holds particular role in German foreign policy. To some 
extent, for the parliament’s role in foreign policy there is a differentiation between 
foreign policy and security policy. The executive does have a control in both, however, 
it is slightly limited in questions of security. It only holds veto power in relation to the 
deployment of troops abroad. This power is anchored in the German constitution and 
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was confirmed by the decision of the Constitutional Court in 1994. The parliament has 
budgetary control over the army, which is referred to as a parliamentary army. It thus 
needs to approve any deployment but also has control over the general use of the armed 
forces. These processes are intended as safeguards against potential abuses by the 
executive over the army.217  
 
In regards to general foreign policy, the power of the parliament is limited. It is 
important to note that the parliament does not have a right to initiate new policies and 
that those presented by the government can only be approved or rejected. According 
to Section 59.2 of the Grundgesetz, the Bundestag’s approval is only needed for 
international treaties, which regulate the ‘political relationship’ of the Bund or those 
that concern objects of federal law. Political relationships refer only to issues of the 
existence of the state, its territorial integrity, its independence, and its position or 
influence in the international community of states. Thus, the approval of the Bundestag 
is limited to fundamental treaties, such as joining international organisations or 
European integration.218 The constitutional reform of Article 23, in 1992 following the 
Maastricht Treaty, recognises the right of the Bundestag to participate in policy 
making at EU level and stipulates that the parliament is to be kept informed of all EU 
policy changes and that the government should consider statements made by the 
Bundestag. A ratification of each EU policy by the Bundestag is, however, not required 
unless it implies further European integration with constitutional changes, in which 
case a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag is necessary.219 
 
However, the Bundestag is not a ‘Redeparlament’, a debating parliament, like the 
British parliament but an ‘Arbeitsparlament’, a working parliament. Parliamentary 
committees thus play an important role, somewhat aspiring to that of US Congress 
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committees, however with less policy making power.220 The role of the parliamentary 
committee on foreign affairs, the Auswärtiger Ausschuss, is thus interesting as it is 
used as a ‘working committee’ in the sense that policy is discussed and evaluated by 
coalition and opposition MdBs.221 The Auswärtiger Ausschuss should be kept 
informed of all foreign policy of the government. Considering the vast number of 
policy areas covered by the committee, its secretariat and the party working groups 
support the committee in research and policy analysis222 The Bundestag is, therefore, 
not a foreign policy making body and cannot initiate new policy and its influence is 
mainly confined to the majority vote of the coalition parties. Meetings of this 
committee are not open to the public. However, members of the committee use the 
public plenary sessions to repeat discussions from the committee and state party 
positions. Therefore the Bundestag is used as a key institution to communicate foreign 
policy to the public and to allow public political debates on foreign policy questions.223 
Foreign policy is, in fact, the most debated aspect of German policy in the Bundestag; 
although debates seldom affect policy change, they are able to exert pressure on the 
government and can promote consensus among parties.224 For example, the ratification 
of Germany’s recognition of Kosovo by the Bundestag was not necessary, but an 
extensive debate was held nonetheless, a day before recognition.225 
 
The secondary chamber is the Bundesrat, composed of the heads of the sixteen Länder. 
Regarding domestic policy, the Bundestag and Bundesrat share powers in many areas 
but this is not the case for foreign policy. In fact, the Bundesrat is only able to vote on 
federal foreign policy if this should imply constitutional changes for which both 
chambers’ majority vote is needed or if the foreign policy directly affects the affairs 
of the Länder.226 Here EU policies are particularly important and the Länder have 
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more influence than the Bundestag as they are informed and can participate in the 
policy development of all policies that would affect them as state entities.227 
 
2.2.7   Political Parties 
Although foreign policy in Germany is led by the executive branch of the government, 
political parties in the Bundestag play a significant role. It is unlikely that a 
government would be able to divert too far from the foreign policy outlook of its party 
without significant backlash, and this restriction is also exacerbated by the nature of 
coalition governments, which need to satisfy two or more, parties. Major foreign 
policy decisions have often been accompanied by major party political debates and 
often intra party debates.228 The role of party leader is therefore considered central to 
German foreign policy making.229  
 
The nature of Germany’s coalition government and federal structure, which leads to 
multiple coalitions in the Länder, thus engenders consensus politics in foreign policy, 
as in other policy areas as well.230 However, this focus on consensus overlooks 
differences among parties and also within them.231 In this thesis, the positions of 
political parties will be of central importance in discussing domestic political positions 
in Germany. Thus, it is worth outlining here the main foreign policy outlooks of 
political parties. As I will demonstrate, general approaches to foreign policy may be 
held up by party members and MdBs. However, these are often not aligned with the 
policies of the governments and their coalition and divisions on issues and policies 
exist. Overall, the general consensus, which is referred to in German foreign policy, is 
that all five main parties are committed to peace and security and to the UN as the 
international institution to guarantee these. Also, most parties, except for the sister 
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party of the Christian Democrats in Bavaria, the CSU, are in favour of Greater 
European integration, although disagreement exists on processes and priorities. 
However, major differences among the parties exist regarding Germany’s role within 
global economic and financial structures, but these differences are beyond the scope 
of this research.232 Later in this chapter, I will discuss Germany’s changing position 
on military interventions in detail, but this section will provide an overview and 
introduction to the parties. 
 
The two main political parties are the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the 
Social Democrats (SPD). Smaller parties have included the Free Democrats (FDP), the 
Green Party and the Left (initially PDS and later Die Linke). These parties, except for 
Die Linke, have collaborated within different federal government coalitions over the 
decades and have sought different compromises. The CDU has never been the so-
called junior partner in a coalition but has worked with the Free Democrats and the 
Social Democrats in long term coalition governments. They only held the position of 
foreign minister in the early years of the German Federal Republic after the Second 
World War. However, as discussed above, German chancellors have been very 
influential on foreign policy and, as I will also show below, certain chancellors, such 
as Adenauer and Kohl, as well as Merkel, have prioritised it. The foreign policy 
outlook of the Christian Democrats is one embedded in the principle of multilateralism 
and with a specific Atlanticist outlook.233 Unlike other parties, which may think in 
terms of prioritising peace in foreign policy (Friedenspolitik), among the Christian 
Democrats the emphasis lies on ‘international cooperation’.234 The CDU has been keen 
to bring Germany back as a central actor in international affairs. After the Cold War, 
the support and expectation from Germany’s key allies, mainly the United States, has 
also influenced its approach towards military force, as it was the only party willing to 
consider and support the use of force from the early 1990s.235 With its strong 
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orientation towards the West, the CDU has also been committed to European 
integration from early on in the post War era.236  
 
The Social Democrats have held both senior and junior positions in coalitions and their 
chancellors have been very involved in foreign policy. Historically, the party has been 
anchored in anti-militarism,237 which has informed many of their key policies, such as 
the Ostpolitik.238 However, as I will discuss later, during the Cold War the party was 
split between its left and right wings on the question of nuclear deterrence.239 The SPD 
is also committed to multilateralism but has prioritised less the relationship with the 
United States than the CDU. Despite potential unease with the economic policy 
developments of the European Union, the SPD has also been committed to European 
integration since the 1950s.240 In the 1990s, the move towards greater military 
interventionism was very controversial for the SPD. Disagreement with the 
government led to legal challenges. It has slowly moved toward accepting military 
action since the 1990s.241 However the approach of understanding foreign policy as 
‘peace policy’, remained central in parliamentary statements by the SPD MdBs.242 The 
case of the military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was controversial, and a watershed 
moment, for the party as it supported military intervention without a Security Council 
resolution. 
 
The Free Democrats, also referred to as the Liberal party, have always been junior 
parties in governments but were influential on foreign policy particularly during the 
Cold War and immediate post-Cold War eras. Their approach is anchored in both anti-
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militarism, multilateralism and a cosmopolitan outlook.243 Their commitment to 
internationalism and pooling of sovereignty, including in foreign policy, is the most 
developed among German political parties and is reflected in their strong support for 
a more integrated EU foreign policy. Within this context they also give particular 
priority to international law and the maintenance of internationally and domestically 
agreed legal processes.244 While very principled as a party overall, they oversaw the 
controversial decision of the early recognition of Croatia in the early 1990s. As 
described in the previous chapter, the liberal foreign minister Genscher was very 
influential in this process at the time.  
 
The Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) grew out of civil society and social 
movements in the post-war era. It therefore does not have the same tradition as other 
major parties, whose predecessors operated in the Weimar Republic. The Greens (Die 
Grünen) developed from a dissident group in West Germany with a focus on 
demilitarisation, peace and environmental justice, growing larger after unification as 
it joined with the East German Bündnis 90.245 The party’s outlook remained one of an 
anti-militarist approach and thus it is aligned with the Social Democrats to a certain 
extent.246 It has however also been committed to international institutions, the 
international legal order and the European Union. The Greens became the coalition 
partner of the Social Democrats, holding the position of foreign minister from 1998-
2005. With greater political power came a significant strain on the party in this period, 
in which they enabled the Kosovo intervention.247 The period highlighted the division 
in the party on foreign policy questions. One wing, often referred to as the ‘Realos’, 
supported greater German participation in international affairs and accepted the 
presence of German troops abroad, albeit with an emphasis on the civilian character 
of these missions. The pacifist wing of the party, often referred as the ‘Fundis’, 
remained closer to the party’s origins as a peace movement and was reluctant to 
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participate in military intervention or general intervention.248 Overall, the party is 
highly committed to international institutions but is keen on the reform and 
democratisation of these in favour of non-Western Countries.  
 
The Left Party joined the Bundestag after German unification and its members and 
Members of Parliament came mainly from Eastern Germany. The party was originally 
called Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS) but reformed after 2007 as Die 
Linke. It is the one party that lies outside of the general consensus on foreign policy 
issues. The foreign policy of the party is defined by a fundamental disagreement with 
the Atlantic alliance and alignment with the West. It has been very outspoken in its 
criticism of US American foreign policy, describing it as imperial and aggressive.249 
It has also been very critical of further integration with the EU, mainly because of 
social and economic policies, and voted against key treaties in the 1990s. Also, its 
consistent resistance towards German military involvement is unique amongst German 
parties.250 It has been heavily influenced by it close relationship with Russia and 
advocates the inclusion of Russia in the international security framework. In regards 
to international interventions, it has been highly critical of developments in Germany 
towards greater involvement abroad. To promote its foreign policy, the party has used 
legal arguments and frequently challenged the foreign policy decisions of German 
governments at the constitutional court, and has succeeded in some cases. 
 
2.2.8   Non-Governmental Actors – Think Tanks, NGOs and Interest Groups 
The influence of NGOs has been limited in Germany in comparison with Anglo-Saxon 
states, where NGOs, think tanks and interest groups have gained more footing in high-
level policy making. Thus, NGOs working on foreign affairs rarely prioritise lobbying 
or policy work but rather focus on the running of projects often supported by 
government funds.251 Their influence on high-level policy making is thus limited, 
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although contact with the government and political parties does exist.252 The literature 
has often downplayed the extent to which many NGOs, particularly those representing 
diaspora groups253, have influenced German policy makers. There appears to be little 
evidence of German foreign policy decision makers meeting or considering the 
positions of these groups as a priority.254 
 
Among German think tanks in foreign policy, state-subsidised political foundations 
with party affiliations are particularly active actors. Some argue that they can also be 
considered a foreign policy tool by the German government. The complex position of 
these foundations is due to their officially non-governmental and independent status. 
However, they are nearly exclusively financed by federal money. The foundations are 
independent in designing and executing activities, however, the foreign ministry has 
to sign off all programmes in regards to potential concerns.255 The parties are also 
closely connected to the major parliamentary parties, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung to 
the Christian Democrats, and the Hans-Seidel Stiftung for the Bavarian Christian 
Social Union (CSU), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung to the Social Democrats, the 
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung to the Liberals, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung to the Greens 
and the Rosa-Luxemburg Stiftung to Die Linke. The party affiliation of these 
foundations relates mostly to political outlook and close collaboration on the human 
resource level, as politicians from either parties are likely to take senior positions in 
the foundations’ international offices or on their boards.256 
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The role and influence of industrial interest groups is more controversial than that of 
other non-state actors. Some argue that, due to the European common market, industry 
consortia and representatives focus on Brussels rather than Berlin.257 Others point at 
the promotion of German businesses and of the search for investment as key and 
historical aspects of German foreign policy. The promotion of German business on 
official visits, the coordination through the several consortia, and investment 
promotions are important aspects with which German industry is intrinsically linked 
to German foreign policy.258 
 
2.2.9   Public Opinion and Media  
Judging public opinion and its influence on policy has been controversial in foreign 
policy analysis. The Almond-Lippmann consensus argues that public opinion is not 
rational and without interest representation and thus not relevant to the study of foreign 
policy.259 In the 1990s Page and Shapiro, as well as Holsti argued that, based on the 
United States, the public is becoming better informed and more interested in foreign 
policy.260 Research on Germany is quite new in the literature but it seems that, 
compared to the UK or France, the German public is less interested in foreign policy 
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issues and considers them to be a low priority when voting in national elections.261 
However, there appears to have been an increase in awareness of foreign policy and 
European issues. This rarely has a real impact on election results, with the the 
exception being the Iraq War in the early 2000s, which is often cited as a key issue in 
the 2002 elections.262 
 
Nonetheless, German public opinion on military activity is often considered an 
obstacle for certain German foreign policy action, particularly the use of force. In fact, 
despite changes in the international environment and the end of the Cold War, general 
trends remain. German support for ‘out of area’ military operations remains weak 
although acceptance has grown among the public.263 However public opinion on key 
issues of German foreign policy, such as NATO membership, participation in military 
missions abroad, or further European integration, fluctuates and is not reliable. 
Furthermore, due to the relative high control of the executive over foreign policy in 
Germany, the influence of public opinion remains quite weak.264  
 
The relationship between the media and public opinion is also a difficult one to 
disentangle. Overall the media appears very much as an agenda setter on public 
opinion in foreign policy.265 In Germany, national press agencies, such as the Deutsche 
Presseagentur (dpa), or the German branches of international agencies such as 
Associated Press (AP) Reuters and Agence de France (AFP), play an important role 
in controlling the international and foreign policy news.266 However, evaluation of the 
quality of information in German media and its effect on public opinion is significantly 
divided.267 Also the content of foreign policy comments in the media is not always 
policy focused but more ‘issue-driven’. The unclear relationship between public 
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opinion and the media can be seen in the fact that on many occasions the press does 
not reflect the traditional public opinion on key issues, such as the use of force.268 
 
Here, I have to provided an overview of the key actors involved in foreign policy 
making in Germany. Although foreign policy is considered a policy of the executive 
in the German context, other factors and actors have great influence on policy making. 
One such factor is the reality of coalition governments and the attention foreign policy 
receives in parliament. Also, the multitude of ministries and the division of labour 
among the Chancellery and the AA affect the way policy is made. This overview 
provides an insight to the different actors involved and will be referred to more 
generally in the historical discussion of German foreign policy in this chapter as well 
as in the subsequent chapter, particularly in regards to tracing the position of Germany 
in regards to the status of Kosovo.  
 
2.3  Civilian Power Germany 
After outlining the different actors in German foreign policy, the remainder of the 
chapter will focus on German foreign policy since the Second World War. For this, I 
will first describe Civilian Power as a foreign policy role, which has dominated the 
literature on Germany. As part of this discussion, I will highlight how multilateralism 
and Germany’s role in the EU have been particularly relevant for this role description.  
I will then reconsider this status in light of specific policies, which will be discussed 
in a more historical review of German policy. 
 
The description of Germany’s foreign policy role as a Civilian Power originates from 
a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach of role conceptions. Such approaches 
originate from the constructivist analysis that roles provide the rationale for actions of 
states. Role theory  was firstly applied within Foreign Policy Analysis by Hoslti in the 
1970s, borrowing from concepts developed in sociological, anthropological and 
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psychologist literature.269 Holsti’s understanding of national role conceptions began 
with an analysis of the Self of states in the international system. Role conceptions were 
developed further by Walker and have been applied by a variety of authors in FPA.270 
Originally, role theory focussed on beliefs, images and identities of groups and how 
this reflects their behaviour towards others. Foreign Policy Analysis attempts to apply 
this onto states.  
 
Role theorists consider the role expectations from within a state, the ego, and the 
expectations from outside of the state, the alter.271 Role conceptions consider the role 
of one actor in relation to others. This is where the social nature, the social identity of 
roles in foreign policy, becomes evident. Finally, role theorists also examine to what 
extent changes in roles are possible, considering this as a social aspect. Changes in 
roles can come as role adaption or as learning. Adapting their role could be adjustments 
such as increasing or decreasing certain instruments, changing instruments, or 
changing the perception of a problem.272 Learning constitutes the adaption of 
behaviour by an actor through a change of beliefs or, as analysed in greater detail by 
Levy, diagnostic learning. 273 
 
Recognising the potential for greater integration of role theory in Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Thies has argued that its contributions to the field has been limited due to a 
series of factors such as its early focus on sociological aspects not compatible with the 
wider FPA literature of the time, its initial limitations to the level of analysis and its 
methodological constraints.274 It is striking how central role conception has been in the 
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discussion of Germany’s foreign policy, with a focus on Civilian Power. Thus the 
concept has been adapted by authors of different perspectives, who do not always trace 
the origins back to the wider FPA literature on role conception.  
 
The term Civilian Power (CP) was first coined in relation to the European Union by 
François Duchêne in the 1970s and formed an important basis in the development of 
the debate on the EU as a foreign policy actor. The characteristics of a Civilian Power 
are that it, firstly, recognises international cooperation as a necessity, secondly, 
focusses on economic rather than military power, and finally, that it prioritises 
international institutions for international affairs over national interest in the realist 
sense.275 This original definition is quite loose and has been discussed among EU 
scholars.276 The term was then used by Maull after the end of the Cold War to describe 
a new kind of foreign policy role, which he attributed to both Germany and Japan in 
the post Second World War period.277  
 
Describing Germany as a Civilian Power (ger. Zivilmacht) was for Maull a 
retrospective analysis but also an attempt to predict Germany’s foreign policy 
behaviour in the near future after its unification. To a large extent the concept aimed 
to reassure those who feared an expansionist Germany, pursuing a new Realpolitik. 
For Maull, German Civilian Power is defined, firstly, by the position of fundamental 
integrations into the West during the Cold War and thus a commitment to democracy. 
Secondly, its willingness to be integrated in western institutions and to pool 
sovereignty, mainly via the EU and NATO. Third, its fundamental multilateral 
approach in foreign policy, which seeks to resolve conflict through international 
institutions or informal multilateral collaboration. Fourth, its scepticism towards 
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military means. Fifth, its commitment to Human Rights and, finally, the alliance with 
its main partners in international affairs: France, the Unites States, and Russia.278 
In his description of Civilian Power, Maul highlighted the pursuit of multilateral 
avenues and respect for the rule of law internationally. The assumptions underlying 
such a reading of Civilian Power have, however, rarely been unpacked. What kind of 
multilateralism is Germany pursuing as a Civilian Power? To what degree would 
Germany, in order to comply with a Civilian Power role, be expected to follow 
international law? Is defection from multilateralism reconcilable with the role of 
Civilian Power? The difficulty of pinpointing Germany’s multilateralism is further 
amplified by the lack of a coherent engagement with the concept of multilateralism in 
Foreign Policy. 
 
Keohane famously described multilateralism as the practice of coordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states.279 Through multilateralism, so Keohane 
argues, states accept short-term costs for the sake of longer-term benefits, what he 
coined as ‘diffuse reciprocity’.280 Ruggie’s interpretation is more qualitative. He 
argues that, in contrast to bilateralism, multilateralism prevents exploitation of the 
weaker actor and introduces ‘generalized’ principles of conduct among states.281 
Caporaso further emphasises the normative aspect of multilateralism: not only does it 
describe state behaviour, but multilateralism carries with it its own ideology of how 
states should behave.282 Koops refers to these initial descriptions in the literature as 
‘classic’ approaches to multilateralism.283 While so central to international affairs, 
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theorizing on multilateralism has been surprisingly limited. However, newer 
interpretations of multilateralism have emerged, which describe the behaviour of states 
after the Cold War and in the early 2000s as a means to an end rather than an ideology 
or principle. Van der Oudenaren attributed the failure of multilateralism to ineffective 
institutions. Here, he refers mainly to the UN, describing political undermining by 
state actors of multilateralism as ‘dysfunctional multilateralism’. response, some states 
have returned to greater unilateralism, while others have sought greater 
institutionalisation of multilateralism.284 These varying views towards multilateralism 
become increasingly apparent in the difference between the United States, which 
approaches multilateralism more as a means to an end, and Europe, with its ideological 
base that promotes continuous integration.  
 
One of the key issues that led to the described dysfunction is whether multilateralism 
should be defined by quantity or quality. Should the priority be to reach high numbers, 
in the traditional multilateral sense, or is it about who executes the action?285 
Underlying this political development is what Keohane, in his later reflection on 
multilateralism, defined as the ‘contingent legitimacy of multilateralism’. He 
challenges the established rules for legitimising multilateralism and the emphasis on 
high numbers in intergovernmental collaboration. Instead, he argues that multilateral 
action should be considered legitimate if it reflects and works to the end of promoting 
democracy and fundamental values agreed by the international community, namely 
human rights.286 This tension, as I will explore in this chapter, has developed 
significantly in the post-Cold War era and after 9/11. Such tensions on the future of 
multilateralism played a significant role in post-war and post-unification Germany. 
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The German approach towards multilateralism after the Second World War has been 
described as normative. It was not just about coordinating policy with other states, but 
also about building institutions, following and upholding the established rules, and 
promoting integration among states, particularly within the European Union. 
Multilateralism was a constituent part of its new role in foreign affairs. Germany’s 
commitment to multilateralism was, in broad terms, seen as the antidote to its 
unilateralism, particularly under the Nazi regime.287 It was so much so, that Krause 
describes Germany’s approach to multilateralism in the post-war era as ‘uncritical’.288 
Other interpretations of Germany’s motivation to become multilateral have also been 
discussed, such as its geographic position and economic interest in a globalising world 
economy, or as a confidence building measure after two world wars.289 
 
Where such role conceptions originate, who the relevant actors in a society are, and 
how roles can change are central debates among role theorists. For Maull, Germany’s 
role as a Civilian Power was a result of a concerted effort to make foreign policy elites 
more civilian.290 Germany’s Civilian Power role after the Second World War, with its 
authoritarian tradition and aggressive foreign policy past, highlights the possibility for 
roles to change.291 The change Germany underwent is considered one of the most 
radical of, what in role theory is referred to as, international orientation change. Thus, 
Germany’s unification created potential for change in Germany’s role in international 
relations, and thus would have led to expectations of a change in its foreign policy 
behaviour.  If Germany would have become more interventionist and more willing to 
use military force, would this imply a role change?292  
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Baumann has focussed in greater detail on the changing attitudes among German elites 
towards multilateralism. He highlighted that after unification, multilateralism, as a 
term, was  increasingly used in  reference to self-interest . While this concept was 
nearly absent from public statements by ministers prior to the end of the Cold War, it 
became increasingly common to refer to them. In regards to the term responsibility, 
Baumann notices that, prior to unification, it was considered in the context of the Nazi 
past in Germany and thus it was the responsibility to assure peace in Europe. Later, 
however, the term was considered in the context of playing a greater role in 
international affairs.293 Thus. being a proactive actor in international institutions and 
using the institutions for a political outcome became much more of a pursuit in German 
policy rather than using international institutions as a way to level the field to keep the 
balance between different actors. 
 
In regards to the German role conception as a Civilian Power and its attitudes towards 
multilateralism, I will argue that the description of Germany as a Civilian Power 
overlooked the well-documented domestic political debates on foreign policy after the 
Second World War as well as tensions regarding multilateralism and militarism after 
unification. Wehner and Thies have argued that domestic contestations are often 
overlooked by role theorists. However, it is important to include the domestic 
contestation to explain how narratives of leaders are influenced by such contestation 
and therefore adapted.294 Brummer and Thies have demonstrated in detail how, in the 
case of Germany, opposition parties have contested the change of role conceptions by 
the government . They also found that bureaucratic politics of coalition governments 
affect the national role conception of the states..295I therefore argue that the level of 
analysis applied by Maull in his interpretation of Germany’s role was too limited, as 
it focussed on the governments or influential civil society groups rather than on the 
political conflict in Germany on contentious issues. 
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I will illustrate this, firstly, by highlighting the differing positions of chancellors along 
and across party lines on German rearmament, nuclear deterrence in Europe and the 
relationships with Germany’s key allies in the West and the East. I will argue that the 
Civilian Power model assumes an unanimity, which is reductive of German foreign 
policy positions. Germany’s commitment to multilateralism is not simply anti-
militarist or committed to unanimity within International Relations. After the Second 
World War, military and security issues were central to the debates among political 
parties and within coalition governments. Additionally, Germany had to find a balance 
between its close allies the United States and France, establish itself against the former 
occupying powers and create a sustainable relationship with Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. In these areas, the non-military approach of a Civilian Power as 
described by Maull was not the only ethos in Germany. The two main parties, the 
Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), argued at different 
stages for arms proliferation in Europe, both conventional and nuclear. Although this 
was always framed in the language of deterrence and multilateralism, non-militarism 
did not equal anti-militarism. German elites did not seek to act militarily abroad but 
did not reject military power and sought it for domestic defence during the Cold War. 
 
In the following, I will discuss the key policies and events of post-War Germany. This 
will then be followed by, first, a discussion of the literature on the concept of Civilian 
Power in that period and, second, I will then turn to German foreign policy after 
unification in which I will also highlight the role of the EU in Germany’s 
multilateralism. I will then conclude this section with a more extensive discussion of 
the Civilian Power concept and continuity and change in the post-Cold War era. 
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2.4  Post War Germany 
2.4.1   Anchoring Germany in the West  
After the defeat of Germany in the Second World War and a period of full control of 
German territory by the occupying powers, the Christian Democrat Konrad Adenauer 
became the first chancellor of the FRG, West Germany, in 1949. The priorities of 
Adenauer at the time are often cited as ‘security, equality and unification’. He 
considered the anchoring of Germany to the West (Westbindung) the only opportunity 
for Germany to re-join the international community. Thus, the contribution of 
Germany to the institutional framework among Western allies was a key aspect of this. 
Most importantly the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic 
Community, as well as NATO were important institutions for reconciliation with and 
integration into the West.296 The next chapter will discuss how Germany integrated 
into Western Europe, here I will focus on the security aspect outside of the EU and 
mainly on NATO.  
 
Adenauer was dependent on support from the United States. However in regards to 
security, his approach was ambitious and often not perfectly aligned with the United 
States or NATO.297 It was also in stark contrast to wider public opinion throughout 
Germany.298 For example, Adenauer wanted to rearm Germany at a time when 
NATO’s Massive Retaliation policy focused primarily on atomic weapons. This was 
a controversial pursuit just a few years after the defeat of the Nazi regime. To adapt, 
Adenauer’s priority changed to increase Germany’s role in the NATO decision-
making process.299 Germany, in Adenauer’s eyes, had to become indispensable for the 
alliance. He thus moved to lobby for Germany to hold nuclear launchers, which he 
achieved in 1958.  
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In 1963 Germany signed the Franco-German Elysee treaty, reinforcing bilateral ties 
but also raising alarm in Washington.300 NATO moved further away from Adenauer’s 
security policy by changing from Absolute Retaliation to Flexible Response, initiated 
by US Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. This was received positively by the Social 
Democrats. The SPD, which was in opposition at the time, disagreed with Adenauer’s 
nuclear ambitions.301 The United States appeased Germany with additional security 
guarantees within NATO, partly to avoid Germany forging a closer alliance with 
France.302 Adenauer had to balance the priority of Germany becoming a full 
independent member of the international community with its dependence on the 
United States for its security. While West Germans were keen allies of the US, it 
became evident that their security interests would diverge to a certain extent. The 
nuclear deterrent was to remain a political issue for most chancellors.  
 
The Harmel report of NATO in 1967 was the beginning of a new Cold War Policy of 
the United States and foreshadowed or enabled the German Ostpolitik, which followed 
a few years later under the SPD government. It combined the approaches of Johnson 
and de Gaulle to combine the détente cooperation to begin negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, on the one hand, but continue to maintain security for the alliance, on the 
other.303  
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Thus, after regaining sovereignty from the occupying powers, Adenauer, as first 
chancellor in the post-War era, had to adapt to a new Germany and a new international 
security situation. He realised quickly that although directly affected by the Cold War, 
Germany would not have a first tier position in policy making. Its dependence on the 
United States for security and its relationship with France highlighted a complex 
tension in regards to militarism and multilateralism. I argue that considering this early 
period of the FRG, highlights important tensions, which existed for Germany in the 
post-War era, which, in turn, highlights the shortcomings of a pure Civilian Power 
understanding of Germany. While German economic integration and multilateralism 
were a central part of post-War Germany, anti-militarism was not the predominant 
policy of the German leadership. Instead, multilateralism was the only opportunity for 
Germany to re-establish itself as an independent state and any attempts to move 
beyond a fully integrated security framework or to seek more autonomy would have 
led to conflict with its key allies. 
 
2.4.2   Ostpolitik 
Ostpolitik was a central policy in post-War Germany, developed by Social Democrat 
Chancellor Willy Brandt. This policy entailed the establishment of treaties with 
Eastern Germany and Eastern European states to allow for the de-escalation of the 
Cold War. Historically, the policy is considered Brandt’s main legacy.304 After the 
escalations of the Cold War with the Cuba and Berlin crises, also the United States 
and many western European countries were keen to improve relations with Eastern 
Europe. Within Germany, civil society organisations were increasingly advocating a 
change to the previous Deutschlandpolitik, which had unification as the priority with 
a zero-sum approach.305  
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As mayor of West Berlin, Brandt had witnessed the building of the Berlin wall and 
since then had taken a pragmatic approach to improving the lives of the population of 
Eastern Berlin and Eastern Germany. ‘Change through rapprochement’ (Wandel durch 
Annäherung) became the key philosophy for Brandt’s approach to be able to undo the 
division of Germany.306 As minister of foreign affairs,307 Brandt used the French 
détente policy to lay the foundation for his Ostpolitik by including the GDR in non-
aggression agreements. 308 At the time, this lead to disagreement with the coalition 
partner the Christian Democrats, and was not well received by the United States who 
continued to frame the conflict in an ideological manner.309 As Chancellor, Brandt set 
out the Ostpolitik, with his main adviser, Social Democrat Egon Bahr, and the policy 
became more aligned with the US Kennedy administration towards a peace strategy.310 
 
In the period of 1970-1973 treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague, as well as with 
the various agreements with the German Democratic Republic and the four occupation 
powers became the cornerstones of the Ostpolitik. The first treaty of Moscow laid the 
foundation for rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It aimed to work from the current 
status quo towards peace and détente, rejecting the use of force and respecting current 
borders in Europe. Relationships with the Soviet Union and all states of the Eastern 
Bloc were to be established.311 Finally, the treaty expressed willingness to improve 
collaboration in international organisations. Both Germanys would become members 
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of the United Nations and the establishment of the Conference for Security and 
Collaboration in Europe was decided, which later became the Helsinki act and the 
OSCE.312  
 
Eventually, also a German-German treaty was agreed, improving transport and travel 
arrangements across the border. This so-called ‘basic treaty’ (Grundlagenvertrag) 
between East and West Germany echoed the principles of the agreements with the 
Soviet Union: a rejection of violence and the desire for an improvement in relations 
between the nations. For the German-German relationship, mutual acknowledgement 
as neighbours enabled application to the United Nations, although again there was no 
diplomatic recognition.313 The last of these treaties, with Czechoslovakia enabled West 
Germany to come to an agreement to override the agreement of the Munich conference 
of 1938 and reaffirmed the current borders of Czechoslovakia, rejecting any German 
claim over the Sudetenland which had been annexed by Nazi Germany.314  
 
2.4.2.1 Domestic and International Debate over Brandt’s Ostpolitik - For Maull, 
Ostpolitik, and the related commitment to the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, are essential aspects of Germany’s Civilian Power role.315 The policy 
supports his argument of Germany as a fundamentally multilateral actor and ‘coalition-
builder’ among international actors.316 He also emphasised that Germany’s recognition 
of the Oder-Neiße line to Poland was key proof that the country was no longer a Real-
political threat to the rest of Europe.317 He argues that this recognition demonstrated 
Germany’s clear preference for political solutions over the use of force, and an 
inherent focus on de-escalation and overcoming tensions.318 This was true for the 
principles of the Ostpolitik: demilitarisation, rejection of violence, respecting borders, 
securing peace and improving collaboration between the East and West. However, the 
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policy was disputed among German politicians. The opposition always opposed the 
approach and Brandt’s policy became isolated and lost support, even in his own party, 
after new escalations in the Cold War and delays in implementing the agreements. 319  
 
The Christian Democrats had opposed the 1970-73 treaties and went on to contest 
these at the constitutional court. The fear was that such agreements would undermine 
constitutional commitment to a unification of Germany. Especially Brandt’s approach 
to relations with Poland was criticised, firstly, in regard to the Oder-Neiße line, and, 
secondly, regarding the way Brandt represented Germany in Poland.320 Especially the 
associations of expellees, representing the interest of German exiles from East 
European countries, was highly critical of Ostpolitik. This led to a failed attempt to 
remove Brandt from power with a constructive vote of no confidence.321  
 
At the same time, the Christian Democrats were also split internally, as some engaged 
in a long-term reconciliation process with Poland, while others stood to defend the 
rights of German expellees.322 Also, the close negotiations with Moscow caused the 
CDU/CSU and Western allies to fear that Brandt was planning to let Germany join the 
non-aligned movement. Similarly, Western partners brought up fears of a repetition of 
history, such as the treaty of Rapallo.323 While Britain and France supported Germany 
moving away from its blockade with Eastern Europe, there remained the concern that 
Germany’s increasingly close relationship with Soviet Union would undermined their 
own efforts.324 Brandt continuously reassured his partners that Ostpolitik was only 
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possible if West Germany remained firmly anchored in the West (Westbindung).325 
Christian Democrats did not trust this promise and still today many see Brandt’s close 
collaboration with the regimes of the East as having been two-faced.326 
 
The domestic debate about Ostpolitik highlights various tensions within German 
Foreign Policy in the post-War and Cold War era. General alignment during the Cold 
War was contested during this period, although the question of engaging with the 
Soviet Union without undermining the Westbindung was accepted. Security concerns 
were central for many politicians at the time. Finally, the willingness of the 
government to reconcile with Communist countries but also with those states that had 
been invaded by Germany during the second World War was also a contested by critics 
mainly within the CDU. As much as the Ostpolitik was an important legacy for the 
Brandt administration it was not one built on the consensus of German politicians and 
parties. 
 
2.4.3   NATO Double Track Decision 
With escalations of in the Cold War in the early 80s, the Soviet march into Afghanistan 
and the Poland crisis, as well as the continuing arms race, the lauded effects of 
Ostpolitik came into crisis.327 Brandt’s successor Helmut Schmidt led a Social 
Democrat-Liberal coalition.328 Schmidt was increasingly concerned about the Soviet 
dominance in Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF).329 In response to this threat, 
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Schmidt and his party increasingly pursued disarmament, while the Christian 
Democrats followed Adenauer’s tradition of focusing on modernisation and increasing 
Germany’s influence in NATO.330 West Germany also considered itself vulnerable to 
conventional weapons attack from the USSR.331 Schmidt succeeded in gaining 
recognition of the INF issue in Europe through the double track decision in 1979, 
which was in line with the goal of disarmament and the introduction of the zero 
option.332  
 
While considered a tool for de-escalation and demilitarisation, Schmidt’s support for 
the double track decision and deployment of medium range missiles in Germany faced 
significant opposition from the German public. The political mobilisation against the 
agreement encouraged the German peace movement in the 1980s, which called for a 
Europe free from atomic weapons.333 Schmidt disagreed with this opposition arguing 
that the security of the West depended on the positioning of the missiles. The Christian 
Democrats supported Schmidt’s policy, while the left wing of the SPD wanted to 
prioritise arms control.334 Eventually, Germany ratified the agreement with a small 
minority and when Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl succeeded Schmidt as chancellor 
in 1982, he implemented the policy. 
 
The double track decision highlights the strong political divisions within German 
foreign policy on military and nuclear questions. Although parts of civil society and 
public opinion may have been in favour of disarmament, the strong public support for 
greater disarmament did not become government policy. The domestic opposition to 
the double track decision was not stronger than the government’s commitment to 
Westbindung and the dependence on the Western allies for security at the time. 
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External pressure on the German government was thus essential and very influential 
in the decision making. 
 
2.4.4   German Unification 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, West Germany needed an immediate response 
in, firstly, domestic politics, secondly, to the legal status of the new Germany and, 
finally, in foreign policy.335 Overall, Chancellor Kohl appeared to be acting initially 
quite unilaterally when he presented a ten-point plan on the unification of Germany 
and security in Europe, without input from his liberal coalition partner, or from West 
Germany’s closest international allies. For Kohl, the unification of Germany was the 
priority.336 
 
Unification was managed through the so-called two-plus-four treaty, which referred to 
the two Germanys and the four occupying powers. Through this formula, the Soviet 
Union accepted German unification; however, the future of Germany in NATO was a 
more difficult issue to resolve. The Soviet Union showed considerable resistance to 
the idea that the newly unified Germany would become a full NATO member. The 
Soviet Union wanted Germany as a whole to be demilitarised and with neutral status 
instead. The German leadership considered a policy of non-alignment, and this would 
have been supported by public opinion. Due to American pressure on the Chancellor 
and negotiations between Kohl and Gorbachev, the full accession of Germany to 
NATO was, however, agreed.337 With the two-plus-four treaty, it was eventually 
agreed that the territory of the new Germany would include the areas of the former 
GDR and FRG, Germany would reaffirm its border with Poland and that there would 
be no change to borders as part of a European Peace Order, which was to be recognised 
by the four occupying powers.338 
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The case of unification put Germany right at the heart of multilateral negotiations in 
which it depended on the benevolence of its former occupying powers. It also 
demonstrates that Germany’s unwavering support for and dependence on NATO was 
briefly put into question. This was mainly considered to avoid de-stabilising Europe 
in light of the major changes. Establishing peaceful relations with its new Eastern 
European neighbours was also a stabilising policy by the FRG. Due to the history of 
violence of Germany against its Eastern neighbours, the Warsaw Pact countries were 
vulnerable after 1990. Thus, Germany moved quickly to sign agreements with its 
Eastern neighbours to recognise the new borders of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
This was just the beginning of the further integration of Eastern Europe into NATO 
and the European Union.339 The peaceful fall of the GDR and unification remains an 
unexpected turn in European history. The immediate post-Cold War era was a period 
in which Germany’s foreign policy was under great scrutiny and, especially, its 
multilateralism and position on military force was of great concern for its closest allies 
and some domestic actors.  
 
2.4.5   Post-War Germany – More than a Civilian Power 
Above I have provided a review of key policies in Germany’s foreign and security 
policy of the post-war era. The analysis by Maull of this same period has led him to 
ascribe Germany a foreign policy role of a Civilian Power. I have provided a 
discussion of Germany’s foreign policy role, which acknowledges that within 
Germany there have been political positions and policies which would not fit a strict 
Civilian Power role. 
 
I have already provided a first critique of the emphasis by Maull on Ostpolitik as the 
central proof for the Civilian Power nature of Germany. The debate around Germany’s 
Ostpolitik was continuous not only along party lines but also within parties. Brandt’s 
was strongly contested and his successor moved away from it entirely. The policy 
remains disputed among political parties. Domestic contestation of a role in foreign 
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policy has been considered to be under-studied within Foreign Policy Analysis and 
International Relations theory.340 It is therefore necessary to incorporate the domestic 
debate in the analysis. The disagreement on Ostpolitik does not signify a disagreement 
on the Civilian Power role per se, but it demonstrates that the specific character of the 
Civilian Power role was disputed and is not inseparable from Ostpolitik. Brummer and 
Thies have outlined the ongoing negotiations and the struggle between different role 
conceptions by German actors after the Second World War. These different 
approaches were the ‘faithful ally’- the role advocated by Adenauer - and other role 
conceptions promoted by parts of the Social Democrats, such as ‘recalcitrant ally’, 
neutrality, or ‘the eastern ally’.341 Thus, the contestation of Brandt’s Ostpolitik could 
be considered a continuation of this struggle of the role conception for Germany. The 
central aspect of multilateralism was  not questioned - in fact, it constituted a central 
aspect of the overall Civilian Power role accepted by most of the elite in Germany. 
However, it remained contested as to how Germany should execute this 
multilateralism. 
 
In regards to commitment to anti-militarism, I have also highlighted particular political 
strands in that period. The Chancellors Adenauer, Brandt and Schmidt all found 
themselves at odds with the expectations of their Western allies. Both Adenauer and 
Brandt found themselves arguing for changes in NATO, however on opposite sites. 
While Adenauer wanted nuclear proliferation, Brandt called for a stronger 
conventional defence force for Germany. For Brandt, this was not the alternative to 
nuclear weapons but an addition, which he saw as vital to fill a security blind spot in 
Europe. While some changes were made to NATO policies, generally, German claims 
were largely put off.  
 
Germany’s relationship with nuclear proliferation and conventional weapons in 
Europe is thus more complex than a Civilian Power role might suggest. Adenauer and 
Strauss had nuclear ambitions for Germany. The first German Chancellor did not 
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embrace the same values of disarmament as the peace movement did against NATO 
thirty years later. Social Democratic Chancellor Schmidt was confronted with strong 
public opinion against the double track decision but went ahead with the policy. The 
domestic peace movement was not as influential as stressed in the Civilian Power 
characterisation. Maull’s Civilian Power does not imply a pacifist position. However, 
it still excludes the political and security considerations several administrations in 
Germany took. These were not always for the purpose of de-escalation, although often 
they were framed in this context. German chancellors tried to re-establish Germany as 
a full member of the Western alliance and to respond to perceived security threats 
during the Cold War era. The limitations on their military ambitions came partly from 
domestic politics, Brandt being a case in point, but mostly from Western Germany’s 
allies, especially the United States and France. In the description of the domestic actors 
above I highlighted the anti-militarist approach of public opinion and of political party 
factions in Germany. This outlook is not fully reflected in the political elites of the 
parties and the government policies. In role theory, the alter and ego are central to  a 
state’s role conception and, in the case of Germany, the influence of its close allies, 
particularly the United States, has been highlighted as an important factor in its 
approach to militarism. From the developments in post-War Germany, Tewes has 
argued that the acceptance of the Civilian Power role occurred over time, first by 
affecting the ego role conception of the elites, and, in the longer term,  of the wider 
public. Hence at the end of the Cold War, the conceptions of the ego and the alter were 
closely aligned, particularly in regards to prioritisation of alliances for Germany and 
to its use of force.342  
 
The argument here is not that Germany had military and expansionist ambitions after 
the Second World War. It is rather that, although a diverse political debate and German 
considerations during the post-War era up to unification have been well documented 
in the historical literature, these have not found their way into the literature 
surrounding Civilian Power, a concept which has dominated interpretations of 
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Germany as a foreign policy actor after unification. Taking these more diverse political 
factions into consideration, my argument will help explain Germany’s willingness to 
intervene in conflicts also through recognitions, as I aim to do in this thesis.  
 
The next section will discuss developments in German foreign policy after unification. 
This period is especially relevant to the case study presented here because after 1990 
Germany began to develop as a foreign policy actor outside of the Cold War 
dichotomy and the 1990s are the central period in which Berlin developed its policy 
on Kosovo’s status. I will firstly outline the debate about continuity and change in 
German foreign policy after unification in regards to multilateralism. I will then 
discuss key cases which were used in the literature to discuss Germany’s changing 
foreign policy role. For this I will focus firstly on the controversy on Germany’s 
recognition of Croatia and secondly military interventions of the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Here Germany’s relationship to key allies and also within the European Union 
will particularly highlight the changing role of Germany in international affairs.  
 
2.5  Germany Post-Unification 
The post-Cold War period brought many challenges for Germany as a foreign policy 
actor although it was then that the concept of Civilian Power was defined by Maull. 
What Germany’s foreign policy would look like after unification was a key debate 
within academic and also foreign policy circles. Would Germany, now reunited and 
growing economically, develop a classic Realpolitik? Was Germany again a threat to 
Europe? Throughout the 1990s, policy analysts and academics looked anxiously for 
signs; each German foreign policy decision was torn between interpretations of 
continuity versus anomaly. Fundamentally, the debate was divided between rational 
neo-realists and constructivists, between accounts of Realpolitik versus those focused 
on values.  
Another element became increasingly important in the discussion of Germany’s 
foreign policy role change: that of the European Union. The understanding of the EU 
role of Civilian Power and the relationship to Germany’s role was one aspect of this. 
Secondly, the other the growing literature on Europeanisation of EU members’ states, 
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which also reflected on the consequences in foreign policy in particular, became 
relevant to how Germany’s role may develop.  
 
As described above, the original term of Civilian Power was coined by Duchêne in 
regards to the European Union..343 Duchêne’s characterisation differed from Maull’s 
description of Germany and Japan’s foreign policy role Duchêne raised the question 
of whether the EU could be an actor in international relations at all and what kind of 
actor it should be. Maull’ Civilian Power description does not questions Germany 
being an actor and presumed it to have a  foreign and security policy.344 What type of 
international actor the EU, as an organisation, should become has therefore been a 
central question in the literature. In regards to Germany, the literature has also focussed 
on what kind of actor it wanted the EU to become and how its changing approach to 
military action was linked to the EU’s new role in international affairs. 
 
The concept of Europeanization has played an important function in the description of 
Germany’s foreign policy role. It describes the effect of the creation and reinforcement 
of an EU identity - through norms, regulations and practices - on state behaviour. It 
can broadly be understood as a phenomenon of socialisation at the level of the EU 
member states’ executives in developing policy.345 Europeanization acknowledges the 
role of the state and of intergovernmental negotiations at the European level, however, 
it also claims that within these EU-level talks, negotiators are more attuned to the 
importance of finding a common solution. Thus, their negotiation strategies may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Duchêne (1972). 
344 Maull (1990). Duchêne formulated a future role for the Europe Union in which it seeks political 
influence using its economic power and rejects all military activity. Building on its violent past, 
Duchêne saw Europe as a civilizing force which should encourage responsibility among other members 
of the international system and thus contribute to world peace. Duchêne (1972) and (1973) The 
European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence, in M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds) 
A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community, pp. 1–21, London: 
Macmillan, pp. 19-20. 
345 A fundamental mechanism to achieve Europeanization at domestic level is the concept of Diffusion, 
through which norms are accepted and internalised. Checkel, for example, identified two key 
phenomena, elite learning and societal pressure, both of which influence changes in state behaviour, 
specifically in liberal democracies. Checkel, J.T. (1997) International Norms and Domestic Politics: 
Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide, European Journal of International Relations 1997 3: 
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focussed on finding a European solution rather than focusing on representing their 
domestic position.346 It can therefore fundamentally affect the way EU members 
behave in a multilateral environment. 
 
In regards to foreign policy, however, proving the existence of a high intensity of 
Europeanization has been less obvious. The spectrum of critics includes Realists, who 
deny the existence of the EU as a significant foreign policy actor in the international 
system and consider it simply a coordination of member states’ policies, and 
Functionalists, who hoped for intensive integration of EU in foreign policy, but accept 
that the lack of institutional maturity and committed resources remain an obstacle to 
achieving this.347  
 
Applying the concept of Europeanization to foreign policy, Wong identified the 
following three developments: EU Member States adapt foreign policy as advocated 
by the majority of member states and/or the EU institutions; member states attempt to 
‘export’ their national foreign policy to the EU level in regards to specific countries or 
issues; and finally, member states engage in socialisation and identity reconstruction 
of the EU as a foreign policy actor to overcome previous conflicts with third countries 
and/or to redefine themselves in the international sphere as  EU member states.348  
 
Within the literature, the role of the EU in the development of German foreign policy 
has been emphasised significantly. Particularly in regards to Germany’s potentially 
changing foreign policy role after the Cold War. Miskimmon and Paterson applied the 
framework of Europeanization to explain the changes in German foreign policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. (2003) (eds) The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press Bulmer, S., and C. Lequesne  
(2005) The EU and its Member States: An Overview, in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds) The Member 
States of the European Union, Oxford University Press; and Smith, M.E. (2004). 
347 Wong, R. (2007) Foreign Policy, in Graziano, P. and Vink, M. (eds.) Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 324-325. 
348 Wong, R. (2007) p. 325. Hill and Wong explain this Europeanization of foreign policy through a 
‘three-and-a-half level game’, as this concept was developed prior to the Lisbon treaty, the ‘half level’ 
would be under Pillar II of the CFSP. [Wong, R. and Hill, C. (eds.) (2011) ‘National and European 
Foreign Policies’ New York: Routledge, p. 227.] 
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towards greater intervention and military foreign policy.349 Hellman et al raised the 
possibility of Germany de-Europeanizing over time. 350 The role of Europeanization in 
Germany’s behaviour after the Cold War is therefore an additional layer to Germany’s 
change towards multilateralism. In the following cases. the approach towards the EU 
was an integral part of the observed change  
 
2.5.1   Germany’s Recognition of Croatia 
In Chapter One I indicated that the understanding of the of recognition of Croatia as 
conflict management had been linked to Germany’s foreign policy. Firstly, in regards 
to Germany’s understanding of the conflict was a ‘war of conquest’ by Serbia rather 
than understanding it as a civil war, as others, especially France interpreted it.351 
Secondly, German domestic pressure was interpreted to have mounted based on a 
commitment to self-determination in the post-unification context of the Federal 
Republic.352  
The use of recognition was therefore considered a conflict management method, 
compatible in principle, with Germany’s foreign policy role as a Civilian Power. It 
was intended to be a civilian solution to a military aggression, with the long-term goal 
of supporting self-determination and the establishment of a new democratic political 
system. Germany’s policy was however also under particular scrutiny because of the 
perceived uncharacteristic unilateral approach towards the recognition process. While 
the Badinter Commission had established a clear timeline and criteria of recognition, 
Germany recognised prior to the publication of the decision of the Commission as to 
whether the republics would be recognised. This therefore created particular tensions 
among its close multilateral partners, especially within the EU. In this context, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W.E. (2003) Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp Between 
Transformation and Accommodation, in Dyson, K. and Goetz, K.H. eds. Germany, Europe and the 
Politics of Constrain, New York: Oxford University Press 
350	  Hellmann, G., Baumann, R., Bösche, M., And Herborth, B., Wagner, W. (2005) ‘De-
Europeanization by Default? Germany’s EU Policy in Defense and Asylum’ Foreign Policy Analysis 
(2005) 1, 143–164	  
351 Caplan (2005) p. 27 and 2002, p. 165. See Chapter One 1.7 Recognition as Intervention and Foreign 
Policy. 
352 Glaurdic, J. (2011) The Hour of Europe. Western Powers and the Break-Up of Yugoslavia, New 
Haven: Yale University Press; Crawford, B. (2007) Power and German Foreign Policy - Embedded 
Hegemony in Europe, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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Germany has been depicted as pushing its European allies into recognition. Thus, the 
discussion has not only been on whether Germany supported Croatian independence, 
and why it may have done so but also on how it went about it. 
 
Some authors have traced Germany’s position on Croatia in more detail and have 
pointed out that its policy was first committed to a unified Yugoslavia and only later 
moved to support for the independence of the constituent states.353 Caplan points out 
that Germany was supportive of maintaining Yugoslav territorial integrity and 
reiterated statements of the EU at the beginning of the apparent dissolution of 
Yugoslavia until the summer of 1991. Only once the conflict had escalated militarily 
did Germany advocate recognition. Furthermore, Caplan also points out that Germany 
was not alone in this approach and that other EU members had indicated a need for 
recognition.354 Glaurdic also emphasises the early commitment of Germany to a united 
Yugoslavia controlled by Belgrade.355 
 
The reason for the change in policy has been justified by many authors with the role 
of domestic actors in Germany. Maull has argued that the Christian Democrats were 
sympathetic to the Croatian independence struggle because of Croatia’s Catholicism, 
and that Croatia’s cultural ties with Germany added to this sympathy.356 However, 
other authors have demonstrated that the cultural ties have been exaggerated and that 
other factors, such as the support for self-determination, were more influential in this 
regard.357 The consensus among the political parties on the importance of supporting 
self-determination claims from the Republics has been especially highlighted in the 
literature.358 Crawford discusses the party relations and the unusual coalitions that built 
over the recognition question. She argues that the experience of the then recent 
German reunification created a momentum of support for self-determination and this 
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354 Caplan (2005) p. 18, Glaurdic (2011). 
355 Glaurdic (2011). 
356 Maull, H.W. (2005) ‘Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic’ New York 
and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 111 and 122. 
357 Lucarelli, S. (1997) Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia: An institutionalist perspective, 
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 32:2, 65-91, p. 81. 
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resulted in greater pressure on the government. The German foreign minister Friedrich 
Genscher’s own party, the Free Democrats, was traditionally very committed to a 
liberal but legalistic approach to foreign policy. Thus, the question of the legal process 
and a commitment to the Badinter Commission was important to the party. The 
Christian Democrats, senior coalition party at the time, and the Social Democrats, in 
the opposition, were also not initially supportive of recognition. Crawford argues that 
the Green party succeeded in gaining support for their position of pro-independence, 
by focusing their argument on supporting self-determination as post-unification 
Germany, including East Germany, was enjoying.359 The strong consensus of the 
political parties thus affected Genscher’s position considerably, as Glaurdic argues.360 
 
Other interpretations of Germany’s behaviour have used a Realpolitik argument: 
particularly the media at the time read the behaviour of Germany as coercive. 
Germany’s interest in maintaining a ‘sphere of influence’ in the Balkans was cited as 
justification for Germany’s support for independence. This was justified with the 
former occupation by Nazi Germany of the Balkans and implied a historical strategic 
interest in the region by Germany. Germany was described as ‘twisting the arm’ of the 
its partners by putting other EU member states under pressure. Moreover, Germany’s 
support for Croatia’s declaration of independence was considered unreasonable.361 
This very negative depiction of Germany persisted over the early 1990s especially as 
the violence conflict between Serbia and Croatia escalated after the recognition of the 
republics as independent states. However, this approach has not been reiterated fully 
in the academic literature but the backlash for Germany as a foreign policy actor has 
been noted.362 
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360 Glaurdic (2011); Augter (2002); Crawford (2007). 
361 For example, ‘Germany Muscles In’ Daniel Singer, The Nation, February 3, 1992; Crawford, B. 
discusses others in (1996) Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral 
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The most evident symptom of the disagreement among EU members was the threat 
from the UK and France to bring a UN resolution to stop Germany from recognising 
new states in the Western Balkans.363 When the remaining eleven EU member states 
recognised Croatia’s independence, some argued that the agreements among EU 
member states were mainly to protect the unity of the EU at a difficult  time during the 
Maastricht negotiations.364 Bearce describes how the French and British positions 
shifted towards recognition due to the risk of the institutional breakdown of the 
European Union.365 Lucarelli highlights the strategic calculation of Germany to choose 
late December to recognise, as the Maastricht treaty had been signed.366 Glaurdic 
claims that Germany was ‘calling in its favours’ from these negotiations, as it had 
made serious concessions on social, economic and monetary policy.367 Crawford 
argues that the internal dispute in the EU highlighted the weakness of a Common 
Foreign Policy at the time. She argues that this institutional weakness allowed for the 
strong domestic interest of Germany to determine EU policy on the question of 
recognition.368 But, although the other member states may have made concessions to 
Germany, Augter argues that the German government would not have recognised 
Croatia if it had not been sure that the other EU members would follow. Crawford 
contends, in contrast, that eventually the German leadership lost trust in it European 
counterparts and therefore pushed ahead alone.369  
 
Hence, the policy of recognition itself, as well as Germany’s approach to it, were 
questioned and criticised heavily by some of Germany’s closest allies. Germany’s 
behaviour was considered by many authors incompatible with the characterisation of 
Civilian Power. In post-unification Germany the case of Croatia led to criticism of 
Germany as a multilateral actor, as a committed European and the questions about 
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continuity or change in German foreign policy after the Cold War. The case of Croatia 
also highlights the influence of domestic actors and political parties in foreign policy 
and the influence of a consensus among the parliamentary parties in the Bundestag can 
have on the policy of the government. 
 
2.5.2   Military Interventions: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq 
With the end of the Cold War came a new international order, freed from the bipolarity 
between the Soviet Union and US. One consequence of this was more action from the 
United Nations, as collaboration in the Security Council was now possible to a greater 
degree than before. Also, the United States was able to act more freely. Here, the cases 
of the Gulf war, the Balkan wars, conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, and Eastern Timor 
raised issues globally on international intervention, military or humanitarian, and the 
role of the UN Security Council and NATO. Above I discussed that the international 
influence from close allies was very influential on Germany’s foreign and security 
policy: with the changing environment of greater involvement, these factors also 
resulted in calls on Germany to participate in collective action.370 
 
With regard to the post-unification period, debate in the literature has circled around 
two aspects. Firstly, Germany’s multilateralism in interventions and, secondly, its 
approach to the use of force. The participation of Germany in military interventions 
has been the focus of the literature on Germany’s multilateralism. There are, however, 
also parallels with the debate on Germany’s recognition policy. Above I outlined how 
in this particular period Germany’s commitment to multilateralism came under 
criticism, in regards to Croatian independence.371 In this section, I will highlight the 
debate on multilateralism as it developed in Germany in the 1990s and early 2000s in 
regards to interventionism. The following issues arose from this debate: the tension 
between responsibility and anti-militarism, the question of legality versus 
multilateralism, and the question of being a reliable partner to German allies. Although 
these questions were related to cases of military intervention and were affected by anti-
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371 See Chapter One, 1.7 Recognition as Intervention and Foreign Policy. 
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militarist arguments, there remained key tensions regarding questions of 
interventionism and involvement in multilateral activities generally. These cases 
therefore provide a perspective on the debates and issues raised in regards to disunity 
on the recognition of Kosovo. 
 
One key characteristic of the concept of Civilian Power is commitment to international 
institutions, thus multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism.372 This implies also a 
commitment to upholding international law. Below, I will outline how commitments 
to international institutions and to international law were at the heart of the debate on 
these interventions. I will then discuss the literature on the expectations and 
developments of interpretations of the multilateralism of Germany as a Civilian Power 
and how these affect our understanding of this concept.  
 
Here, I will review three cases of military international interventions and Germany’s 
role in them, as well as the views on Germany’s involvement or non-involvement. 
These are the Kosovo war of 1999, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, starting in 2001, 
and the Iraq war, starting 2003, in which Germany did not participate. This is not an 
exhaustive list of international military interventions or Bundeswehr participation 
since unification. However, these three cases were central examples of intervention 
prior to the recognition of Kosovo. These missions took place after a decision by the 
German constitutional court in 1994 on the legality of German participation in ‘out of 
area’ operations, which had taken place increasingly since unification with the most 
recent cases being in Somalia and Bosnia. The opposition, at the time the Social 
Democrats and the Socialist Party (at the time PDS now Die Linke), had requested a 
verdict on those operations. The constitutional court, ruled that while the operations 
were lawful as long as they were under a multilateral mandate, they had to be approved 
by the Bundestag.373 This legal decision was defining for post-unification German 
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foreign policy. While during the Cold War Germany had been in the midst of a 
potential military conflict, the use of German troops abroad in ‘out of area’, referring 
to cooperation taking place abroad and not as direct defence action, went against the 
anti-militarist factions of German policy makers in the various parties. The three cases 
of military intervention were characterised by the following: A debate over a UNSC 
mandate or endorsement of military action, other international institutions and allies’  
participation in military action and, finally, domestic support. 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, in the case of the Kosovo war, there was no UN Security 
Council consensus,374 but the German government still pursued participation and put 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(last accessed 25 September 2016); German Consitutional Court (1994) BVerfGe 90, 90, 286 – Out of 
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374 Several UN Security Council Resolutions had called repeatedly for an end to the violence from the 
FRY government and KLA, condemned the actions but also reaffirmed the territorial integrity of the 
FRY. United Nations (1998a) UN Security Council, Resolution 1160 (1998) Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 3868th meeting, on 31 March 1998, 31 March 1998, S/RES/1160 (1998) 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1160 (last accessed 25 September 2016); United Nations (1998b) 
UN Security Council, The situation in Kosovo, Resolution 1199 (1998) Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 3930th meeting, on 23 September 1998, 23 September 1998, S/RES/1199 (1998) 
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25 September 2016); Miskimmon, 2009, p. 561. 
Table 1: German participation on military interventions 1999-2003 
Case UNSC mandate EU consensus Domestic authorisation 
Kosovo 1999 - 
NATO Operation 
Allied Force 
No Yes 
Government supports 
participation; majority vote 
in Bundestag 
Afghanistan 2001 - 
ISAF 
UNSC resolution 1386 Yes 
Government supports 
participation. Approval in 
Bundestag with vote of 
confidence for chancellor 
Schröder. 
Iraq War 2003 – 
US UK initiative 
No No 
Government against 
participation, supported by 
majority in Bundestag. 
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the intervention to a vote in parliament.375 The mission Allied Force was conducted by 
NATO and there was consensus within the EU for a need of military intervention. The 
ISAF operation in Afghanistan in 2001 had a Security Council mandate with UNSC 
resolution 1386 and was not contested within NATO or the EU.376 Finally, the case of 
Iraq was contested in the Security Council, among NATO members and the EU. 
Germany did not participate in this war.  
 
I will discuss the position of Germany on Kosovo in the 1990s in Chapter Three where 
I will trace Germany’s politics towards it.377 Here, I focus on the discussion among 
domestic policy makers and the academic literature regarding the meaning of the 
Kosovo war for Germany’s foreign policy. In Germany, the preparation for and 
execution of military strikes were conducted by two very different governments. The 
federal elections in Germany took place in September of 1998 and the designated a 
new Berlin government, which did not take office until late October. After sixteen 
years Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition was voted out 
and replaced by a Social Democrat-Green coalition under Chancellor Schröder and his 
deputy and foreign minister Joseph Fischer. The vote on the military intervention took 
place just a fortnight before the new government came in, after significant pressure 
from the United States for formal approval from the Bundestag in time before the 
change of government.378 The Social Democrat-Green coalition had thus inherited a 
commitment to NATO to intervene and support the operation in Kosovo.379  
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The Social Democrats, as I have described above in this chapter, come from an anti-
militarist yet multilateral tradition, although the party was divided during the Cold War 
between different factions on the question of disarmament and nuclear proliferation.380 
The question of military deployment was controversial for the party. Internecine 
disagreement over this intervention was even more severe for the Green party, the 
junior coalition partner. Despite its origins in the peace movement and it being in the 
federal government for the first time, the party was set to enable Germany’s first 
military action abroad since the Second World War. This debate polarised the party 
further between its so-called pragmatic and fundamentalist wings.381 The main 
opposition to German participation came from the leftist party (at the time still called 
PDS).382 
 
The intervention remains highly contested not only within the Green party but in 
German public opinion. Beyond the military aspect of the Kosovo case, there was a 
lack of consensus in the Security Council. This international divide posed a significant 
challenge to Germany considered to act mostly multilaterally.383 For some factions of 
the government and of the Left opposition, not only was the intervention unnecessary 
and against German foreign policy role and values, but also illegal. Miskimmon argues 
that the government reinterpreted its traditional role of ‘never again’, which referred 
to the wars of aggression from Germany into ‘never again genocide’ or ‘never again 
Auschwitz’, thus making the clear connection to genocide and ethnic violence.384 This 
interpretation also implies responsibility to prevent such acts globally, not just on 
German soil.385 This justification for the intervention by the government gives a first 
indication of Germany’s interpretation of the Kosovo conflict. As indicated in the 
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previous chapter, Germany’s interpretation of Serbia as the main aggressor in the 
conflict, affected its attitude towards supporting independence to manage the 
conflict.386 Chapters Three and Four will discuss in detail Germany’s position towards 
the conflict but from the debate on the military intervention it appears that Germany 
continued to see Serbia as the main source of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and 
sought greater intervention from the international community. Nonetheless, although 
the government’s justification for intervention was accepted at the time and received 
support from Parliament, it has been argued that the Civilian Power narrative was 
destabilised by the Kosovo war.387 Others have considered this development in 
German foreign policy as a ‘normalization’ as Germany was now contributing in 
military operations while it had remained on the side-lines before.388 
 
Due to the lack of a UNSC resolution, Germany had to take a position in regards to its 
support for NATO. The Social Democrat-Green government had committed to civilian 
conflict prevention and the pressure from the United States to contribute were out of 
touch with the German position.389 For the German chancellor, maintaining a 
transatlantic relationship and being considered a reliable partner in the alliance were 
important.390 Nonetheless, Berenskoetter and Giegerich argue, Germany was very 
resistant to the dominance of the United States on European security and divisions in 
the transatlantic relationship began to emerge during the Kosovo crisis and 
foreshadowed the tensions during the Bush administration in Washington.391 The 
intervention remains very controversial in Germany and in public opinion.392 
 
The case of Afghanistan was in one sense less controversial, as the operation had 
backing from the UN Security Council. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was little 
opposition to the deployment of the ISAF mission. Nonetheless, opposition existed in 
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several countries, including in Germany. The critique was built on the increased use 
of military action and in the aftermath of the controversial Kosovo decision. The 
‘never again’ argument did not seem to apply in the case of Afghanistan and some did 
not consider the connection between the Afghani Taliban regime and the attacks on 
the Twin Towers in New York sufficiently clear to justify military intervention in the 
country. This decision was again taken in the same period of the Social Democrat-
Green coalition government. Although there was greater international consensus on 
the Afghanistan mission than on Kosovo, Chancellor Schröder publically committed 
to supporting the United States and did not hesitate to accept the invoking of Article 5 
by NATO.393 He used a vote of confidence from parliament for the approval of the 
Bundeswehr deployment for the mission.394 He did, however, play down the role 
German troops would play on the ground and emphasised civilian support instead.395 
Potential anti-militarists arguments were countered with the duty to stand by NATO 
allies and the perceived threat to Western states.396 While in the case of Kosovo, there 
had been a clear moral and normative argument made toward defending a population 
against an aggressor state, the case of Afghanistan was about contributing to the North 
Atlantic Alliance, particularly in the light of unanimity at the UN.  
 
The final case is the Iraq war of 2003, in which Germany did not participate. The 
Anglo-American initiative sought to remove Saddam Hussein from power after he had 
been accused of developing nuclear weapons and supporting Al Qaeda. The United 
States President George W. Bush and his administration had failed to gain support 
from the UN Security Council, where only the UK supported its claim. Some European 
Union and NATO members joined the alliance, including Poland, Denmark, the 
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Netherlands, Spain and Italy.397 Among political parties a division emerged between 
those who prioritised the commitment to the transatlantic relationship and the anti-
militarist factions, although even support from a Christian Democrat faction did not 
include deployment of forces.398 The justification for intervention lacked a ‘never 
again’ argument, nor was it in response to an immediate threat, such as had been 
perceived in the case of Afghanistan. Given the lack or multilateral agreement, 
intervention was therefore not justified in the eyes of the German government.399 
Ultimately the government did not participate, some have argued that Schröder turned 
the issue into an election campaign argument and, thus, followed public opinion. 
 
Germany’s transatlantic relationship suffered significantly from this episode. The 
United States framed the lack of international support at the time as a disappointment 
from European partners. Germany was criticised by the Bush administration as having 
been too assertive and independent in working against its key allies the US and UK.400 
Its anti-militarism was framed as undermining multilateralism by the United States, 
and this, by extension, questioned its Civilian Power approach. The strain on relations 
with the United States was significant and Schröder attempted, to an extent, to ease 
tensions after the invasion had taken place. His successor, the Christian Democrat 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, prioritised Atlanticism in her foreign policy after taking 
office. In light of the deteriorating transatlantic relationship, all parties, including the 
Greens, have stressed the importance of this alliance to German foreign and security 
policy.401 However, the Social Democrat-Green coalition was perceived of as having 
gambled with its ability to influence the US position with its outright rejection of 
support for the Iraq war rather than taking time to negotiate.402 Maull argues that more 
than in the case of the Croatian recognition, the case of Iraq revealed a failure for 
Germany to use international coalition building effectively and act as a genuinely 
multilateral actor. It failed in stopping the war in Iraq and at the same time put strategic 
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relationships at risks.403 In German public discourse, however, and with the progress 
of the Iraq conflict, the Government’s position was considered justified and the 
literature has considered the rejection of the Iraq war as being in line with a Civilian 
Power role as it rejected both militarism and weak multilateralism.404 The debate on 
multilateralism in regards to the 2003 Iraq war is indicative of the developments after 
the Cold War. After the initial enthusiasm for greater collaboration through the UN in 
the 1990s came a change to a selective multilateralism of ‘coalitions of the willing' 
that did not seek legitimacy in the classic sense. The main example here is the Kosovo 
war in 1999, which exhibited multilateral action from a united NATO and EU, without 
UNSC approval, and would be lauded by cosmopolitans like Keohne..405  However, 
examples that followed are what van Oudenaren described as ‘dysfunctional 
multilateralism,’ in which members of the international community did not remain 
committed to the established rules and sought out loopholes for unilateralism or 
limited multilateralism.406 This has also been referred to as ‘minilaterlaism’ by 
Kahler.407 The Iraq war demonstrated the limits for some Europeans on acting 
multilaterally without institutional approval out of concern that multilateralism was 
being used for state interest. Particularly in the case of Germany, the contrast between 
its support for Kosovo, as opposed to the Iraq War, was striking. 
 
Considering the cases of military interventions since unification, the NATO operation 
in Kosovo in 1999 can be seen as an exception in German foreign policy. This is 
mainly as it was the only engagement in an out of area NATO operation without UN 
approval. The domestic objections were, firstly, regarding military intervention in 
principle, secondly, regarding the intervention’s legality and, thirdly, connected to 
Germany’s approach to multilateralism. In the case of Afghanistan, the multilateral 
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question was not pertinent due to the UN endorsement. The main objection was with 
the military action per se, which the government responded to with a vote of 
confidence, justifying action through its commitment to multilateralism. Finally, the 
case for participation in the Iraq war was rejected due to both legal objections from the 
government and the lack of institutional multilateral support from either the UN or 
NATO.  
 
Multilateralism and International Law have played central roles in decisions on 
military intervention for Germany. The political debates also indicate the relevance of 
political parties in foreign policy decision making in this period. The three 
interventions discussed here took place during the Social Democrat-Green coalition. 
At the time, the Christian Democrats were in opposition and in all three cases argued 
for greater German involvement in military action or support for the interventions. 
Assuming Germany to be a Civilian Power might lead one to expect a less military 
approach and commitment to international law and international institutionalism 
among German actors. These cases, however, demonstrate that multilateralism is not 
directly tied to specific institutions or the consensus of multiple organisations. This 
was evident in the case of Kosovo, when NATO and the EU were united on the 
mission, while the UN Security Council was divided. In the case of Iraq there were 
legitimate concerns within the German government about the justification for the war 
and the claim of the existence of nuclear weapons in Iraq, also no international 
organisation - UN, NATO or the EU - had endorsed the war. Nonetheless among 
German policy makers there are significant concerns that Germany would appear as 
an unreliable partner to the United States and the UK. 
  
To explain the shift in the use of force in Germany, Miskimmon and Paterson 
identified, in particular, Europeanization through elite socialisation. They argued that 
after unification, German foreign policy elites were more receptive to socialisation at 
the EU level due to an  emerging framework for security and defence, pushed mainly 
by France, which provided Germany justification for intervention and ‘responsibility’, 
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an orientation through which to adapt its new defence policy.408 The establishment of 
committees for decision coordination at the EU level also ultimately affected German 
bureaucratic structures. The introduction of the Political Security Committee (COPS), 
the EU military Committee (EUMC), and EU military staff (EUMS) all led to more 
power for the German ambassador in Brussels reform of the German military (such as 
the professionalisation of the conscription-based army), and the strengthening of 
capabilities to support international missions.409  
 
Similarly to other Member States, Germany had to make constitutional changes to 
adapt to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but the most significant change 
was related to the deployment of the Bundeswehr abroad, which was authorised by the 
Constitutional Court in 1994.410 Finally, the notion of Germany participating actively 
in a common EU Security and Defence Policy appears to have been widely accepted 
by the public by the early 2000s. However, public reluctance to support military 
activity remained and instead, the public supported more civilian and diplomatic 
efforts.411 In the debate on the change of Germany’s foreign policy away from a 
traditional Civilian Power role, Europeanisation accounts for this change, describing 
it as an elite-led development that does not have domestic support, as measured by 
public opinion. The ‘normalisation’ of German foreign policy was only possible 
through the Europeanisation of Germany and its foreign policy. Following from the 
debate outlined above it becomes clear that, authors have argued that Germany’s 
foreign policy has developed due to EU pressures, as well as pressures from other 
alliances, particularly from NATO. 
 
2.5.3   Continuity or Change? The Academic Debate on Intervention and 
Multilateralism in German Foreign Policy 
The Civilian Power role meant that the analysis in the literature of foreign policy has 
been dominated by the values and norms debate. Many argued that after unification 
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German foreign policy was likely to continue with the Civilian Power role. The 
constructivist explanations of Germany, as the odd-one-out as a foreign policy actor, 
still scarred and defined by the past of a Nazi regime, and Germany’s continued 
commitment to multilateralism and economic growth, stand in direct contrast to 
Realpolitik accounts, which focus on Germany’s growing economic power and 
increasing influence.412 In a critique of the neo-realist prediction of German foreign 
policy in the early 1990s, Rittberger argues that multilateralism remained at the core 
of all of Germany’s foreign policy culture. Building on Katzenstein, Eichenberg and 
Dalton,413 he argued that it was the national culture of German foreign policy, which 
explained the behaviour. While Germany may have engaged in military operations 
since unification, which would have been unthinkable prior to 1989, it always engaged 
in operations under NATO command and closely embedded in alliances.414 Germany 
may have been more confident in seeking influence and pursuing goals, but again, 
always within a multilateral set up. In fact, Germany supported the building of 
international institutions in the 1990s, especially promoting further integration of the 
EU and the strengthening of EU instruments.415 
 
Maull points to these values as markers of Germany’s foreign policy. Borrowing from 
Katzenstein and Rittberger, he describes Germany’s role as promoting multilateralism, 
institution building and supranational integration, and seeking to constrain the use of 
force in international relations through national and international norms.416 Germany 
was considered committed to preventing potential nationalism and militarism, 
upholding democratic values domestically and internationally, and promoting 
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European integration.417 Maull argues that the decision to intervene in the Kosovo war 
was particularly challenging because, in accordance with Germany’s Civilian Power 
role, a deployment of troops abroad was considered impossible. He speaks of the 
conflict of values within this Civilian Power framework, which eventually led to 
Germany contributing to the NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999.418 He argues that 
this case had already been made possible through small developments in the direction 
of intentional humanitarian interventions during the Bosnia UNPROFOR operation. 
Eventually, the historical responsibility and commitment to deter grave violations of 
Human Rights, and the failure in Bosnia to do so, was considered more important than 
anti-militarist intentions. It is, however important to note that, when considering 
Germany as a Civilian Power, Maull points to two crucial thresholds, which were 
crossed with the participation of the NATO operation in Kosovo: the use of German 
Luftwaffe aircrafts and the missing UN Security Council mandate.419 While these 
thresholds were crossed, the debate in Germany on whether it was right to do so 
continued in the aftermath of the war, and the success and legitimacy of the campaign 
remained questioned.420 Maull, therefore, attributes good intentions and a sense of duty 
to its alliances as the main reason for the new German interventionism. 
 
Even when re-evaluating the concept of Civilian Power in 2006, Maull reiterated that 
Germany’s foreign policy has been defined by continuity and that the changes or 
anomalies in German foreign policy should be understood as responses to 
developments in the international system. Germany’s opposition to the Iraq war in 
2003, should therefore not be seen as Germany reasserting its national interest but as 
the United States imposing new expectations on Germany that Germany could not 
fulfil. Not joining the war in Iraq was thus considerably more consistent with German 
foreign policy than following the American allies into war, from the non-militarist 
point of view.421 The retired position Germany took after 2001, should be understood 
as a response to four main changes Maull identifies: firstly, the end of the Cold War, 
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secondly, the growing influence of globalization on Germany’s economy and society, 
third, the progress of European Integration and, finally, domestic gridlocks on foreign 
policy issues.422 As described above the Iraq war highlighted for Maull the greater 
complexity of multilateralism in the post-Cold War era and the difficulty this brought 
for Germany to be an effective coalition builder.423 
 
Explaining the sudden change through role conception is not straight forward. How 
and whether roles change in foreign policy is a central debate in role theory. Harnisch 
stresses that both the domestic change towards Germany’s role conception, as well as 
the international pressure - the alter perspective - cannot explain the change in 
behaviour by Germany, particularly in the case of the Kosovo war. Instead, the conflict 
of the arguments ‘never again war’ and ‘never again Auschwitz’, which I discussed 
above, were a ‘creative reconstruction’ of Germany’s role to allow it to respond to 
international pressure but also to justify its response to this international crisis.424 
 
To describe the continuation of Germany’s peculiar foreign policy Erb describes the 
country as a ‘post sovereign’ power, defined by its commitment to institutions and to 
the EU. Germany’s foreign policy, according to Erb, is defined more by its 
commitment to multilateralism and international cooperation and, thus, its traditional 
Real-interests are not formulated as a traditional nation state might formulate them.425 
Instead, Germany formulated its interests within an EU context. Chancellor Schröder 
said, the Europeans should act in the Balkans collectively and not Germany by itself. 
Here, Erb sees Germany as avant garde in comparison to its fellow member states, 
which might put their own interests before the interests of the EU as a whole.426 
However, while this political culture has developed over several decades and appears 
to have continued after unification, reinforcement of these values is mainly driven by 
the current political elites, who have dominated post World War II and post-Cold War 
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Germany. Duffield warns that a change of this culture is not impossible and may occur 
as a response to external or internal factors in the same way German political culture 
changed drastically after 1945.427 Maybe in less alarmist terms, considerations of 
changes in the most recent foreign policy elite should be considered. For example, that 
Merkel as the first Chancellor of the post-World War II generation and with experience 
in East rather than West Germany, would reflect a different sense of national identity 
than her predecessors. 
  
Tewes points out that argument for an anti-militarist Germany is deeply rooted in a 
liberal reading of Germany as a Civilian Power and the developments in Europe after 
the Second World War.428 He suggests a more security focused approach to Civilian 
Power in which he stresses the need for collective security and calls for an international 
enforcement authority, thereby implying considerable encroachments on state 
sovereignty.429 He therefore seeks to emphasise more the soft power aspect, as defined 
by Nye, of Civilian Power and the interest of reshaping social realities.430 
  
Thus, the extension and strengthening of international institutions after unification is 
often considered the main evidence for Germany continuing along the Civilian Power 
path. Above, I have demonstrated that in the post-Cold War period Germany 
developed its policy in a multilateral environment, albeit not always tied to the 
institutional frameworks of the UN or the EU. The literature has engaged with this 
more differentiated approach to multilateralism. Maull discusses Germany’s role as a 
coalition builder in the more complex multilateral environment.431 Crawford rejects 
the notion that through its membership of international organisations and socialisation, 
Germany is less prone to Realpolitik. Instead, she argues, it has used organisations to 
promote its interest, especially in Europe.432 Banchoff argues that rationalist accounts 
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of the events post-unification simply disregard any notion of state identity and 
therefore fail to explain German behaviour in the long term. Acknowledging that 
equally constructivists need to take actual policy decision into account, Banchoff 
suggests a stronger interconnectedness of the constructivist and rationalist 
understandings of Germany as a foreign policy actor.433  
 
Within the EU context, a parallel debate has emerged which engages with the limits 
of Germany’s Europeanization and thus questions this specific aspect of its 
multilateralism. Hellmann, Naumann, Bösche, and Herborth scrutinised Germany’s 
behaviour regarding EU policy in European defence and security policy, highlighting 
a possible de-Europeanization. They found an increasing reluctance from Germany to 
promote progressive EU integration and that Germany was actively undermining the 
implementation of policies. This was based on an interactionist approach through 
which it appeared that Germany’s de-Europeanization was not necessarily a strategic 
policy decision. Rather, Germany supports big political projects for further integration, 
but then hesitates to raise the ambition or does not fulfil its commitments in the long 
run. Cases discussed are the Eurocorps, or the commitment made with the treaties of 
Amsterdam and Maastricht, and the EU Cologne summit.434 The responses to this 
claim have been varied. Daehnhardt argues that it is not a case of de-Europeanization 
necessarily, but that it proves that Europeanization in itself is not a unidirectional 
process.435 Bulmer and Paterson responded that Germany is now simply more likely 
to avoid lengthy negotiations for consensus in the Council and may instead look for 
alternate ways of implementing a policy, including unilateral action within EU 
institutions.436 This de-Europeanization debate revolves mainly around the three 
aspects of firstly, domestic actors in German European policy making and the 
heterogeneity of the process in Germany secondly, the issue of security and military 
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engagement and, finally, the role of Germany as impulse-giver becoming more policy 
and procedure orientated. 
 
Bulmer and Paterson discuss Germany’s approach towards EU integration with 
reference to Katzenstein’s concept of ‘Tamed Power’. Tamed Power refers to the fact 
that Germany institutionalised its power within the European Union and was willing 
to leave more than proportionate influence to smaller states, thus aiming to exercise 
its soft power through the new institutions.437 They argue that Germany is simply a 
normalised power with a greater interest in using institutions to its advantage.438 They 
see Germany more as an ‘agenda-setter’ rather than concerned with pragmatic 
implementation of policy more generally.439 Crawford argues that Germany uses its 
position, on the one hand, to strengthen institutions at EU level in the long term, but, 
on the other, defects from common EU positions when it wishes or needs to 440 Based 
on the cases of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, discussed above, she described 
Germany’s development into a regional hegemon and its significance for ‘regional 
stability’. Daehnhardt argues that Germany is mainly engaged in the uploading of 
foreign policy and has adapted a similar approach to other large member states who 
have significant bilateral relationships with large global powers.441 For Daehnhardt, 
this shift in behaviour from Germany can be explained with reference to the new 
situation after Germany’s unification.442 
 
Aggestam stresses that although Germany may not be committed to a single 
international organisation specifically and may accept to act without a consensus 
within institutions, it is important to still acknowledge it as a fundamentally 
multilateral actor. The reflexive consultation with international partners and the 
emergence of Germany as a trade nation has by definition meant that Germany would 
reject a security focused Realpolitik in the classical sense. Rather, Germany has 
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completely embraced the notion of security community as opposed to considering 
post-Cold War Europe as a security dilemma.443 Ash has termed this the sowohl als 
auch [as well as] approach, meaning that Germany will not commit solely to one 
institution but will use the transatlantic alliance for continued security.444 In this sense, 
Aggestam argues, there has been a ‘normalisation’ of German foreign policy after 
1990. Germany has emerged as more assertive and proactive in international 
institutions, however, good relations with neighbours and the perseverance of peace in 
Europe have remained a cornerstone of German strategy.445 
 
Germany’s behaviour lies in the tension created by the so-called ‘dysfunctional 
multilateralism’ as described by van Oudenaren.446 As the failure and ineffectiveness 
of multilateralism becomes evident, some states are drawn towards diminished 
commitment to international institutions, or in some cases even unilateralism. Others 
are keen to consolidate existing rules more firmly to generate greater commitment to 
them.  From its role as a Civilian Power and its commitment to multilateralism, a shift 
towards greater integration would have been expected, but the cases above 
demonstrate that Germany may be turning further away from greater integration. The 
cases above also link back to the issue raised by Keohane on where legitimacy lies in 
multilateralism.447 The normative discussion underlying multilateralism and what kind 
of multilateralism Germany should pursue has played an important role in German 
foreign policy decisions. Divisions along party lines and within parties have brought 
out the disagreements on the priority for Germany, and show that although German 
foreign policy makers do take a multilateral approach, there is no unanimous opinion 
on what such multilateralism will look like in the future. 
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For this thesis, Germany’s behaviour in multilateral negotiations in relation to the 
status of Kosovo will be a central aspect. The recognition of Kosovo was a coordinated 
effort, requiring several years of negotiations. Thus, although recognition is ultimately 
a decision of each state taken domestically, coordination with other states was central 
to the decision to recognise. From the literature discussion in this section, it has 
become clear that Germany’s behaviour among different international organisations is 
not as clear as a Civilian Power role may suggest. While Germany is deeply embedded 
in international organisations, it has diverged from in certain cases and has acted 
without a full multilateral consensus, as in the case of Kosovo in the absence of UNSC 
approval. Beyond multilateral organisations, the military interventions reviewed here 
have shown the importance of relationships with specific partners. Although Germany 
did not participate in the Iraq war, the strain on the transatlantic relationship was 
considered detrimental among political actors in Germany. International law also 
continues to play an important role in the understanding of foreign policy and 
international engagement for Germany. When in the case of Kosovo, the lack of 
multilateral agreement was perceived as potentially illegal, the argument of a 
responsibility to prevent genocide was brought forward and the unity at NATO and 
EU level was considered sufficient to justify participating in the Allied Force mission.  
 
2.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the actors within German foreign policy and the 
development in its role in international affairs. The domestic foreign policy process is 
controlled mainly by the executive and centred around the relationship of the 
Chancellery and the Auswärtige Amt. However, political debate among parties also 
influences policy making significantly. This is the case in regards to the relationships 
between government coalition parties. Here, although the junior partner holds control 
over the foreign office, the power of the foreign minister depends on the relationship 
between the two parties in power and, thus, strategic direction will still mainly be 
controlled by the Chancellery. Party politics in the Bundestag are also important. 
Although the Parliament has little effective power in policy making, it is the central 
forum in which policy is discussed and consensus among parties is sought. For this 
thesis, the positions of parties on the status of Kosovo will play an important role and 
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debates in the Bundestag will be of special interest to demonstrate domestic positions 
on Kosovo. 
 
I have argued in this chapter that the Civilian Power role which was applied to post-
war Germany by Maull, misses the continuous political debate on foreign policy 
among political parties and within governments. I have demonstrated this by reviewing 
the foreign policy of Germany during the Cold War. Under Adenauer, Germany sought 
a greater role in the Western Alliance, including a military role. Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 
central to Maull’s argument on Civilian Power, was not build on consensus and its 
critics wanted less collaboration with Eastern Europe and to prioritise Germany’s 
unification instead. Finally, Germany was deeply embedded in and depended on the 
nuclear and conventional arms strategy of NATO throughout the Cold War. Thus, 
while Germany was civilian in regards to deploying its own troops, it was not in 
regards to its defence and reliance on NATO. However, the multilateral aspect, which 
is the second central aspect of Civilian Power, was prominent during this period. 
Germany appeared to work with its partners and establish new institutions: the 
development of the Helsinki accords is a central example here. By discussing this in 
the context of role theory in FPA I have highlighted how domestic contestations of 
roles and therefore changing ego but also alter perception can develop a foreign policy 
role. 
 
After unification possible changes in Germany’s multilateralism and the use of the 
military dominated the debate on its foreign policy. Germany appeared to be acting 
less in consensus in institutions or with key allies. This was the case in regards to the 
recognition of Croatia, and also in regards to military interventionism. I have discussed 
here the cases of multilateral military intervention in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, 
which have influenced this debate. The debates on multilateralism at those times did 
not simply concern legality, but also Germany’s responsibility to act with its allies and 
versus its commitment to anti-militarism. The role and expectations of Germany 
within the EU become also increasingly relevant in this period. In Kosovo, the NATO 
consensus to launch the mission and the EU consensus to legitimise the intervention, 
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overruled the missing legal authorisation from the UNSC. While in the case of Kosovo, 
although the German government argued to accept the lacking UNSC authorisation 
due to the ‘never again’ argument, it did not do so in the case of Iraq. The case of 
Afghanistan, although it had UNSC authorisation, still sparked a strong debate in 
Germany on whether Germany ought to participate. In the case of Iraq, the lack of 
consensus in the UN, NATO and the EU, allowed Germany to argue against 
intervention. However, critics of Germany, including domestic ones who wanted to 
see some form of participation, albeit not military, saw this act as undermining 
multilateralism and the commitment to the transatlantic relationship. 
 
The post-unification cases discussed in this thesis demonstrate that Germany’s 
multilateralism was under debate in cases relating to conflict management and 
intervention, in cases with military aspects and those of diplomatic negotiations. 
Although military action has received greater attention in the literature, it is the 
underlying debate on Germany’s multilateralism that will be central to this thesis. In 
the early 2000s, when the negotiations on Kosovo’s status began again, the German 
multilateral approach had been changing. Domestically, military actions abroad 
continued to be contested and governments would tend to underplay the role of 
German troops to the public. Germany’s commitment to multilateralism was tested 
and criticised by its allies for a lack of reliability and commitment. The literature on 
this period has mainly interpreted Germany as having been under pressure from its 
international partners, who requested a greater contribution that it was prepared to 
make. Others argue that this represented the beginning of a new militarism in German 
foreign policy. In regards to its multilateralism, German policy makers approached it 
as a means to ‘do more’ in international affairs rather just as an end in itself. This also 
resulted in Germany being less committed to specific institutions, although it is not 
considered en route to a unilateral approach.  
 
The breakdown of a multilateral consensus was central to the controversy over 
Kosovo’s status. Therefore, in this thesis, Germany’s complex relationship with 
international institutions and multilateralism will be taken into consideration when 
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analysing Germany’s position towards the independence of Kosovo, particularly in 
regards to the division within the EU and the UN Security Council. 
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Chapter 3: Germany’s position on the status of Kosovo 1989-2007 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Chapter Two discussed German foreign policy in relation to conflict management and 
multilateralism and its role in the European Union. This chapter will provide the first 
part of an in-depth discussion of Germany’s policy towards Kosovo specifically in 
light of the issue of multilateralism and conflict management. This chapter is the first 
of two to analyse specifically Germany’s role in this process. This chapter will 
examine the developments in international negotiations on the Kosovo conflict and the 
German policy within these, until the final negotiations in the summer of 2007. I will 
address the developments during the 1990s, the NATO operation in 1999, the UNMIK 
administration, and the period of the Ahtisaari Process in particular. The final 
negotiations on Kosovo’s status under the Troika will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
There has been abundant discussion of the status negotiations of the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and the lead up to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. This chapter 
aims to marry the extensive literature on Kosovo status negotiations with the German 
accounts of the same period. I examine how the role of Germany evolved in the 
negotiations from the early 1990s at international level, how domestically Germany’s 
position on Kosovan independence evolved and what themes were relevant for 
German foreign policy makers over the time in question.  
  
Throughout this chapter it will become evident that the role of Germany within the 
multilateral negotiations on the status of Kosovo increased. Its strategically used its 
simultaneous chairmanship of the European Union and the G8 and also gained 
influence through German diplomats involved in international institutions such as 
UNMIK. On the question of Kosovo’s status, I will highlight that in the 1990s 
sympathies for Kosovan independence claims and close political connections existed. 
However, Germany’s efforts to bring the status question onto the international agenda 
were quite weak and were stifled by its close partners. Thus, overall, Germany’s policy 
very much reflected the international policy for Kosovo to remain a region within 
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Serbia with greater autonomy rather than independence. Also, throughout the 1990s, 
the focus remained on containing Milosevic and additional armed conflicts in the 
Western Balkans. After the war of 1999 and UN resolution 1244, the international 
position changed: most prominently, the United States began to encourage the 
independence of Kosovo to replace the UN administrations. This strong support for 
independence was however supported by few other states. Among European countries, 
including Germany, fears about setting a precedent for secessionist movements, 
concerns about the reaction of post-Milosevic Serbia, and the political situation 
Kosovo predominated.  
 
In Germany, there was no consistent parliamentary support for Kosovan 
independence, however, the question of Kosovo was considered in relation to other 
aspects of EU and international policy towards Kosovo. Discussions addressed 
Germany’s military role in the Balkans, immigration from the Western Balkans and 
efforts for the repatriation of former migrants and refugees living in Germany. 
Considerations of Kosovan independence returned in the early 2000s. But rather than 
discussing these claims in regards of granting the right to self-determination, political 
parties in Germany approached the issue within the EU enlargement framework and 
as a questions of democratisation and state building. Furthermore, for German policy 
makers, the relationship with Serbia and the potential effect of an escalation of the 
Kosovo conflict on regional integration played a major role. Kosovan independence 
was considered by some as inevitable but still to be approached in an internationally 
managed and coordinated process with leadership from the EU, NATO and western 
powers in general.  
 
In this chapter, the narrative will focus on different international, national and 
domestic actors in Germany in relation to the status question. Here, particularly the 
UN and the Contact Group on the Western Balkans, usually referred to as the Contact 
Group, which had been very active throughout the Balkan wars of the 1990s, will be 
particularly relevant prior to the 1999 war and later again in the later years of status 
negotiations from 2004. The Contact Group consisted of Russia and the so called 
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Quint, the five Western allies and G8 members: US, UK, France, Germany and Italy. 
The work of the two UN Secretary General Special Envoys Karl Eide and Martti 
Ahtisaari informed and advanced UN efforts for a resolution of the status. Finally, the 
work of the UN Mission in Kosovo and the role of the Security Council will be 
particularly relevant here. Finally, the role of the EU will be discussed by mainly 
focusing on the Council’s declarations and policy output. 
 
3.2  Kosovo in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia  
In the introduction, I mentioned that Kosovo was excluded from recognition as a new 
state after the dissolution of the SFRY because it was not a constitutive Republic.448 
Kosovo had been an autonomous province in the SFRY but had lost its status within 
Serbia in 1989. Milosevic had revoked autonomy and integrated Kosovo 
administratively into Serbia.449 Under Milosevic any promises given by Tito to grant 
Kosovo the status of a republic were revoked and from an administrative legal point 
of view independence was impossible.450 Prior to the dissolution of the SFRY, 
Milosevic’s political move had been accepted as fait accompli by the international 
community, which gave little attention to this loss of autonomy. Germany, which had 
strong economic ties with the SFRY, showed little response to this act. The act was 
viewed as having been carried out within the known undemocratic practice of the 
communist and socialist regimes during the Cold War and thus did not result in a 
response.451 When the unexpected dissolution of SFRY began, initially European 
capitals recognised the Serb leadership, now as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY), as the legitimate successor state of the SFRY. Germany supported the unity of 
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the SFRY until the early 1990s when the independence movements in Croatia and 
Slovenia became evident.452  
 
When the dissolution of the SFRY seemed imminent, the EC Declaration on 
Yugoslavia in 1991 applied the concepts of uti possidetis and invited only its republics, 
thus not Kosovo, to declare whether they were to claim independence.453 These 
requests would then be brought to the Arbitration Commission of the conference for 
Peace in Yugoslavia, commonly known as the Badinter Commission. Kosovo did 
declare independence in 1991 after a local referendum, which was not recognised by 
the FRY authorities. Following this declaration, Kosovans established a government 
of mainly political exiles and under President Ibrahim Rugova and Prime Minister 
Bujan Bukoshi. In parallel and in competition with this Kosovan Albanian self-
proclaimed government, the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UCK) or Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) began to organise more effectively as a military movement 
for independence.454 Kosovo’s independence claim however remained ignored. At the 
EC Peace Conference in The Hague in September 1991, the Kosovo question was 
treated as a minority rights issue. A plan proposed by the British diplomat Lord 
Carrington, which would have provided extensive minority claims for Kosovo 
Albanians, was rejected by Belgrade.455 Kosovan representatives were excluded from 
the London Peace Conference in August 1992 and Kosovo’s status was not 
discussed.456 The UN Conference on Yugoslavia held in Geneva in September 1992 
was supposed to address the situation in the whole of Yugoslavia. When EU negotiator 
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David Owen attempted to bring Kosovo onto the agenda however, this was completely 
rejected by Slobodan Milosevic as an internal Serbian problem.457 
 
In Germany, at this time, the Kosovo Albanian political struggle received some 
attention and support. Germany had economic ties with Albania and Kosovo 
Albanians, mainly through migration from the region to Germany during the Cold 
War. Germany had received some asylum applications from Kosovo Albanians, 
however, it had granted these only in very few cases. Most Albanians and Kosovo 
Albanians were considered economic migrants.458 Nonetheless, some politicians in 
Germany supported independence for Kosovo: in 1991 the Social Democrats, in 
opposition at the time, argued in support of Kosovan statehood. Using similar language 
to the cases of Croatia and Slovenia, they argued that it was important to 
‘internationalise’ the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo to allow for greater 
international intervention. The German government, Christian Democrats and Free 
Democrats at the time, were also in contact with the Kosovan leadership. 459 Within 
the German Green party, in opposition at the time, some considered a German 
recognition of Kosovo possible after the declaration of independence of 1991.460 
Political ties continued to develop with the Albanian and Kosovan leadership among 
all German political factions in the early 1990s. Albania became the greatest recipient 
of foreign aid from the German government, and the German foreign minister even 
encouraged Albanian NATO membership. 461 However, this did not result in greater 
support for Kosovan independence at international level. Instead, the German 
government, throughout the 1990s, pursued a policy of increased autonomy with 
strong minority rights for the Albanian populations.462 Overall, German efforts to raise 
the question of Albanians in international fora, were too weak and lacked institutional 
support from their international partners.463  
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The German policy toward Kosovo has been described as being strongly affected by 
the aftermath of the Croatian and Slovenian independence claims and recognitions. 
Germany was blamed widely by its European partners for escalating the conflict and 
the outbreak of war with Serbia, as well as for undermining the international process 
for recognition.464 Thus, for the remainder of the 1990s, the German leadership would 
be aligned closely with its international and Western partners, especially the United 
States, on the policy. Germany thus continued to participate actively in multilateral 
and international fora and avoided insinuating support for unilateral independence or 
recognition.465 
 
The only international forum in which the question was discussed was the Special 
Group on Kosovo, which had been established by the London Conference. The 
chairmanship of this group in the beginning lay with German ambassadors Geert 
Ahrens and Martin Lutz. Bonn’s initially optimistic approach towards this working 
group was disappointed, as attempts to establish autonomy for Kosovans in Serbia 
were met with strong opposition from the Serbian government. The literature has 
viewed the Special Group rather critically, as it did not discuss the status question 
directly and achieved no progress on any of the policy issues which it set out to 
discuss.466 Overall, within this forum, and throughout the period prior to the greater 
involvement of the international community in the Kosovo questions, Germany 
pursued a policy focused on re-establishing greater autonomy for Kosovans within the 
borders of the FRY and to achieve direct negotiations between the two conflicting 
parties.467 
 
From 1994 onwards Germany was part of the Contact Group, which consisted of the 
United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and 
Germany. It was originally the main international forum to coordinate work on the 
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Bosnia conflict and in the late 1990s began to work on Kosovo.468 Through the Contact 
Group Germany was also involved in the settlement of the Bosnia conflict in 1995 at 
the Dayton Conference. Although there had been hopes that in this conference the 
Kosovo status question would also be addressed, this was not the case. The focus of 
these negotiations was on the aftermath of the Croatian and Bosnian wars and resulted 
in the establishment of the Bosnian Federation.469 The failure to bring the Kosovo 
question onto the agenda stemmed from the Serbian leadership’s refusal to accept the 
issue as an international matter. The head of the German delegation at the conference, 
Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, described raising the question with Milosevic who 
‘exploded’ at the mere mention of Kosovo.470  
 
The question of Kosovo was not a priority after Dayton. The international community 
had established new conditions for the FRY after the Bosnia war. The hope was that 
this would also improve the situation for Kosovo Albanians.471 However the Contact 
Group was split regarding whether or not to take a reconciliatory approach with the 
FRY. The United States, with support from Germany, were particularly 
confrontational towards the FRY, while France had favoured appeasement. This 
became particularly evident when France recognised the FRY as an independent state 
in 1996, with Germany being the last EU member to recognise it. Germany’s change 
of position on the recognition of the FRY from a strict non-recognition to recognition 
was linked to migration policy. The German government had pursued more systematic 
returns and the repatriation of Kosovan refugees to Serbia. Through recognition, 
Germany was able to impose greater conditions on a repatriation agreement to manage 
the returns effectively. However, few asylum seekers were deported because the 
security situation in Kosovo deteriorated quickly.472 
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The Kosovo Albanians, in a pacifist movement under Ibrahim Rugova, had been 
struggling to keep the resistance in the region peaceful. This was mainly because 
support from the international community had been weak. The Contact Group at the 
time continued to adopt a wait and see approach. After NATO had intervened in the 
Bosnia conflict, it was hoped that the possibility of a military response from the West 
would seem more likely to Milosevic and put additional pressure on the Serbian 
leadership. 473 Since the situation had not escalated in comparison to Croatia and 
Bosnia, the international community continued to hope that it would remain calm and 
that after two violent conflicts in the region it would be possible to solve the Kosovo 
issues peacefully with Serbia.474 The Contact Group thus made no commitments to the 
status of Kosovo and encouraged the finding of a solution within the borders of the 
FRY.475 By 1996, however, the KLA had begun to gain more popular support and 
access to weapons. This was followed by a strong response from Serbia, which used 
the activities of the KLA to suppress and expel the Albanian population.476  
 
From the summer of 1996 Ambassador Martin Lutz, the German chair of the Special 
Group on Kosovo, worked in collaboration with the EU to initiate dialogue between 
Serbian and Kosovan leadership. Additionally, from 1997, the Contact Group began 
to work on Kosovo in the hope of coordinating an international response to the status 
issue generally and addressing the increasing military activities of the KLA.477 This 
effort for a return to the Kosovo status question can be traced back to the German 
delegation in the Special and Contact Groups. However, the discussion in New York 
in December 1997 resulted in the Serbian delegation abandoning dialogue and leaving 
immediately. Also, the conclusion of the Contact Group ministers only resulted in an 
‘expression of concerns’ rather than a specific call to action or policy 
recommendations.478  
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Germany’s position in the period of the dissolution of Yugoslavia was defined by its 
domestic approach towards the independence of Kosovo and the international backlash 
after its unilateral recognition of Croatia. Domestic political actors supported the 
independence based on the ‘internationalisation’ argument. This was despite the fact 
that the Badinter Commission established uti possidetis as the principle for managing 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This period also shows Germany actively participating 
in the different international fora established on Kosovo, such as the Special Group, 
the Contact Group and within the EU. However, its efforts to bring the greater attention 
to the question of Kosovo were stifled by its international partners. Unlike in the case 
of Croatia, Germany did not pursue unilateral recognition of Kosovo but focused on 
promoting efforts for greater autonomy within Serbia. 
 
3.3  Leading up to the Kosovo War of 1999 
From late 1997 to 1998 tensions among Contact Group members heightened. In 
principle the Contact Group had agreed on supporting greater autonomy for Kosovo 
within Serbia. The United States, however, pushed for sanctions against the FRY while 
Russia strongly opposed these. Germany, France and the UK tried to mediate between 
the two superpowers, underlining progress in the Serbian response towards autonomy 
claims. However, because of US threats to leave the Contact Group, sanctions were 
agreed in early April 1998.479 Russia’s greater engagement in the conflict became 
clearer and Germany found itself increasingly mediating between the United States 
and the Russian Federation. 
 
In the following months, the United States exerted increasing pressure for military 
intervention. However, International Organisations were sending mixed signals in 
regards to the threat to Milosevic. The international conditions to Serbia included the 
cessation of violence against Albanians, humanitarian access and a political process 
on Kosovo. Milosevic had made small concessions, which resulted in hope from some 
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European leaders that military force would not have to be used. NATO allies were 
reluctant to act without a UN resolution. Thus, due to Russia’s continuing support for 
Serbia in the Security Council, Milosevic did not have to fear an immediate military 
intervention.480  
 
From the efforts of the two main US negotiators Holbrooke and Hill in October 1998, 
prior to the NATO bombing campaign, the US’s emphasis was on the containment of 
Milosevic rather than on a political solution to the status or even independence of 
Kosovo. The question of the final settlement was avoided in the negotiations under 
Ambassador Hill. Instead, the negotiations focused on local administration and 
proposed a three year waiting period before a commitment to status negotiations.481 
Ultimately, it was Holbrooke’s direct talks with Milosevic that led to a pause in 
military action from the FRY side in the fall of 1998. While the Kosovans were aware 
of the proposed agreements, they eventually did not become party to the final 
agreement with the FRY.482 The agreement was brokered solely by the US, to the 
exclusion from the Holbrooke talks of the western allies, including Germany.483 
 
Although excluded from the process, Germany had committed to participate in a 
NATO mission in Kosovo, should the ultimatum have to be implemented. The 
domestic debate in Germany was discussed in Chapter Two:484 the Christian 
Democrat-Liberal coalition government had argued for German participation before 
leaving office in October 1998. I discussed how the decision to participate in the 
bombing was controversial for the new Social Democrat-Green government coalition. 
The lack of legal authorization from the UN Security Council was particularly 
controversial for German critics. The German government’s justification focused on 
the issue of preventing genocide, requiring collective responsibility to stop dictators 
from committing such a crime. German policy makers interpreted the Milosevic 
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regime as the main aggressor in this conflict against the civilian population of Kosovo. 
However, at this stage the support that had existed among German policy makers for 
an independent Kosovo in the early 1990s was not translated into government policy. 
The NATO mission was not framed as a liberation of Kosovans or to support their 
right of self-determination but to end Serbian aggression.485 
 
The final negotiation effort in Rambouillet in February 1999 prior to the war with 
NATO changed the dynamics among the Contact Group and the conflict parties. 
Germany and Italy were relegated to second tier members and excluded from the main 
negotiations.486 The KLA had replaced Rugova as their negotiator. This represented a 
significant shift in the recognition of the regime and delegation representing Kosovo. 
The KLA had been previously labelled as a terrorist group by the United States.487 
This shift towards the KLA also led to greater support for the independence claim, 
especially from within the US delegation.488 The Contact Group imposed a final 
ultimatum to find a settlement under threat of a NATO operation in Serbia. Among 
Contact Group members there was resistance towards the independence claims. But 
the KLA, at this point, saw anything short of immediate independence or a NATO 
operation in Serbia as less beneficial and was thus unlikely to support any kind of 
political settlement. 489 The lack of leadership within the Contact Group and 
contradicting policies within it have been blamed for the lack of progress at the 
Rambouillet negotiations. The initial leadership of Europe was quickly undone as the 
US received support from France and the UK to negotiate directly with Milosevic, 
who had refused to attend the conference himself.490 While the Contact Group worked 
on the basis of unanimity, the UK had become sympathetic to the claims for 
independence from the Kosovo Albanians and UK diplomat Robin Cook was keen to 
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keep the option of independence open following the three-year interim period.491 
Germany’s exclusion from the main negotiations meant it had little influence on the 
process and was merely kept informed.492 
 
Germany’s role in the international negotiations had been weakened as the consensus 
moved towards military intervention and it had struggled to mediate on the question 
of status of Kosovo. Although Germany held the EU presidency at the time, the new 
Social Democrat-Green government had still to earn trust from the western allies.493 
Unlike Germany, the French position had been against promoting independence for 
Kosovo.494 The EU and Germany were on occasion in conflict with US dealings, and 
in comparison had little influence on the Serbs or the Kosovar Albanians in the 
negotiations.495 European NATO members had been calling for a political strategy for 
the aftermath of the bombing of Serbia and Germany sought to take a central role in 
this process. German Foreign Minister Joseph Fischer worked with US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright on a joint paper to set political conditions for the NATO 
bombardment of the FRY to stop. Negotiations over the status of Kosovo based on the 
Rambouillet accords and an international military presence on the ground were two 
essential conditions.496 In regards to the status of Kosovo, Rambouillet intended to 
freeze its status for three years before it would be renegotiated. Some have blamed this 
plan for a more aggressive occupation of Kosovo by Milosevic. A future negotiated 
settlement was likely to lead to a loss of full Serb control and thus gave the Serb 
leadership no incentive to keep to a diplomatic or political solution.497 With the failure 
of Rambouillet and after months of military threats from NATO, the bombardment 
began on 24 March 1999. The details of the NATO mission are beyond the scope of 
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this research. Germany sought to develop its role in the negotiations to focus on future 
political and civilian aspects of the international intervention in Kosovo.  
 
3.4  German multilateral diplomacy and the Fischer Plan 
After Germany had de facto been excluded from the main negotiations in Rambouillet 
and once the NATO operation began, Germany gained more diplomatic influence 
through a proposal brought forward initially by foreign minister Fischer, often referred 
to as the ‘Fischer Plan’. The proposal’s demands included that Serbs should accept an 
immediate ceasefire, removal of all Serbian troops, the disarmament and withdrawal 
of paramilitary Serbian groups, the return of refugees, and that Serbia express 
willingness for a political solution based on the Rambouillet accord.498 Fischer aired 
his proposal in different international fora and was able to gain support from the US, 
which had opposed a temporary ceasefire. The progress of this plan went firstly to the 
Quint, the five western Contact Group members, before gaining support from Russia 
in the Contact Group. Here Germany used both its position as rotating president in the 
EU but more importantly its chairmanship of the G8 at the same time. This allowed 
for an additional forum to include Russia in the talks. The plan was then discussed at 
NATO level and, finally, it also received support from EU foreign ministers.499 Most 
importantly the plan primarily allowed for a cessation of hostilities and paved the way 
to UN resolution 1244, which provided a settlement for the Kosovo conflict.500  
 
From Germany’s perspective this multilateral process was deemed a major success. 
The new Social Democrat-Green government had succeeded in re-gaining access to 
the main negotiations on Kosovo and in brokering a consensus among its key western 
allies as well as with Russia. As discussed in Chapter Two, multilateralism has been a 
central aspect to Germany’s foreign policy role. The Kosovo war had been a 
significant issue for German policy makers due to the military aspect and the lack of 
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consensus in the UN Security Council. Rebuilding such a consensus and promoting 
civilian and political solutions was in closer alignment with the concept of Germany 
behaving as a Civilian Power. For the Social Democrats and the Green party, which 
both considered themselves coming from an anti-militaristic tradition, this change in 
Germany’s role was also of political importance to maintain the credibility of the 
newly elected coalition government. 
 
In this period, Germany also initiated the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, with 
the intention of  bringing the Western Balkans closer to the EU in the aftermath of the 
war. This initiative was mainly attributed to German Foreign Minister Fischer. The so-
called Fischer Plan sought economic and development support to the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia and provided prospects for future membership in NATO and the 
European Union. The German approach was met with concern about further 
enlargement plans within the EU, but the Fischer Plan became a key German strategy 
towards the Western Balkans to ensure regional stability.501 Germany had been the 
main supporter for EU enlargement after the end of the Cold War, which included 
Central and Eastern European countries.502 It headed the major enlargement process 
in the early 1990s with the establishment of the Association Agreements and the 
Copenhagen Criteria, which introduced structure and criteria for joining the EU.503 
The Social Democrat-Green government saw the opportunity to extend its role relating 
to the Western Balkans by applying a similar approach. After the Kosovo war, 
Germany thus emerged as an active multilateral player who had engaged with its major 
allies and delivered in regards to military appeals from NATO, while focusing on 
civilian aspects in the aftermath of the war. 
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This interpretation of the events was particularly important for the German domestic 
audience. Internationally, the settlement of the conflict was accredited to Russia and 
the United States, who negotiated the final settlement, as I will discuss below. 
Nonetheless, discussing the process in the Bundestag, Fischer emphasised the role of 
Germany in bringing the UK and France to an agreement and the importance of the 
multilateral process through the G8 and the EU.504 An interesting development in 
regards to the German position is also that while in the lead up to the military 
intervention Germany did not prioritise the question of the status of Kosovo, Fischer 
mentioned it after the NATO operation started. In the Bundestag he raised the question 
as to whether maintaining the territorial integrity of the FRY at all costs was a realistic 
strategy.505 Thereby, he reintroduced the issue, although as we will see below, at 
international level the support for independence had weakened again.  
 
3.5  Political Settlement and UN Resolution 1244 
The political settlement after the Kosovo war was eventually only possible due to the 
involvement of the Russian diplomat Chernomyrdin, who was part of the 
EU/US/Russia Troika, along with Martti Ahtisaari and Strobe Talbott.506 The UNSC 
resolution 1244 established the UN Mission UNMIK and made important concessions 
to Milosevic in comparison to the Rambouillet accords. Firstly, the international 
presence would be under United Nations command with a status-neutral approach. The 
status neutrality of the UN implied that it would neither support independence nor the 
reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia. Secondly, the Rambouillet claim for the 
'unrestricted access' of NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops throughout the FRY was 
dropped. Finally, the Rambouillet accords were not to be the basis for further status 
debate as suggested by Fischer and Albright.507 Instead, the G8 Petersberg declaration 
was taken as the basis for the political settlement. Here, Rambouillet is merely to be 
taken into 'full account' with 'the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
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the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region'.508 This 
meant that the three-year interim period, as well as the promise of a referendum on the 
status of Kosovo, had been removed from the political settlement.  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 became a legal milestone in the contemporary 
discussion of Kosovo’s status and its claim to independence. Its ambiguity was, 
however, fundamental to the progress that was made on the status question: Despite 
stating that the resolution will take ‘full account’ of the Rambouillet accords several 
times, the text does not refer specifically to the three year waiting period as described 
in Rambouillet. It also mentions a commitment to the territorial integrity of the FRY, 
also emphasising the Helsinki Final Act, which cited the rejection of military 
intervention in other states to undermine territorial integrity.509 Considering the 
international community’s hesitance for Kosovan independence throughout the 
previous negotiations, it could be argued that 1244 was a compromise to leave all 
possible future negotiations open. In Chapter Two, I discussed the principle of 
territorial integrity and its juxtaposition with the principle of self-determination.510 The 
reference to territorial integrity in UNSC resolution 1244 was taken by those arguing 
against Kosovan independence as supporting internal rather than external self-
determination. Therefore, Serbian territorial integrity would be maintained by 
providing greater autonomy rather than independence. Russian supporters of the 
Serbian position argued that at the time this was the understanding and thus the reason 
Russia supported the resolution. This central disagreement on the intention of UNSC 
resolution 1244 on the status of Kosovo would define the future negotiations between 
Kosovo and Serbia. 
 
After nearly a decade of conflict in the former Yugoslavia the end to the Kosovo 
conflict did not come with the ousting of Milosevic by foreign forces but through an 
internationally brokered agreement. The overthrow of Milosevic eventually happened 
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with popular support led by Voislav Koštunica as part of the Democratic Party of 
Serbia, who defeated Milosevic and the Socialist Party in the 2000 elections. The 
campaign was marked by controversy and Milosevic attempted to reject the result. 
Koštunica, although far from adopting the nationalist position of Milosevic, 
considered Kosovo an integral part of Serbia. His strong views on Kosovo would 
define the negotiation process until 2008.511 
 
3.6  German position on Kosovo post-UNSC 1244 
German foreign minister Fischer had questioned the territorial integrity of the FRY 
but after UNSC resolution 1244 had been established he did not pursue this further. 
He argued that the time was not right to discuss the status question but instead it was 
urgent to focus on setting up a process and international framework to accompany any 
future discussion on the status.512 The settlement after the Kosovo war had been 
defined by the division between Russia and the United states on Kosovo’s status. 
While there had been momentum to support Kosovan independence during the 
Rambouillet accords, the international community, including western supporters of 
Kosovo, were now taking a more careful approach again.  
 
In Germany, the Kosovo status question was however raised in the Bundestag. The 
Christian Democrats in particular, argued that the current international and European 
approach was without a long term strategy for the Balkans, especially in regards to the 
status question.513 The response from the government parties, the Social Democrats 
and Greens, was that the current volatile situation should not be upset by any 
speculation or discussion on status.514 In response to continued pressure from the 
Christian Democrats, Fischer blamed the opposition for engaging in ‘dangerous’ 
speculation, countering that the government would not want to make the same mistake 
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as the Christian Democrats had done in the case of Croatia and Slovenia. While he 
stood by the importance of recognising the two republics, he emphasised multiple 
times the failure to create an international framework to manage the process.515 Also, 
the coalition partner, the Social Democrats, warned about any attempts from the 
Christian Democrats at this stage to weaken the consensus over status neutrality, 
suggesting that the focus should instead be on the democratisation of Serbia and 
stabilisation of the region.516 The Christian Democrats in contrast advocated an 
advancement in the status of Kosovo and a fundamental role of the United Nations in 
the process. The ethnic separation of Albanians and Serbs was perceived as non-
reversible by the party and a more comprehensive plan to accept this reality would, 
according to the CDU, lead to peace in the region.517 The Free Democrats also opposed 
the proposal from the Christian Democrats specifically as it was opposed to an 
independent Kosovo.518 Although within the Green party and from the foreign minister 
support for Kosovan independence continued to exist, the division in the coalition 
government and the status neutral approach under UN resolution 1244 meant a more 
hesitant German policy in regards to Kosovo’s status at this stage. Generally, the 
government coalition parties appear to have been bound by the international situation 
on Kosovo and thus continued to reiterate the point of status neutrality and the need to 
establish regional stability, especially in light of the Serbian elections.519 This was 
supported by the FDP in opposition.520 Later in 2000 some divisions became evident 
as the Christian Democrats continued to push for specific progress in talks and 
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suggested a republic status for Kosovo within the FRY, similarly to that of 
Montenegro.521  
 
German domestic parties appear to be split on the question of Kosovo. While in the 
early 1990s most showed sympathies for Kosovan claims for independence and there 
was a consensus among the parties on Croatian independence, this appears to have 
changed by the end of the 1990s. The settlement through UNSC resolution 1244 
significantly influenced the coalition parties and reduced their public commitment to 
Kosovan independence. The Christian Democrats, which had just lost the federal 
elections in Germany and were now in the opposition for the first time in 16 years, 
argued for greater involvement of the international community and support for 
independence 
 
3.7  The early UNMIK years 
The fall of Milosevic and the establishment of UNMIK represented a new period for 
the Serbia-Kosovo conflict. For the international community, efforts would focus on 
rebuilding the region and its states after the conflict. Political and status questions were 
put to one side, due in part to the new political landscape in Kosovo and Serbia. 
Germany, like other western states, supported an improved status for Kosovo in 
principle. However, the leadership of the KLA was considered unsuitable as political 
partner due to its undemocratic structures, its possible participation in war crimes and 
its uncompromising stance on independence for Kosovo.522 The new Serbian 
leadership was under much scrutiny as well. Although Koštunica had been supported 
by many western governments in his campaign against Milosevic, his inexperience 
and inflexible stance on Kosovo was cause for insecurity and some suspicion.523 
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The relationships between the conflict parties and the international community 
developed significantly over the subsequent years due to the following: the political 
leadership in both Serbia and Kosovo, the international position of Russia, the 
increasing support for an independent Kosovo from the United States, and the 
increasing role of the EU in the Western Balkans.  
 
UNMIK remained status neutral and avoided any apparent support for Kosovan 
independence in its operations. Slow developments towards allowing more ‘self-
governance’ were initiated by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG), Hans Haekkerup, from 2001. A constitutional framework was established 
with some success, which left executive powers to the SRSG and allowed for 
representations within the parliament and the representation of minorities.524 
Germany’s official policy followed closely the work of the UN and the Contact Group 
and resulted in little debate. The 2001 and 2002 annual reports by the German 
government on South Eastern Europe supported the policy of focusing on practical 
policy issues in Kosovo rather than on the status question.525 Specifically, in the 2002 
report, Germany’s position on Kosovo became defined as non-determined on the status 
question, rejecting a territorial division within Kosovo and supporting the building of 
a multi-ethnic and democratic state. By 2003 Germany had brought forward an 
initiative to reactivate the Contact Group and welcomed the start of work on the 
possible independence question.526  
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Within the Contact Group there had been disagreement on the level of self-governance 
for Kosovan Albanians that should be allowed at this stage. While the United States 
would have supported a much more comprehensive self-governance for the Kosova 
Albanians, others were more reluctant to raise hopes of self-governance, not wishing 
to initiate the status discussion at such an early stage.527 The difficulties in establishing 
a government and continued inter-ethnic tensions led to the increasing involvement of 
the SRSG. The new post-holder, German diplomat Michael Steiner, introduced the 
concept of ‘Standards before Status’ in 2003. The rationale behind the policy was that 
Kosovo was not yet ready for full self-governance or talks on its status. Instead Kosovo 
would have to fulfil specific benchmarks before being able to discuss the question of 
status. A complex matrix of conditions and standards was provided by UNMIK, which 
focused on key policy areas including institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, 
rights of return, economic development, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and 
reforming the Kosovo protection corps.528 
 
The new leadership in Serbia was not supportive of full Kosovan independence. On 
the other side, the KLA was keen on a payoff and independence.529 Instead, the focus 
was put on functional state institutions and the improvement of inter-ethnic relations 
as well as the protection of minorities.530 The doctrine of Standards before Status was 
also a response to the continued volatility of states in the wider Western Balkan region. 
The UN wanted to discourage secessionist movements, such as the Republika Srpska 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.531 Along with the institutional conditionality of UNMIK, 
the 2003 EU Council conference in Thessaloniki promised a ‘European perspective’ 
to the Western Balkans. While this perspective was welcomed, it was also long-term 
and attached to conditionality on regional integration, the establishment of democratic 
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institutions and minority rights. This was also the financial and institutional backing 
to the original Fischer’s Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe.532 The period after the 
establishment of UNMIK represented an important phase in which the international 
community was attempting to establish governance in Kosovo without approaching 
the status question yet. With greater conditionality and the indication of the prospect 
for European integration the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia was to be managed. 
The rationale for the international community was to use the leverages of future 
statehood for Kosovo or EU integration of the region as a whole. However, the 
conditionality for and delay in addressing the status questions would lead to significant 
challenges for the international community in Kosovo. 
 
3.8  Violence of 2004 and Eide Report 
The long-term view taken on the conflict created stagnation on the ground, frustrations 
with progress on the governance of Kosovo, and increasing disappointment with and 
hostility towards UNMIK. In 2004, violent protest became a major concern for the 
international community. Among German policy makers, particularly outbreaks of 
violence, raised fears of a returning armed conflict. Since the end of war in Kosovo, 
German troops had been positioned in the territory as part of KFRO. This ongoing 
military operation had become a central issue in German foreign policy. The issue of 
German troops in the region was continuously discussed in the Bundestag. The 
deteriorating security situation was considered an increasing risk for German troops. 
The projection from the Auswärtige Amt on the development of the situation was very 
pessimistic.533 By early 2004, the opposition Christian Democrats and Free Democrats 
continued to argue in the Bundestag for a restart to negotiations, reiterating that the 
unresolved status question was a significant obstacle for economic and democratic 
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development.534 Thus, the German government began to pursue again a political 
process between Belgrade and Pristina.535  
 
Within the international community attention had shifted away from the Balkans and 
towards Afghanistan and Iraq.536 The European Union was expected to take over from 
UNMIK and develop a greater role in the Western Balkans, and Kosovo in particular. 
The security situation on the ground in Kosovo and the inability of KFOR to cope with 
the violence was of grave concern. The UN’s standards before status policy had failed 
to help Kosovo fulfil these standards and it had not changed the position of the two 
conflict parties. Trust in UNMIK fell in July to a low of 30% approval, while it had 
been above 70% at the beginning of the mission.537 The attacks against mainly Serb 
minority enclaves appeared to be coordinated, with groups transported into the 
enclaves to intimidate and attack the communities.538  
 
For Germany, at this stage, the priority became calming the situation and reducing 
security risks as well as possible spill over risks to the region.539 In regards to the status 
question, the violence of 2004 has been cited as a turning point in the thinking of 
western diplomats on the status question. Independence for Kosovo was considered 
the most likely outcome among western diplomats. Commentators and those working 
on the issue at the time are hesitant to determine when exactly independence emerged 
as policy.540 However, within German circles it was accepted that the United States 
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had made independence its priority and was going to pursue this through new talks. 
While the United States appeared not to consider any alternative position to timely and 
full independence, Germany was not committed to independence in the short term but 
did not have an alternative proposal at this stage.541 From a German perspective the 
stability in the region and potential risk in regards to its own troops was the priority.542 
The status issue was not raised in the Bundestag or in public discussion on the issue 
until much later. 
 
In 2005 the UN Secretary General Special Envoy in Kosovo, Norwegian diplomat Karl 
Eide, presented his assessment of the situation in Kosovo. His comments were very 
critical and suggested the transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to the Kosovan 
authorities and the initiation of further status talks.543 He emphasised the future role of 
the EU in the report. At multiple stages the report identifies the EU as the key 
institution to lead on issues of police and justice, as well as the on implementation of 
the standards process.544 Security and the status question, however, were mainly 
identified as being the responsibility of other international organisations.545  
 
The report after the 2004 violence and the failed efforts by UNMIK shows an 
important shift in which the EU would be increasingly taking a lead role in the question 
of Kosovo. The EU had already been involved in the multifaceted state building 
activities international community in Kosovo from 1999 onwards.546 While the UN 
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led the international community in Kosovo after the war, several international 
organisations were present and worked in similar directions with regards to 
conditionality. The United Nations, the EU and the Organisation of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) shared civilian aspects while NATO provided military 
security. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) fell under the UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary General. Its main responsibilities were policing and 
justice, civil administration, democratisation and economic reconstruction. At the 
same time, the EU was present through the European Agency of Reconstruction and 
the European Union Monitoring mission. The EU established a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy office in Kosovo in 2004. The EU’s future leading role became 
increasingly evident. The establishment of the International Civilian Office in 2006 
under a European diplomat was to replace UNMIK with the expected UN agreement 
after the negotiations. Further, a European Union planning team worked in Pristina 
since 2006 and focused on crisis management, specifically policy, justice and 
preparing a future mission in Kosovo.547 
 
After the Eide Report it appears that the independence of Kosovo was considered an 
aspect of this future development. However, strong support for independence came 
from the United States, which was also intending to retreat from its leading role in the 
region. The talks on the status of Kosovo suggested by Special Envoy Eide were to be 
held under the auspices of the UN. The following period would therefore be affected 
by the coordination between several international institutions, including the United 
Nations and the EU.  
 
3.9  Vienna Talks and Ahtisaari Process 
3.9.1   German position before Ahtisaari 
The return of greater international involvement in Kosovo’s status resulted in greater 
attention in the Bundestag to the issue. In the parliamentary debate on the government 
report on South Eastern Europe, divisions along political party lines re-emerged and 
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would define the next four years of the negotiations. Disagreements among political 
parties mainly concerned how the international community should approach these 
fresh talks. All parties feared an escalation of the situation, due to the stalemate 
between Serbia and Kosovo, and a return to violence. However, the responses within 
the parties were different and reflected different approaches to multilateralism. The 
Christian Democrats, in opposition,  accused the government again of delaying 
tactics.548 The continued pressure from the CDU for greater involvement of Germany 
and more support to solve the status question reflected its more Atlanticist outlook. 
The party was in line with the US government’s intention to support Kosovan 
independence in the future. Representing the government policy, the Social Democrat 
MdB Uta Zapf rejected any criticisms from the Christian Democrats that the German 
government was not giving enough importance to the status question and delaying 
progress on this issue. She also emphasised the importance of not leaving Belgrade 
behind and being able to offer some kind of bargain to the Serbian leadership.549 While 
the SPD had expressed support for the independence of Kosovo in the early 1990s 
during the Milosevic regime, its position towards Belgrade changed after he was 
ousted. Throughout this period the Social Democrats were keen to emphasise the 
democratisation process of Serbia after the conflict and to support the new leadership 
rather than alienate it unnecessarily over Kosovo. The Free Democrats presented a 
third alternative to the multilateral approach Germany should take. They were highly 
sceptical of the apparent strong support for Kosovan independence among some 
international actors. The party had previously suggested EU-governance over the 
territory of Kosovo rather than independence and continued to advocate for this.550 
Thus for the Liberals greater EU involvement and intervention were considered the 
most sustainable solution for the conflict. Thus, prior to the Ahtisaari talks, there was 
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significant disagreement in Germany on how future multilateral negotiations on 
Kosovo’s status should proceed and what Germany’s role should be within them. 
 
3.9.2   Beginning of the talks 
After the Eide Report in 2005 recommended new talks on the Kosovo status, the 
Vienna talks began in 2006. The 15 rounds of talks, which were led by the former 
Finnish Prime Minister and UNSG Special Envoy for the Future Status of Kosovo 
Martti Ahtisaari, resulted in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement, often referred to as the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’. The specific talks for the Ahtisaari 
proposal have been discussed extensively in the literature and a detailed description is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I will highlight the positions of the parties 
generally and review the progress made.551 
 
Overall the talks were approached with scepticism from Belgrade and with enthusiasm 
from Kosovo.552 To a large extent, Pristina was hoping that the talks would initiate the 
long anticipated process that would lead to independence. The Kosovan leadership 
expected the talks to provide a constitutional framework for the future Kosovan state. 
The talks were to be held with a status neutral approach, however. Although some 
Contact Group members were particularly in favour of Kosovan independence, the 
talks were committed to the territorial integrity of the FRY, as per UNSC resolution 
1244, and aimed for a consensual agreement on the future status of Kosovo. 553 
 
In the process, Ahtisaari, rather than focusing the talks on the status question directly, 
decided to discuss specific policy issues first. This way, the conflict parties would be 
able to compromise on concrete problems on the ground to improve relations between 
Belgrade and Pristina without having to make concessions on status. However, the 
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positions of the two conflict parties were inflexible. Pristina, now again represented 
by Rugova, was reluctant to consider anything short of independence, while Serbia 
suggested again greater autonomy, but not independence. Because of this stalemate, 
commentators have argued that Ahtisaari had little ambition to continue the talks or 
hope of reaching a consensual agreement. The Serbian delegation argued that 
Ahtisaari’s proposal was presented with little possibility of amending or discussing 
them comprehensively.554  
 
2006 was also the year of Montenegrin independence after the status referendum, 
which affected the EU’s and Germany’s approach towards Kosovo and fears of 
potential instability in the region. Although in the case of Montenegro a path to 
independence had been agreed with Belgrade, there were concerns about greater 
political pressure from secessionist movements in the region. The EU had advocated 
a continued union between Serbia and Montenegro but EU incentives through 
enlargement prospects had little effect on the result.555 Germany, as many other EU 
member states, was also concerned about the possible regional repercussions of the 
Montenegro case. Government officials were therefore keen to stress that the legal 
process and agreements between Podgorica and Belgrade to implement the referendum 
result. As independence for Kosovo was becoming a viable option, it was stressed that 
whatever the outcome for Kosovo, it should be considered a sui generis case.556 
 
3.9.3   Progress of Ahtisaari Process 
Although negotiations were held under UN auspices and led by Ahtisaari, the Contact 
Group was involved in the process. The progress of the talks was also regularly 
discussed at the UN Security Council. The outcome of the talks, the Ahtisaari 
comprehensive proposal on the status of Kosovo, was eventually rejected by Serbia, 
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276; Friis (2007) p. 83. 
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after many months of trying to find a compromise within the Security Council and 
among the conflict parties.557 The talks were defined by debates and disagreements 
between the United States and Russia in the Security Council. Here, disagreement 
ranged from the role of the talks, the expected framework, for example the role of 
Serbian territorial integrity, the relevance of the Helsinki agreement, as well as the 
duration of the talks. Russia also argued that whatever the outcome of these talks, it 
would have to be build on a universally applicable legal principle and that it would not 
accept sui generis justification. While the US wanted to finalise the talks by the end of 
2006, Russia, in support of the Serbian delegation, pushed for an extension. 558 
 
The Serbian delegation’s mistrust in the process and its perceived undermining of it 
by the Kosovan delegation led to very little progress on either the practical policy 
issues or the larger status question. Because the Kosovan delegation was expecting 
independence as the ultimate outcome, it considered its approach to be already 
conceding, while the Serbian delegation saw the whole process set up against its 
interest. The first policy area, decentralisation, was supposed to help the delegations 
to ease into the process. The discussions on this topic, however, dragged on for several 
months with little progress. Issues of Serb municipalities and power sharing appeared 
impossible to overcome. Kosovans perceived themselves to be allowing concessions, 
including extensive minority rights provision for the Serbian minority in Kosovo, 
which was not reciprocated from Serbia. Little time was left for economic issues.559 
When later in the process Serbia pushed for a discussion on status it reiterated its 
proposal for a twenty-year agreement on autonomy after which an independence 
would be a possibility. While, in the eyes of the Serbian delegation, the proposal was 
considered a de facto offer of independence, the Kosovan delegation considered this 
rather a repetition of previous proposals of greater autonomy.560 
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558 Ker-Lindsay (2009) p. 43. 
559 Weller (2009) p. 220. 
560 Ker-Lindsay (2009) p. 32. 
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The Serbian perspective, as the negotiations continued, perceived independence as 
being as treated as an unavoidable outcome and that other status options were not to 
be discussed. The focus on policy issues had been welcomed to get the parties to speak 
to each other, but leaving the status question unresolved, created significant grievance 
and mistrust from the Serbian delegation.561 At the same time, Ahtisaari perceived the 
Serbian delegation as non-collaborative in the process. Serbia had sent less senior 
officials to the negotiations and insisted on the argument of territorial integrity as the 
priority for the outcome of the talks.562 Serbia’s less collaborative position was 
supported by Russia, who approached the negotiations more as a general discussion 
rather than a process to resolve the conflict. To other participants in the negotiations, 
Russia appeared interested in creating a frozen conflict in Europe. While it contributed 
and participated in the talks, its legalistic approach towards resolution 1244 indicated 
its inflexible position and unwillingness to compromise on the status.563  
 
3.9.4   Germany’s multilateral role and position during the Ahtisaari Process 
By the time of the Ahtisaari process, Germany’s role in the Contact Group had changed 
considerably as compared to the late 1990s. After the conflict with the other Quint 
members over the recognition of Croatia, Germany had been able to re-establish trust 
and create a new role for itself in the Contact Group. Through the 2000s Germany 
became the most proactive European power in the Balkans.564 By both Pristina and 
Belgrade, Germany was considered a balanced international actor. Within the Contact 
Group Germany took the role of a mediator with Russia, with which it had the closest 
political relationship among Quint members. Altmann identifies this period as central 
for Germany to reconcile its position in the Western Balkans as leader among the 
European countries politically, militarily, and economically. The role of German 
officials in Kosovo international missions, as well as its military contingent, gave 
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Germany significantly more credibility and relevance than in other conflicts at the 
time.565 Thus Germany was able to take an active role within the Contact Group 
without appearing too forthright, as it had done in the Croatian case. This did not result 
in a leadership role but rather a confident use of the multilateral fora. 
 
In the period of the Eide report and the beginning of the Ahtisaari Process, a German 
general election took place in the fall of 2005, which resulted in a change in 
government. The Christian Democrat Angela Merkel was elected as Chancellor of a 
grand coalition with the Social Democrats. 566 Seven years after having approved the 
Kosovo operation, the CDU was now retuning to work on the conflict. The former 
senior coalition partner, the SPD, were now the junior partner and thereby held the 
foreign ministry. Franz-Walter Steinmeier, former head of the Chancellery under 
Gerhard Schröder, became foreign minister.567 In Chapter Two I highlighted how this 
period marked a change in foreign policy in Germany as Angela Merkel prioritised 
reviving the transatlantic relationship, which had suffered due to Germany’s refusal to 
participate in the Iraq war.568 While in opposition the Christian Democrats had been 
particularly critical of delays in the Kosovo status talks and indicated support for 
Kosovan independence. Thus this was another aspect in which the CDU would have 
sought closer collaboration with the US leadership, as it shared the US’s position on 
independence. The future government policy would however also depend on the 
relationship between the Chancellery and the foreign ministry. With seven years of 
experience in working on the Kosovo conflict in government, the SPD would still seek 
to influence the policy, despite the fact that it was now the junior partner of the 
coalition. Thus the Social Democrats’ sympathy for the Serbian position, which had 
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been expressed by MdBs before, would therefore continue to influence the position of 
the German government.  
 
With respect to its wider Western Balkan policy, after the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 
the EU in 2004 and the imminent Romanian and Bulgarian accession, there was little 
political appetite in Europe for further enlargement. ‘Enlargement fatigue’ was also 
reflected in public opinion. This meant that prospects for accession or accession status 
were delayed and had a diminished prominence in public discourse on EU foreign 
policy. Instead, the EU decided on stricter implementation of the accession criteria for 
future members.569 Consequently, while the prospect of EU accession would still be 
part of the approach to the Kosovo conflict  the stabilising effect that the coalition 
government had hoped for with the Fischer Plan and the EU perspective was 
significantly weaker than it had been at the beginning of the decade. Furthermore, the 
EU would continue to use conditionality.  In addition to the Copenhagen criteria, the 
EU imposed additional normative conditions onto the Western Balkans States. These 
included more focus on the rule of law and improved relations between different ethnic 
communities, such as returning refugees, and, most prominently, cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).570 Critics pointed 
to the volatility of societies after conflict and suggested that delay in the accession 
process would likely politicise EU conditionality.571 Paired with ‘enlargement 
fatigue’, the region faced a ‘fog of uncertainty’572 based on ‘lukewarm promises’.573 
However. the EU perspective on the Western Balkans was compatible with Germany’s 
foreign policy role as a Civilian Power. It fully embraced the logic of regional 
integration, and the promotion of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. The 
implementation of the policy, in light of the political reality and decreased capacity of 
the EU to accept new members, would become a difficulty for the new government. 
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The first official report by the new government commented on the Eide report and the 
beginning of the Ahtisaari process and was published in early 2006. Here, the 
government’s position appeared to continue its previous position. It stressed the 
importance of implementing UN resolution 1244 in the Ahtisaari process and 
emphasised the importance of a multilateral approach and the leadership of the UN.574 
In the Bundestag discussion of the report, the government State Secretary Gernot Erler 
(SPD) highlighted furthermore the risk of a continued unresolved status to the region, 
which was also echoed by his colleague defence minister Franz Josef Jung from the 
Christian Democrats.575 Erler pointed out that the Contact Group aimed to find a 
solution to the status question by the end of 2006. As part of this solution, the German 
government was committed to the ‘three Nos’ or red lines which had been agreed in 
the UN Security Council: no return to pre 1999 status, no unification of Kosovo with 
another state and no division of Kosovo into north and south.576 The government also 
stressed its involvement with the conflict parties directly. For example, foreign 
minister Steinmeier met with Kosovan Prime Minister Ceku to discuss the governance 
and minority right provision by the leadership in Pristina. Steinmeier had also 
discussed with President Koštunica Belgrade’s policy to encourage Serb Kosovans to 
retreat from local Kosovan institutions and had expressed his concern about such 
actions.577  
 
The grand coalition government thus began to emphasise its active role in the 
negotiations. It was also concerned with stressing the importance of the 
implementation of agreements that had been achieved in the talks and to uphold the 
policies of the Contact Group. At this stage, Germany was also presenting itself as 
taking a balanced approach to Pristina and Belgrade, although domestically there had 
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been strong support for independence. The opposition expressed disagreement with 
the progress of the talks. The Green party became more outspoken about the Serbian 
leadership than it had been in government. It criticised Koštunica and his approach for 
being too nationalistic.578 The Free Democrats continued to push for a quicker end to 
the talks and advocated the full integration of Kosovo into the EU.579 The Left party 
was closest to the position of the Serbian leadership and criticised Germany’s policy 
strongly. It reiterated the argument brought forward by the Serbian delegation that 
Ahtisaari had from the start attempted to undermine the territorial integrity of Serbia 
and UN resolution 1244. It cautioned the German government against recognising a 
new Kosovan state without Serbian support.580  
 
During the Ahtisaari process the German domestic position remained therefore split 
on the Kosovo status and the ongoing negotiations. Several parties acknowledged that 
the United States was supporting independence and that Ahtisaari had also been 
working towards this solution. The government did not at this stage publically support 
a unilateral declaration and highlighted the international consensus on UNSC 
resolution 1244, although interpretations of this resolution differed. It stressed the 
importance to work with all parties on a solution to the conflict. 
 
3.9.5   The Ahtisaari Proposal 
When the stalemate between the conflict parties and within the Security Council 
became insurmountable in the autumn of 2006, the Contact Group asked Ahtisaari to 
prepare his report and present it to the Security Council.581 From January 2007 
Ahtisaari met with the Contact Group and the conflict parties to discuss his proposal. 
The proposal set out the details for future self-governance of Kosovo, covering policies 
such as the political representation of different ethnic groups, minority rights, the 
justice system, economic structure and security.582 However, this proposal did not give 
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a recommendation on the status of Kosovo. Instead, in a separate document, Ahtisaari 
submitted a proposal for supervised independence in which he refers to Kosovo as a 
sui generis case as all efforts to reach an agreement had been exhausted.583 Prior to the 
official discussion and the letter being sent to the Security Council in March, the 
Serbian delegation had rejected the Ahtisaari plan. 
 
Political developments in Serbia affected the management of the breakdown of the 
talks: particularly, the secession of Montenegro, the new constitution and the 
parliamentary elections.584 The Serbian constitution text included now a specific 
reference to Kosovo as a part of Serbia and then introduced the new elections for 
January 2007.585 The election resulted in Prime Minister Koštunica returning to power 
although it took several months to form a government.586 Koštunica had also received 
repeated assurances from Russia that it would support Serbia’s position in the Security 
Council.587 Since there was little progress among the conflict parties, the Security 
Council was therefore also unlikely to provide a way out of the stalemate. Nonetheless, 
after the talks between Pristina and Belgrade had broken down the attention shifted to 
the multilateral level to find a solution on how to approach the deadlock. Discussions 
of the Ahtisaari proposals in the Security Council in the spring of 2007 highlighted the 
fundamental division in the approach to the Kosovo status between Russia and the US. 
While the US was keen to bring international negotiations on Kosovo to an end and 
supported the Ahtisaari Plan, Russia took a much more long-term approach, which 
resulted in an additional UN fact finding mission and led eventually to new talks in a 
Troika format.588  
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The end of the Ahtisaari Process coincided with a low point in the deteriorating 
relations between the United States and Russia. This was mainly due to conflict 
regarding the missile defence system the Bush administration of the United States had 
been pursuing since the early 2000s. The defence system had been quite controversial 
within Europe and had led to increasing tensions with Moscow.589 The Kosovo issue 
became tied into the discussion on missile defence and led to direct talks during the 
G8 pre-meeting in Potsdam, between US Secretary of State Rice and her Russian 
counterpart Lavrov.590 Within this context, the US agreed in principle that an extension 
of the talks was acceptable, although the United States was committed to an enhanced 
status of Kosovo. Simultaneously, US diplomats made assurances to the Kosovan 
leadership on different occasions in regards to their independence. Most importantly, 
US President George W Bush had declared shortly after the Heiligendamm G8 summit 
in June 2007 on a state visit to Albania that he supported Kosovan independence.591 
However, it appears that among the states supportive of Kosovan independence, 
considerations of unilateral recognition were held back at this stage.592 After the 
Ahtisaari Plan the collaboration between Germany and the United States on the 
Kosovo question intensified and Germany’s role grew again in regards to the Kosovo 
question.  
 
With the Ahtisaari process the international community had hoped to bring the Kosovo 
question to an end. The stalemate on the status question was however not overcome 
and additionally the relationship of the West with Russia deteriorated during this 
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period. A unilateral recognition at this point would have been of high risk, considering 
the growing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. Thus, the Quint sought new ways 
of engaging the conflict parties and Russia.  
 
3.9.6   The EU position during the Ahtisaari Process 
The EU had not been a central actor in the negotiations. Its engagement took place 
mainly through the EU members in the Contact Group and the Council of Ministers 
had echoed the statements made by the Contact Group. At the beginning of the 
Ahtisaari process, possible disagreements among EU Member States on the status of 
Kosovo were not addressed within the Council. Instead the priority was to support the 
process to reach an agreement between the conflict parties with the support of the UN 
Security Council Members.593 This agreement would have been necessary for the 
deployment of an EU mission in Kosovo. As per the recommendations of the Eide 
report, such an EU mission was to replace UNMIK and assist with rule of law and 
state building efforts. The EU had had a planning team in Kosovo since April 2006 
and was preparing for the deployment of such a mission.594  
 
The question of a possible unilateral declaration of independence was not considered 
an issue among EU members at this stage. Since the Ahtisaari talks were conducted 
on a ‘status neutral’ approach, supporting the process did not require EU members to 
declare their positions. With an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, EU 
members would not have had to make a decision about whether to recognise the 
contested statehood of Kosovo. Should there not be an agreement between Pristina and 
Belgrade, the Quint members hoped that supervised independence, tolerated by 
Russia, would lead to Serbia accepting a new status of Kosovo.595  
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As the difficulties in the Ahtisaari Process began to emerge and an agreement within 
the Security Council appeared very unlikely, disagreement also emerged among EU 
Member States. Already in March 2007 several Member States expressed unease about 
a possible UDI at a Gymnich meeting in Bremen.596 Kosovo was removed from the 
agenda at the following meeting of EU Foreign ministers in May as there was still not 
sufficient agreement to discuss the issue.597 The need for a UN Security Council 
resolution became an important request from many EU members, who were unwilling 
to sign off the Ahtisaari proposal if it was not accepted by both conflict parties or by 
the Security Council.598 This was in contrast to the institutional EU side where the 
Council and the Commission had been much more supportive of the Ahtisaari Plan 
and had encouraged member states to support it.599  
 
Within the Contact Group Germany had been working in favour of Kosovan 
independence. It also took a proactive in role in finalising the future Kosovan 
constitution, in close collaboration with the United Kingdom.600 In the EU, Germany 
held the EU presidency for six months from early 2007 while the Ahtisaari process 
appeared to be unravelling. Thus despite Germany’s support for independence, it was 
committed to deliver EU unity on the question of Kosovo. The German foreign 
ministry therefore promoted the use of the term sui generis in regards to Kosovo 
among EU members. Ahtisaari had used the term in his letter to the UN Secretary 
General. It implied that Kosovo was a special case due to the historical development 
of its status and the many years of international negotiation.601 The concept was 
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accepted by the Council of Ministers in June 2007.602 However the concept became a 
key argument for supporters of Kosovan independence and generated controversy. 
From this point onward, whether Kosovo was in fact a sui generis case or not was a 
fundamental aspect of the disagreement between recognising and non-recognising 
member states.  
 
The EU consensus on Kosovo’s status was in jeopardy. The EU policy towards the 
Western Balkans had been based on a rationale of promoting regional integration for 
conflict management. This had included the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, 
the Thessaloniki declaration and restarting the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement negotiations with Serbia as a reward for their increasing collaboration with 
the ICTY.603 However, the international disagreement on the status might undermine 
the future role of the EU in Kosovo. Until this point the Quint had been very confident 
of EU support for its policy. However, now with clarity on the status unlikely, the 
European Union and its member states required greater involvement in the 
international negotiations if it was to accept their outcome.  
 
3.10   Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the international negotiations on the status of Kosovo from 
the post Yugoslav period, throughout the 1990s and up to the end of the Ahtisaari 
process. The status of Kosovo was not negotiated as part of the post-Yugoslav order 
in the Western Balkans until the early 2000s. Kosovo was not included in the 
international legal process initiated through the Badinter Commission, which granted 
independence to Croatia and Serbia, or the Dayton Agreement, which provided a new 
constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although some sympathies existed for 
Kosovan claims to independence, potential independence was not considered a viable 
solution within the UN and the EU until the early 2000s. Instead, after the NATO 
operation in 1999, Security Council resolution 1244 put Kosovo under international 
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governance, although committing the territorial integrity of Serbia. The failure to 
establish sustainable governance and institutions in Kosovo resulted in eruptions of 
violence and the question of Kosovo’s status finally gained international attention in 
2004. New talks on the status were to be established and to be held under the auspices 
of the UN. They were to focus on reaching a solution between the two conflict parties, 
and result in a new Security Council resolution, which would then set up a new leading 
role of the EU in the future of Kosovo. These talks resulted in a proposal from the UN 
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, however, it was rejected by Serbia. Russia was 
committed to stopping any arrangement that did not have Belgrade’s agreement in the 
Security Council. As this UN process appeared to be running into a dead-end and with 
strong willingness in Pristina to declare independence as soon as possible, 
disagreement on Ahtisaari and Kosovan independence also emerged among EU 
Member States. 
 
Following Chapter Two, which discussed the development in German foreign policy 
more generally, this chapter has highlighted the role of Germany in more detail and 
drawn on the policy debates in Germany in relation to the status of Kosovo. The role 
of Germany in the beginning of the 1990s was highly influenced by the repercussions 
from its recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, which led to a deep crisis of trust between 
Western powers. Germany had strong ties to some of the Kosovan leadership and there 
was an understanding of the grievances of Kosovans. However, the German 
government did not deviate from the mainstream policy of the international 
community at the time and thus did not encourage or publically support Kosovan 
independence. In the aftermath of the 1999 conflict, Germany became more visibly 
involved in developing a political agreement on Kosovo; however, here it worked very 
closely with the United States and focused on maintaining good relations with Russia 
on the issue. With the significant contribution to KFOR, Germany’s role in Kosovo 
began to grow in the UNMIK period. As a member of the Contact Group, Germany 
also actively worked on the status question in the preparation for and during the 
Ahtisaari process, and was considered a close ally to the US and a reliable partner in 
improving dialogue with Russia. When in early 2007 the consensus on the Ahtisaari 
Plan appeared to fall apart at UNSC level and within the G8, Germany, as both 
172 
	  
president of the EU at the time and chair of the G8, aimed to resolve the deadlock, 
albeit without success. Nonetheless, its position in the Contact Group and the EU had 
developed significantly since the beginning of the 1990s and led to it taking a lead role 
in the final negotiation round, which will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
In German domestic policy circles, however, we can see diverse positions on the status 
issue as well as changing positions. While some political foundations and parties had 
connections to the Kosovan secession movement in the early 1990s, most of the 
German government policy towards Kosovo was focussed on the issue of migration 
and returning asylum seekers. The support for the independence of Croatia and 
Slovenia by the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats, in government until late 
1998, did not translate into unconditional support for Kosovan independence. With the 
initiation of status talks, the Free Democrats openly opposed independence, as they 
also did for Montenegro, suggesting strong EU governance over the region instead. 
The Christian Democrats, when in opposition from 1998 to 2005, demanded 
significantly more progress on the status talks, accusing the government and the 
international community of stalling the process. While the party did not advocate 
independence or a unilateral declaration, it appeared to reflect the sense of 
‘inevitability’, which was the approach of some countries involved in the negotiations, 
particularly the United States. The Social Democrats used their position in government 
to argue for caution towards any discussion of status, emphasising the importance of 
democratising Serbia and keeping good relations with Russia. This position was 
maintained both as the senior coalition partner with the Greens and as the junior 
coalition partner, holding the foreign ministry, with the Christian Democrats from 
2005 onwards. The Green Party had been significantly shaken by the Kosovo war of 
1999. While support for Kosovan independence existed in the party, when in 
government the Greens emphasised the need for a comprehensive political solution, 
citing the success of the Fischer Plan and the integration of the Western Balkans into 
the EU. Once in opposition, from 2005, the Greens were much more forthright in their 
criticism of the Serbian leadership. The left party Die Linke had opposed the 1999 
NATO operation and was vehemently critical of unilateral recognition of the 
independence of Kosovo and supportive of the post-Milosevic Serbian leadership.  
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The literature on the status of the nearly twenty years of post-Yugoslav Kosovo has 
highlighted inconsistent policies from different international actors and the 
international community’s inability to integrate the case of Kosovo in a sustainable 
manner into the international legal framework it had created for the other republics. 
The failure of the Ahtisaari talks displayed the fundamental division between the two 
conflict parties, and divisions between Russia and Western members of the Security 
Council as well as the chipping away of the European consensus. Debates in the 
Bundestag revealed a diverse range of positions among the German political parties. 
These also developed over the twenty-year period. The contrasting narratives between 
political parties show the diverse expectations towards Germany as an international 
actor at domestic level. Chapter Four will now highlight the final round of negotiations 
before Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and Germany’s recognition of 
an independent Kosovo.   
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Chapter 4: The Troika negotiations and Germany’s recognition 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter Three outlined the involvement of Germany in the Kosovo status after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo conflict until the end of the Ahtisaari 
Process in 2007. I have demonstrated how Germany’s role developed in the context of 
the break up of Yugoslavia and its role at international level within the UN and EU as 
well as G8. I also discussed the political developments and alignments along party 
lines in regards to the Kosovo status. This chapter will focus on the final months of 
negotiations around the status of Kosovo. The period described here begins with the 
rejection of the Ahtisaari Plan and ends with the recognition by Germany in February 
2008.  
 
As has been discussed in Chapter Three, the German position on the status of Kosovo 
had developed over the years with a change in the ruling coalition and a move within 
the Bundestag towards supporting ‘resolving the status’. This was very much in line 
with the changes at international level, with the United States supporting Kosovan 
independence more openly. From here I will consider what concerns were still raised 
either for or against independence and how Germany engaged at international level 
with these issues. The most important aspect of Germany’s international engagement 
discussed in this chapter will be the Troika negotiations, in which Germany provided 
the diplomat to represent the EU, Ambassador Ischinger, next to US and Russian 
counterparts.  
  
Based on interviews, files related to the Troika and Bundestag debates, this chapter 
will trace the progress of the German position towards recognition. This will begin by 
setting out the initial position of the German government, then the development of this 
position throughout the negotiations will be traced and, finally, justifications of the 
recognition will be examined. In the literature on the status of Kosovo, the Troika 
negotiations are often referred to as a last ditch effort which still did not succeed in 
resolving the conflict. Most accounts have focused on the longer period of the 
175 
	  
Ahtisaari process, which lay the ground work for the constitution of Kosovo.604 Here, 
I aim to detail this period and concentrate on the various parties’ approaches to and the 
process of the Troika negotiations.  
 
For German foreign policy the case of the Troika period represents an important case 
for its multilateral approach to foreign policy. As it held the Troika chair as the EU 
representative, it was able to use its position for its involvement at international level 
as well as to mend domestic conflicts on the Kosovo issue. The Troika talks failed to 
resolve disagreement among the UN Security Council and within the EU. However, 
the process of the negotiations increased the confidence of German domestic actors in 
the recognition of the UDI: Germany succeeded in gaining greater support among EU 
Member States for the UDI and convinced political parties in the Bundestag that all 
other possible options had been considered or tried. Thus, although the talks did not 
succeed where the Ahtisaari Process had also failed, they were able to mend some 
multilateral divisions, which had emerged since the Kosovo conflict of 1999. Here, the 
role of the process of the talks is especially relevant. Thus, Serbia and Russia’s 
rejection of a possible UDI was accepted by Germany and many other EU Member 
States. From this stalemate the priorities became the future EU mission to Kosovo, the 
prospect of governance through the EU and creating trust in the new institutions it 
would build. At a government level in Germany and in the Bundestag the issue of self-
determination or territorial integrity, which were the arguments of the conflict parties 
and the fundamental sources of the conflict, became secondary concerns. Governance 
and stability in the Western Balkans were instead predominant. While Germany 
proposed alternative solutions to Ahtisaari, none of these would have been an obstacle 
to the self-governance of Kosovo. Some may have understood this as Germany being 
open to Serbia’s position or considering ‘all options’ but ultimately Germany was 
supporting a policy that would have enabled the EU mission in Kosovo.  
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In Chapter One I outlined how recognition was considered a tool of conflict 
management to internationalise the conflict between Croatia and Serbia. Here, the 
rationale had been that with independence the international community is able to 
intervene in a conflict for greater conflict management. In the case of Kosovo the 
conflict had been internationalised already in the war of 1999 with NATO intervention. 
From then onwards, the international community has been increasingly involved in 
Kosovo. Germany had been particularly important in the development of the EU’s role 
in this. Nonetheless, in this chapter, I will demonstrate that the recognition of Kosovo 
was also framed by Germany in greater internationalisation and intervention. The 
future role of the EU in an independent Kosovo was to be an example of advanced 
European integration, which was considered the basis of stability and peace for the 
region and would thereby resolve the conflict. While Germany was supportive of the 
increased role of the EU, it was hesitant about the lack of multilateral consensus. 
However, disagreement within the UN and the EU became acceptable for Germany 
once it had been involved in a central position in the multilateral negotiations and had 
exhausted, from its perspective, all other possible outcomes of the negotiations. Thus, 
within this multilateral approach the process of the negotiation was crucial and allowed 
for Germany to take the approach of accepting the UDI.  
 
4.2  German position after Ahtisaari 
The failure of the Ahtisaari Process left the international community with a 
comprehensive proposal with significant backing from western states but with the 
realisation that the goal of finding a deal between Kosovo and Serbia, or achieving 
Russian support for the plan, had failed. In the words of one German interviewee, the 
status situation on Kosovo was “in a shambles”.605 As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
US American administration was keen to progress with a UDI as swiftly as possible. 
Washington continuously pressured the Auswärtige Amt by asserting that, if there 
were no progress, the US would go ahead and recognise a UDI.606 The lack of an 
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agreement appears to have raised issues for the German government and domestic 
actors. In the summer of 2007 the German position appears to have been concerned 
with two main aspects: the issue of the disengagement of Russia and the possibility of 
a return to violence in Serbia and Kosovo if talks should break down indefinitely. The 
relationship with Russia was a central issue for Germany’s multilateral role in the 
status negotiations. In the Contact Group, Germany was considered the mediator with 
Russia for the remaining Quint members.607 In Chapter Three I highlighted how 
relations between Russia and the United States over the missile defence program in 
Europe had deteriorated. The German leadership considered it its role to diminish 
contagion from this clash onto the Kosovo issue as much as possible. In regards to the 
violence between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, Germany saw its Western Balkan 
policy as at risk. After the war of 1999 Germany had invested significantly in EU 
enlargement prospects and conflict management. The German approach considered 
EU integration as the best possible conflict management policy and possibly a 
resolution for the conflict. At the same time, it provided the largest KFOR contingent, 
which also represented the largest German troop deployment abroad since the Second 
World War. A return to violence in Kosovo would thus likely result in greater 
involvement of German troops, which would in turn lead to domestic controversy. 
 
4.2.1   Position in the Auswärtige Amt 
Within the Contact Group the unresolved relationship between Kosovo and Serbia, 
and with Russia, split the Quint on how to manage the unilateral declaration. From 
internal correspondence on the developments in the Contact Group the United States, 
United Kingdom and France were supportive of a UDI. On the other hand, Germany, 
along with Italy, appeared concerned about moving to a recognition without further 
attempts at talks.608 Germany held the six-month presidency of the EU at the time, and 
through its chairmanship of the G8 it was particularly involved in attempts to 
overcome divisions between Russia and the United States. The G8 in Heiligendamm, 
Germany 6-8 June 2007 was considered an opportunity to discuss different scenarios 
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with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Many expected Angela Merkel and the fellow 
Quint members to succeed in convincing the Russian President and Foreign 
Minister.609 Although France was prepared to accept a UDI, the suggestion to extend 
the talks came from President Sarkozy.610 This plan proposed an extension of UN 
Resolution 1244 for six months. In this period, talks would resume and should no 
agreement be reached, Ahtisaari would be implemented.611 Internal Auswärtige Amt 
documents state that the impression from this G8 meeting was that Russia was not in 
principle against independence but uncomfortable to support it at that specific point in 
time.612 Internal correspondence on the positions of the Quint Contact Group states 
that the United States, the United Kingdom and France were all supportive of a UDI. 
The German and Italian positions are described as being pro-independence but also 
desiring of further talks.613 As Russia rejected the Sarkozy plan due to its support for 
independence, the Auswärtige Amt developed the plan further by suggesting the 
Troika format, which would not be bound to the Ahtisaari proposal and would also 
report to the UN Secretary General after a period of 120 days of additional 
negotiations.614 However, in parallel to the negotiation, US and European officials 
would be working on writing and developing what would become the Kosovo 
constitution.615 
 
There was deep concern the Quint’s relationship with Serbia and Russia might break 
down if a UDI were to be supported without further talks. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, many external observers criticised Ahtisaari’s approach to the talks.616 Also, 
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within the AA, there was a significant worry that the Ahtisaari Process had not 
succeeded in convincing the Serbs that Kosovan independence had not been a forgone 
conclusion of the talks. Further talks were considered to be crucial to regain the Serbs’ 
trust in the international process. This is what the German government considered a 
‘last ditch effort’ to see whether there were any other possibilities to explore.617 The 
German position was mainly focused on reducing the possibility of violence returning 
to the Balkans. Specifically, the long-term goal of keeping peace in the Balkans and 
the large presence of German soldiers in the NATO contingent made this a priority.618 
In the political leadership at the AA, several experts expressed concern that another 
violent conflict was a realistic possibility. The extension of the talks was thus for the 
Germans primarily a way to de-escalate the situation, avoid further polarisation and 
demonstrate willingness to collaborate.619 The talks therefore kept the diplomatic talks 
active and avoided an abrupt ending to year-long efforts. At this stage, in the summer 
of 2007, for Germany, independence was not considered the only possible outcome of 
this process although it was clear that the US was keen to achieve this as soon as 
possible. 
 
4.2.2   Position of the Political Parties in the Bundestag 
As discussed in Chapter Two, for most foreign policy decisions the government does 
not require approval from the Bundestag. This would also apply in the case of 
decisions on approaches to the status or recognition of Kosovo. However, due to the 
German government consisting of coalitions and generally Germany operating a 
consensus based approach towards foreign policy, the Bundestag represents an 
important forum in which policy is discussed.620 To reach a united position between 
the CDU and the SPD on the issues of Kosovo’s status was therefore important for the 
stability of the government at the time.  
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In a speech to the Bundestag on 14 June 2007 on the end of the German EU presidency 
Chancellor Merkel highlighted the importance Germany had given to a united EU 
position on Kosovo’s status and that it was a key priority for the German 
government.621 Later, in June, in a Bundestag debate on the extension of the German 
KFOR mandate, parliamentarians expressed their views on the failed multilateral 
efforts and prospects for continued talks. Although there had been concerns regarding 
the Ahtisaari process within the AA, most political parties had hoped for the Ahtisaari 
Plan to provide a basis for an agreement. Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and 
Greens referred to the plan as acceptable, if not ideal. They also discussed the role of 
Russia by emphasising the EU’s failure to gain Russian support for the Ahtisaari 
Proposal.622 The importance of achieving a united EU position was emphasised 
throughout by the CDU, SPD and Greens. The main disagreements among parties 
emerged between the coalition parties in regards to a possible unilateral declaration of 
independence of Kosovo at this stage. 
 
The Social Democrat Uta Zapf went so far as to categorically reject even considering 
recognising a UDI. She emphasised the need to re-engage all parties in more talks, 
especially Russia. She regretted the misinterpretation of Russia’s position by the West 
and highlighted the importance of accepting Russia as a relevant actor. Finally, she 
argued that, to keep both Kosovans and Serbians engaged in an international process 
and not to disappoint or alienate either party too much, more talks were necessary.623 
Thus the Social Democrat perspective was to continue to attempt to find an agreement 
between the conflict parties.  
 
The Christian Democrats took the position that although Ahtisaari may not have 
provided an ideal solution, the unresolved status was fuelling the weak rule of law in 
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Kosovo. MdBs emphasised, however, that any change in the status for Kosovo’s future 
would have to be approved in the Security Council by exerting pressure on Russia. 
The negative developments in the West’s relationship with Moscow were interpreted 
as signs of Russia’s approach to the European Union generally. Thus, from a CDU 
perspective, the relationship with the United States should be prioritised in the process 
on the Kosovo status as it was a close military and political ally.624 In contrast to the 
SPD, the Christian Democrats were already more invested in reaching an agreement 
at international level and within the Security Council rather than focusing on further 
talks with the conflict parties. Before joining the government in 2005, the CDU had 
continuously accused the then SPD-Green coalition government of not showing 
enough initiative to resolve the status question. Now as the CDU found itself in 
coalition with the Social Democrats, the Kosovo question would become a critical one 
for the government. 
 
Amongst the opposition, the responses to the failed talks were varied. The Free 
Democrats reiterated their previous proposal for a resolution of the conflict as soon as 
possible under EU control. They also explicitly asked the government to continue with 
the Ahtisaari Plan, to be committed to a common EU position and to reject publically 
supporting a unilaterally declared independence.625 Marieluise Beck, the Green Party 
Balkans expert, called for a new UN resolution for Kosovo and called both Russia and 
the United States irresponsible; here she mentioned US support for unilateral action 
with Tirana and Russia’s turn away from Europe.626 Die Linke MdBs called for a 
greater commitment to continued talks but rejected the 120 days proposal.627 They 
argued for an altogether new start to talks that should include mainly the Security 
Council in a new configuration of the Contact Group. Considering the international 
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consequences that changes to Kosovo’s status may have had, Monika Knoche MdB 
argued that only the territorial integrity of Serbia and a high autonomy for Kosovo 
would be a viable solution.628 
 
Table 2: Overview of political party positions on the question of Kosovo 
status, 21 June 2007629 
 CDU SPD FDP Greens Die Linke 
Ahtisaari Acceptable 
 
Acceptable 
 
Acceptable Acceptable 
Not 
acceptable 
UDI 
recognition 
Not 
Acceptable 
Not 
Acceptable 
Not 
acceptable 
Not 
acceptable 
Not 
acceptable 
EU unity High priority High priority High priority High priority 
Not 
mentioned 
General 
position/ 
concerns 
UNSC to 
agree on new 
resolution to 
finalise 
status. 
 
Stresses need 
to engage 
Russia and 
Serbia. 
UNSC 
decision on 
new status 
possible. 
 
Kosovo under 
EU 
governance 
 
New UNSC 
resolution 
 
New open 
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The discussion in June 2007 took place during great uncertainty on the future of the 
multilateral negotiations. This dominated the debate among MdBs. Overall support for 
independence or a unilateral declaration was very low among all parties and a return 
to Ahtisaari would have been acceptable for a vast majority of MdBs. None of the 
parties encouraged German unilateral action. A new UN Security Council resolution 
was considered by all parties essential to support any change in Kosovo’s status at this 
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629 Deutscher Bundestag (2007b). 
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stage.630 It is also noteworthy that the principle of self-determination to justify the 
independence was not used in the debate. Discussion on the conflict was instead 
framed mainly in the context of EU integration and the future democratisation of both 
Serbia and Kosovo. This highlights the changing interpretation of the conflict between 
Pristina and Belgrade. During the Milosevic regime Germany had identified the 
Serbian government as the aggressor in all the Balkan conflict, including in Kosovo. 
In debate in parliament, some parties, especially the SPD, the Greens and Die Linke 
showed some sympathy for the position of Serbia on territorial integrity and its 
rejection of Kosovan independence. Also the stalemate between the conflict parties 
was partly blamed on the international community’s management during the Ahtisaari 
process. 
 
4.3  Set up of the Troika  
Following consultations at EU level and within the Contact Group, the Troika talks 
were thus established officially with an invitation from the UN Secretary General who 
welcomed the initiative on 1 August 2007.631 These talks were to be chaired by an EU 
representative with US and Russian counterparts. The EU representative nominated 
was the German ambassador to the United Kingdom, Wolfgang Ischinger, who had 
been previously the ambassador to the United States and had been involved in the 
negotiations for the Dayton Agreement. As a former German Secretary of State he also 
served in the Social Democrat-Green Schröder government in the 1990s and early 
2000s. He was thus a high profile diplomat, not an EU official, but experienced in 
multilateral negotiations. Ischinger’s counterparts in the Troika were Frank Wisner, 
an experienced US American diplomat and US envoy for Kosovo, and Aleksandr 
Botsan-Kharchenko, and Russian representative, who had been the main 
representative of Russia in the Contact Group on Kosovo over the preceding years.632 
The agreed negotiation schedule included meetings by the Troika with the parties 
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631 United Nations (2007c) UN Press Release of the Secretary General ‘Secretary-General Welcomes 
Agreement On New Kosovo Initiative’, SG/SM/11111, 1 August 2007 
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separately, followed by several face-to-face meetings, starting in late September in 
New York and closing with a meeting at the end of November in Austria.633 
 
After the announcement of the Troika, it firstly met in London with the whole Contact 
Group. In the setup discussions between the Troika members the United States 
expressed clearly to the Quint members and reiterated that from their perspective the 
Troika was not supposed to disrupt the process towards independence. The process 
was supposed to be as constructive as possible and to settle the issue of 
independence.634 For the Russians, the Troika was instead a welcome extension of 
potentially open ended talks.635 At this stage of the process the Troika presented itself 
mainly as the mediators of the process rather than a proactive negotiation partner who 
would propose any recommendations. Thus, key aspects of the role of Chair Ischinger 
were to establish what should be achieved with these talks, as the understanding 
between the US and Russia was quite different, and to manage expectations.  
 
Within the AA, due to domestic political concern of a UDI, the talks were considered 
crucial but at the same time the expectations for success in the shape of a new 
agreement were very low. Ambassador Ischinger and the political leadership of the 
AA were well aware that eight years of ongoing talks had not reached any solution. 
Therefore, it was very unlikely that a new and short round of talks would bring a 
different outcome. The main hope for Ambassador Ischinger was that the talks would 
either lead to an unexpected resolution or alternatively prove that all efforts had been 
made to find a solution.636 From this outset, it is clear that for Germany at this stage 
the process around the negotiations was very important. Because of the domestic 
debates on the Ahtisaari process, the importance of including Serbia in a meaningful 
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international deal and reaching an agreement, Germany’s role as chair of the Troika 
represented an opportunity to establish itself and shape these multilateral negotiations. 
 
4.3.1   Role of the Troika Chair 
Ischinger’s inclusive approach defined the work of the Troika. In his role as chair, he 
was the most committed actor in the process and led the negotiations. US Troika 
member Frank Wisner had a significant number of other responsibilities, besides the 
Troika, and joined in only whenever he was able to. The Troika’s schedule was 
adopted accordingly.637 The Russian negotiator Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko was 
less active in the Troika meetings throughout the process.638 He nevertheless did 
contribute constructively to discussions and the working relationship among all three 
members was perceived as very positive.639 
 
As chairman of the Troika, Ambassador Ischinger fulfilled various roles. He was a 
German career diplomat and remunerated by the German government in this role, but 
as Chairman, he represented the European Union and mediated between the United 
States and Russia. The main mission of the Troika was to negotiate a solution between 
the two conflict parties. However, due to the disagreements on the status of Kosovo in 
the UN Security Council, within the EU, and among domestic political parties in 
Germany, Ischinger had to work towards generating consensus at all of these different 
levels. 
 
It is worth noting that the German domestic discussion outlined above, as well as the 
need to keep a harmonious grand coalition, affected the outlook of the negotiator on 
the talks. Of the various issues that were raised in the Bundestag, three were 
specifically influential: firstly, the need to overcome the distrust of the Serbs towards 
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independence; secondly, reaching a common EU position; and thirdly, avoiding a 
legally precarious decision on the status of Kosovo. On the last point, a new UN 
Security Council resolution was improbable after the failure of Ahtisaari, therefore, 
the chair’s strategy was either to strive for a solution between the conflict parties that 
would be supported by Russia, or, should this fail, to focus on unifying the EU 
regarding Kosovo’s status. Hence, the strategy was to find a multilateral level in which 
consensus would be achieved in a way that also responded to the domestic divisions 
in Germany. The Social Democrat controlled the Auswärtige Amt in the grand 
coalition, and therefore the political concerns of the party about the UDI received 
particular attention in the ministry. This was explained by the SPD’s strong 
relationship with and trust in President Boris Tadić’s Demokratska 
stranka/Democratic Party (DS). Hence, the extension of the talks was particularly well 
received in party circles.640 Separate Troika talks with the delegations began in 
Belgrade and Pristina on the 10 of August. 
 
4.3.2   Positions of the Serbian and Kosovan delegations  
The delegations from Belgrade and Pristina had very different outlooks on this 
continuation of the talks. For the Kosovan delegation, participating in the Troika 
negotiations was mostly an act of showing ‘good will’ to find a solution to the conflict 
with the Serbian delegation and to establish friendly relations. Although the Ahtisaari 
Plan had failed, the Kosovan delegation was under the impression that the Quint 
members of the Contact Group considered independence under the Ahtisaari proposal 
the most likely outcome. While Kosovans were reassured by American support for 
independence, there was also considerable pressure on managing this process without 
leading to further conflict.  
 
Hence, the Quint viewed political developments in Serbia optimistically. The Serbian 
delegation reflected the coalition make-up of the Serbian government and some Quint 
members hoped that with greater support for the Democratic Party in the upcoming 
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elections in 2008, President Tadić might be able to introduce a more collaborative 
approach to Kosovo than Prime Minister Koštunica had done.641 From the Kosovan 
perspective, however, there was little incentive to move beyond the Ahtisaari Plan, 
which had been accepted by most Contact Group members, and in which considerable 
concessions had been made to Serbian minorities. For the Kosovan delegation, the 
Troika negotiations seemed essentially a delay to inevitable independence and the 
delegation was unwilling to make concessions regarding what had been suggested in 
the Ahtisaari Proposal. 
 
The main contribution by the Kosovan delegation was thus a comprehensive treaty 
proposal on peaceful neighbourly relations with Serbia after independence. In this 
proposal, Kosovo offered additional assurances of friendly relations and collaboration 
in the region. This was proposed to the Troika during the indirect talks in London on 
the 19 September 2007. When it became evident that the Serbian side was not willing 
to discuss this proposal, the delegation from Pristina considered the talks a failure. 642 
 
From the Serbian delegation, the approach to the new round of negotiation was 
considerably more positive. From Belgrade’s perspective, the talks represented a 
continuation of Russia’s efforts to block Ahtisaari and a path to new and longer talks. 
As already discussed in relation to the German position, the Ahtisaari process had been 
unsatisfactory for the Serbian delegation. Fundamentally, there appears to have been 
deep mistrust in the Ahtisaari process as a whole, as supervised independence was 
considered by the Serbian delegation a premature conclusion by Ahtisaari himself. The 
Serbian delegation considered the Troika negotiations to be a more genuine attempt to 
reach mutual agreement, firstly, due to Russia putting its weight behind Serbia more 
openly, secondly, due to the extended timeline for the negotiations, thirdly, because of 
the appointment of Ischinger as an experienced diplomat, and, finally, because of the 
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more open approach to possible solutions other than independence.643 At the first face-
to-face meeting of the two delegations in New York, shortly after the UN General 
Assembly on 28 September, the Serbian delegation presented itself as being very 
optimistic towards the process. President Tadić emphasised that the Serbian proposal 
of a ‘common sovereign home’ had received a very positive response from the Troika 
and that the delegation expected this proposal to be seriously considered in Brussels 
and in different European capitals.644 This optimism was, however, also exaggerated 
publically. While there was hope that the international community would reconsider 
the Serbian position more than in previous talks, the Serbian delegation were not 
willing to offer any further concessions to their autonomy proposals.645 
 
An important aspect for the Serbian delegation was that, as it was formed from a 
coalition, it was somewhat divided. Prime Minister Kostunica’s party, Demokratska 
stranka Srbije/ Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), took a considerably harder line on 
the question of Kosovan independence and many external observers highlighted his 
unwillingness to compromise on the question as the main obstacle for progress in the 
negotiations. President Tadić from the Democratic Party (DS), and his chief advisor 
Vuk Jeremić, were on the other hand more open to independence for Kosovo. Here, 
observers note that on different occasions Jeremić agreed to proposals and would have 
been willing to sign ‘anything’, but deferred to the prime minister instead.646 This had 
a significant effect on how the aftermath of the talks was managed as we will see 
below. 
 
Unlike the Ahtisaari Process, the Troika negotiations focused solely on the status 
settlement rather than on step-by-step policy issues, allowing for more negotiation and 
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concessions from both sides.647 Thus, the proposal from the Kosovan side provided 
little if no movement from the Ahtisaari proposal. Serbia on the other hand was very 
much tied to its proposal of autonomy short of independence. Later in the process, the 
Serbian delegation presented a variety of alternatives to autonomy based on historical 
precedents. These included, for example, the Åland islands case, which, as discussed 
in Chapter One, was a landmark case that laid out the definition of internal self-
determination in response to secessionist movements. The example of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative region within the Peoples Republic of China was also brought 
forward as a potential model for Kosovo’s status.648 The proposals from the Serbian 
delegation were perceived as too limited and inflexible by the Kosovans who viewed 
them as a tactic to delay or avoid independence. Looking back at the process, one 
member of the Serbian delegation argues that in principle the Serbian side would have 
been willing to support a longer internationally supervised union with Kosovo of five 
to twenty years, which could eventually have ended with independence as final 
political status.649 In essence the direct talks of the Troika demonstrated that after years 
of negotiations in the Contact Group and the Ahtisaari process, the Kosovans were 
unwilling to put a supervised independence at risk and Serbia was keen to extend the 
talks as long as possible. While there was willingness from Belgrade to make further 
concessions with greater autonomy, any mention of independence was dismissed 
especially by members of the DSS delegation.650 
 
Direct negotiations between the Kosovan and Serbian delegation made little progress 
in providing new perspectives. Therefore, although initially not the intended role of 
the Troika, it began to bring forward specific proposals for the parties to discuss.  
 
4.3.3   Troika Proposals 
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Ambassador Ischinger and officials in the AA decided to take more initiative and to 
present the parties with alternative proposals. When acknowledging the difficulty of 
this, Ischinger and officials in the AA regularly estimated the probability that the talks 
would succeed at 10%.651 He had made the motto of these efforts to ‘leave no stone 
unturned’. Demonstrating German commitment to the process and a genuine effort to 
end the stalemate thus became key to the strategy of Ischinger and the AA.652 
 
Two proposals in which Germany was particularly involved were the 14 Point plan 
and a proposal based on the German-German treaty (the Grundlagenvertrag) of 1972. 
No progress was achieved in the preliminary talks and also the first attempt at 
negotiations on 14 October in Brussels resulted in a deadlock between the two parties 
of a non-paper of 14 points.653 This proposal focused on specific collaboration in 
policy areas without making any reference to either Kosovan statehood or UN 
Resolution 1244. It stated that Kosovo would not be governed from Belgrade and that 
both Belgrade and Pristina would work towards joining the European Union.654 The 
paper had been endorsed by all three Troika members and was potentially an 
opportunity to find common ground between the two parties. While Pristina accepted 
the general rationale of the paper, Serbia rejected it for lack of reference to legal 
principles.655 
 
In the following and forth meeting in Vienna on 5 November, Ischinger proposed the 
German-German treaty model. This model had been developed by the legal 
department of the AA. Ambassador Ischinger argued from early on in the negotiations 
that the only way to break the deadlock was to find a way to exclude the status question 
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and enable neighbourly relations between the two states.656 The proposal and the 
efforts from the German side for producing an alternative to an outright UDI were met 
with some resistance from the United States but after some input they were accepted 
from the American side. The US delegation were in the first instance supportive of the 
German proposal although there remained concerns about fundamentally changing the 
policy of supporting independence.657 There had been some concern in Washington 
that the independence of Kosovo was being put in jeopardy and for the US considered 
the Troika negotiations a means to an end rather than a new round of negotiations.  
 
Considering the domestic pressures within Europe and in Germany for extending the 
talks, the AA considered it opportune to bring this German-German treaty proposal 
forward. The proposal was based on the rationale behind the 1972 agreement between 
the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. This agreement, 
as discussed in Chapter Two, allowed the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic to co-exist without recognising each other during the 
Cold War. This allowed for the establishment of informal relations, collaboration on 
policy issues and both countries joining the United Nations. The ideological conflict 
between the two Germanys was thus not overcome but the two separate states existed 
side by side. This ‘Egon Bahr’ approach, named after the German politician who 
developed the rationale behind Ostpolitik, was to be applied in this proposal to Kosovo 
and Serbia.658 This policy had a clear Social Democratic imprint. The Policy had been 
the defining legacy of chancellor Brandt and within the party this approach had been 
embraced for engendering successful de-escalation during the Cold War.659 
 
The expectations for the success of these Troika negotiations overall had been very 
low, even in the AA and, as described above, for the German position, demonstrating 
a genuine international process was important for domestic political parties. The 
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proposal of the German-German approach heartened German policy makers more 
optimistic. Ambassador Ischinger extensively discussed the proposal with the 
domestic political parties as well as the foreign affairs committee of the Bundestag and 
found much encouragement. For politicians in Germany it appeared to be an 
acceptable solution out of the deadlock.660 As described above, particularly the Social 
Democrats and Die Linke were keen on allowing Serbia and Russia a way out of the 
stalemate, the proposal for an ‘Egon Bahr approach’ was thus close to the ideology 
and political outlook for these parties, which furthered their trust in the Troika process.  
 
The German-German treaty idea became the key proposal by Ischinger in his attempt 
to prove that ‘no stone was left unturned’. While the Kosovan delegation was receptive 
of the proposal, and appreciated the provisions outlined, it was cautious about the 
historical precedent. The end of the Cold War brought unification of the two Germanys 
and there was some concern among the Kosovan delegation that there was a ‘hidden 
message’ in such an agreement as a foregone conclusion.661 Kosvans were concerned 
that such a proposal could in the future be reinterpreted as a justification for 
unification. The response by the Serbian delegation was split. On the one hand, Tadić 
reassured Ischinger that if Russia was willing to support such an agreement, so would 
he.662 The Serbian delegation was, however, hesitant as they did not agree with the 
comparison of the conflict between the two Germanys and the Kosovo conflict, 
arguing that the conflict between the two Germanys was ideological in nature while 
the question of Kosovo was ultimately territorial. Such an agreement also enabled both 
Germanys to join the UN and to have Kosovo enabled to become a full UN member 
would have been a concession too far.663 
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Encouraged by the Serbian President, Ambassador Ischinger met with Russian foreign 
minister Lavrov in early October.664 Lavrov’s response was positive in comparison to 
previous proposals and Ischinger was given consent to test the interest from the parties. 
However, a week later, Lavrov changed his mind and since the Troika then did not 
reach unanimity, the proposal could not be tabled. Furthermore, due to the Russian 
disagreement on the proposal, the Serbian delegation would not have been willing to 
consider the proposal.665 In the meantime, however, this proposal had become an 
important aspect of the ‘no stone left unturned’ policy of the German government in 
relation to the Troika and was used as a possible solution in different discussions with 
EU member states (EUMS). The rejection of the German-German model was a 
significant set back for Ischinger and diplomats in the AA where much expectation 
had been invested in this solution. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, the fact that 
Germany had provided additional ideas and a potential route out of the deadlock was 
used as evidence for the Bundestag that all possible alternatives has been discussed 
within the Troika talks.666 
 
From mid-November onwards it became evident for Ambassador Ischinger and the 
delegation that an agreement was not going to be reached in these talks. With the 
United States pressing for a swift conclusion, the German Troika chair was keen to 
leave the talks with a positive resolution even though no formal agreement could be 
reached. Finally, within these negotiations the sense was that the Tadić-Jeremić wing 
of the Serbian delegation would have been willing to sign any kind of agreement. With 
the Serbian elections coming, the President was keen to present himself as the more 
pro-EU and pro-reform alternative to Kostunica.  
 
The Serbian delegation had been more enthusiastic about the process at its outset, as 
described above. Although Belgrade was highly disappointed, and a split on the 
Kosovo issue had occurred within the delegation, tt ended the talks by adopting a more 
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pragmatic stand. From the point of view of the Troika delegation all possible avenues 
had been considered. Serbia and Russia would have however considered further 
negotiations necessary. Russia continued to argue that more options had to be 
explored. In an unexpected proposal during the negotiations the Russian envoy 
Botsan-Kharchenko had proposed the partition of Kosovo. In this proposal the North 
would remain under Serbian control with the rest under Pristina. This was however 
rejected by both parties immediately,667 although the Troika chair had initially 
considered it.668 This would have gone against the previously established principles of 
the negotiations, the ‘three Nos’, which had excluded the partition of Kosovo as a 
possible option to be negotiated. The willingness from the German negotiator to 
consider this was read as an indication of Germany’s willingness to take a more 
creative approach to the negotiations than in the past. Also, Russia’s trust in the 
process appeared to be growing, Putin was cited in conversations with Chancellor 
Merkel as considering the Troika process seriously.669  
 
The partition proposal by the Russian delegation was the only proposal suggested by 
the Troika, which would have provided control of Serbia over part of the Kosovo 
territory. In contrast, the German proposal had focused on keeping Serbia engaged 
with the international community even in the event of a UDI by Kosovo, the plan 
would have not prevented an UDI. While Russia welcomed the more proactive 
approach by Germany, the United States were concerned. Particularly, the US 
considered Germany’s apparent insistence on a UNSC resolution to be the main 
obstacle to accepting a UDI. Therefore, initially they looked at the proposal for the 
German-German treaty with suspicion. However, by the time Ischinger proposed it, 
the US had acknowledged that Germany was ‘on the longer road but on the right track’ 
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indicating a movement towards accepting a unilateral declaration of independence.670 
In the development of the different proposals, the Troika sought advice from the AA 
on what would be feasible legal options. However, in the work of the EU Troika 
delegation, international law was not per se the deciding factor, but it was rather about 
finding a solution agreeable to the two parties. By the end of the process, to the Troika 
team, independence appeared as the only possible outcome, despite the legal concerns 
expressed by non-recognisers and some of the domestic actors, as described above.671 
 
4.3.4 End of the Troika negotiations  
Following the Troika negotiations there was also a keen interest from the Quint 
members to convince the Kosovan leadership to postpone the declaration of 
independence until after the Serbian election, which took place in January 2008 and 
was won by Tadić, elected mainly on a pro-EU and reconciliation with Kosovo 
platform. At the final meeting in Baden in Austria, when Koštunica refused to attend 
the closing dinner, while Tadić and Jeremić did attend, it also became evident that the 
Serbian leadership would pursue the legal route against the independence declaration 
at the international Court of Justice (ICJ). This was perceived as encouragement that 
there would not be a military response to the declaration of independence but instead 
a legal and institutional response.672 This decision was welcomed, especially among 
the Social Democrat circles of the Auswärtige Amt, although in the case at the ICJ 
Germany would argue against Serbia’s claim.673 
 
The Troika presented its final report to the Security Council on 10 December 2007. 
The conclusion reiterated the commitment of the Troika to reach a solution in the short 
period and that every possible solution for a settlement had been discussed with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 WikiLeaks (2007b). 
671 Comments to the author, interview with a member of EU Troika delegation, phone interview, 
October 2014, and interview with a former Political Director of the German Foreign Service, phone 
interview, October 2014. 
672 Comments to the author, interview with a former Political Director of the German Foreign Service, 
phone interview, October 2014. 
673 International Court of (2009) Request for Advisory Opinion transmitted to the Court Pursuant to 
General Assembly Resolution, Statement of the Federal Republic of Germany, April 2009 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15624.pdf (last accessed 25 September 2016) 
196 
	  
conflict parties and within the Troika.674 Although no solution was found between the 
two parties, the report points to the importance of the process and that both conflict 
parties had committed to European integration and peace in the region. These 
assurance, so the report, were considered key achievements of the process overall.675 
Finally, the report made no recommendations for the future status of Kosovo but 
instead stated that a resolution of the status issue would be in the best interest of 
European integration.676 The end of the Troika process would now put each state in 
the situation of having to take a position in light of a possible contested declaration of 
independence from Kosovo. As I discussed above, in the Bundestag, parties had been 
adamant about the need either to find a solution between the conflict parties, find 
agreement with Russia and establish a common EU position. As the negotiations failed 
to find an agreement for the first two conditions, I will now turn to discuss in more 
detail the work of the Troika at EU level and the difficulty of finding a common 
position among Member States and also EU institutions. 
 
4.4  Searching for Consensus within the EU 
As the EU representative in the Troika, the appointment of the German ambassador 
meant that he was reporting directly to the EU High Representative Javier Solana. 
Ambassador Ischinger understood his responsibility to be mainly towards the EU and 
it member states.677 A central aspect of Ischinger’s role was to support EU member 
states in reaching a consensus. Disagreement within the EU was concerned with the 
status question and this dispute also strongly affected by the commitment to and 
planning of the future EU mission. The EU had been involved since the UN report by 
Special Envoy Karl Eide had called for a greater role in Kosovo for the EU and to 
replace the current UN mission.678 From 2005, both the Council and the Commission 
began exploring a greater role for the EU in implementing UNSC resolution 1244 and 
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what the EU’s role might be after a new status for Kosovo had been determined.679 
Over the following two years, the High Representative Javier Solana and Enlargement 
Commissioner Rehn presented a series of papers to Member States on possible 
deployments of an EU mission. The Council and the Commission envisioned a ‘robust’ 
mission, which additionally to technical advice, would have had a considerable 
political role in the management of Kosovo and would have replaced UNMIK 
entirely.680  
 
However, this new EU role was dependent on the outcome of the Ahtissaari talks. To 
deploy a full mission as envisioned by the Council and the Commission, the EU sought 
a clear mandate after a new UNSC resolution. With the failure of Ahtisaari and the 
disagreement in the Security Council on Kosovo status, however, the prospect of a 
clear mandate and the future of this mission as a whole was put in jeopardy.681  
  
The Council had been the main driver behind the future mission in Kosovo, which was 
to become the largest mission for the EU to date. There was confidence that Kosovan 
independence would be supported by the EU despite international disagreement. Thus, 
within the General Secretariat of the Council the expectations for the Troika talks to 
resolve the stalemate were quite low. The talks were rather considered an extension of 
the Ahtisaari Plan. One Council official was quoted describing the Troika as the 
‘theatre’ of ‘no-stone-unturned’.682 At this stage, the Council and the Enlargement 
Commissioner considered a deployment without a new UNSC resolution as 
possible.683 
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The full robust plan of the mission was seen skeptically outside of the Council 
planning team. Among Commission officials the plans for the mission of the EU to 
take over from UNMIK were considered too ambitious from an operational 
perspective.684 Generally, among EU Member States, a lighter version of the mission 
with a mainly technical role was preferred.685 Furthermore, the Commission was 
sceptical about the Troika negotiations. The impression was that the main rationale of 
the German effort was to avoid alienating Russia and Serbia. The German foreign 
minister had been quoted saying that “nothing can be done without the Russians” and 
Ambassador Ischinger was quoted arguing that there is a need to understand the 
“psychological aspect for the Serbian side”. For the EU institutions, the Troika process 
was thus mainly considered to be about demonstrating a continued process of 
engagement with all parties to de-escalate the situation. At the same time, the pressures 
for recognition and an EU mission were continuing to grow.686 Albeit retrospectively, 
commentators in the Commission have described the Troika as a “charade” or simply 
as “an appendix”.687 An agreement among EU member states on the status was 
nonetheless in the interest of the Commission to enable future EU missions.  
 
In contrast to the EU institutions, Member States were less committed to the 
independence of Kosovo for the sake of enabling the EU mission. The divisions among 
Member States were mainly due to the prevailing expectation that the Ahtisaari 
process would lead to an agreement. The wider EU would support what had been 
negotiated by the EU members in the Contact Group. A separate effort to reach an EU 
consensus on the Kosovo question had not been considered necessary. During the 
Ahtisaari process, the Council of Ministers had more or less followed the statements 
and recommendation from the Contact Group.688 After the failed Ahtisaari talks the 
EU High Representative Javier Solana and other high level EU officials in the 
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Commission called for a common EU position on the future of Kosovo.689 As was 
discussed in Chapter Three, however, this apparent EU agreement collapsed publically 
at the Gymnich meeting in Bremen in March 2007.690 Germany held the EU 
Presidency at the time and was particularly involved in the efforts to reach an EU 
position until the summer of 2007.691 However, with the breakdown of the Ahtisaaari 
process and the support for a unilateral declaration of independence from the United 
States, each European Union member states (EUMS) had to take a position on the 
contested statehood of Kosovo, should there not be a settlement in the Troika talks. At 
this stage, the only opportunity to maintain some consensus on the issue would be the 
need for a new UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo after Ahtisaari, which the 
EU could then agree to. 692 
 
Similarly to the situation in Germany, most EUMS conducted domestic debates and 
adopted different positions on the question of the statehood of Kosovo. The concerns 
by different EUMS included legal questions of recognising the independence without 
a new UNSC resolution, for example, in the case of the Netherlands.693 The fears of 
domestic secessionist movements were prevalent in the Spanish, Bulgarian, Slovakian 
and Romanian positions.694 Cyprus appeared increasingly close to the Russian position 
on Kosovo.695 Among those member states that expressed their concern, most 
prominently Slovakia, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Romania, were also diverse 
arguments. For example, Spain appeared to not want to put the EU consensus at risk 
but was very keen on trying to achieve a new UNSC resolution on the status.696 
Slovakia was considered to be the key actor in trying to block EU consensus. The 
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argument at the time was that if there was a settlement between the two conflict parties 
and the UN Security Council, EUMS would have supported such an arrangement and 
also the deployment of an EU mission.697 
 
High Representative Solana was keen on the Troika process as he considered it 
instrumental to reach a closure of the negotiations. The most important aspect was the 
idea of gaining time and showing the European effort to solve this conflict. At the 
Gymnich meeting of 7-8 September, Solana stressed that he hoped the Troika 
negotiations would succeed but that the EU should be prepared for alternative 
scenarios. In contrast, the Portuguese representatives, holding the EU presidency in 
the second half of 2007, expressed the deep unease about a possible UDI felt by some 
Member States and criticised the Council for pre-judging the Troika.698 Among many 
EUMS the impression that Ahtisaari had been a foregone conclusion was widespread. 
Thus, those Member States that were uncomfortable with the UDI, expected a more 
neutral approach from the Troika.699  
 
In light of these disagreements and the low expectations for the negotiations to 
succeed, the AA put its efforts into gaining the largest possible support for Kosovan 
independence within the EU. The role of Ischinger as EU chair was central to this 
effort to emphasise the EU commitment to reaching consensus and a genuine process. 
Thus, Ischinger kept in close contact with EUMS and the Council throughout the 
process. He made it a key aspect of his work to keep Solana informed on the progress 
of the talks.700 In regular fortnightly briefings at the Political and Security Committee 
as well as at the Council meetings of the foreign ministers, he kept EUMS informed. 
Ischinger presented the different proposals that were in the Troika negotiations and 
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discussed the difficulties that had been encountered. Additionally, there were multiple 
visits to EU capitals to discuss the various issues with governments that were 
particularly concerned about a UDI. Ischinger was in a good position to respond to 
alternative proposals from EU capitals and explain what had been discussed and why 
certain proposals had been rejected. He flew to Budapest, Stockholm, Bucharest, 
Sofia, Rome and Athens,701 and conducted in-depth talks with potential non-
recognisers, Spain, Cyprus, and Slovakia. On the sidelines of UN and EU meetings in 
New York, he would speak to several EU ministers and ambassadors, including those 
from Belgium and Finland, as well as remain in contact with foreign ministers 
throughout Europe and heads of states, such as Czech President Vaclav Klaus.  
 
Ischinger’s motto of ‘leaving no stone unturned’ appeared to resonate particularly well 
with EU member states. The response from EUMS concerned about a UDI considered 
Ischinger to be a ‘reasonable, professional’ negotiator, attributing to him a genuine 
interest in resolving the conflict within Europe. Particularly, Ischinger’s approach 
evidently contrasted with that of the United States, Britain or France, whose approach 
some EUMS described as ‘blackmail’, as states were being pressured to recognise a 
possible UDI. In contrast, it appears that other Quint members and supporters for 
independence did not consider Germany in any way less committed to Kosovan 
independence than any other among them. Germany appeared to be highly committed 
and ‘pulling in the same direction’ in the effort to manage the process towards 
independence.702 In this context, however, it appeared that Germany was much keener 
on creating an EU consensus than other large EUMS who supported independence, 
such as France. 703  
 
Overall, the Troika process was considered crucial for many Member States in coming 
to a position on the question of Kosovan independence. Portugal, the Netherlands and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701 See Annex II Travel and Meeting Log of EU Troika delegation 30 July - 12 December 2007. 
702 Comments to the author, interview with COWEB delegation representative of an EU Member State, 
phone interview, February 2015 
703 Comments to the author, interview with Leopold Maurer, Liaison Officer of the European 
Commission to the UN Special Envoy for the future status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, phone interview, 
February 2015. 
202 
	  
Hungary all attributed the work of the Troika to their decision to recognise Kosovo’s 
UDI.704 The defining aspects were the extended consultation process on a question 
which required ultimately the domestic recognition of another state and the evidence 
that, according to the Troika chair, all possible avenues for a solution of the conflict 
between the two states had been explored. The ‘no stone left unturned’ approach thus 
was fundamental for more cohesion among EUMS. Although the German-German 
treaty proposal was not successful with the conflict parties, as has been pointed out 
above, the proposal received a positive response from EUMS and was considered 
constructive because it demonstrated the willingness of the Troika to try all possible 
approaches. Indeed, it appears that the Troika process received greater endorsement 
from the European Union Member States than from the conflict parties.  
 
4.4.1   Responding to the Lack of EU Consensus 
The exact number of the non-recognisers did not become clear until after the Troika 
process had concluded, and many states were then still hesitant, as can be seen from 
official documents. Further evidence of this can be taken from the fact that Ischinger 
discussed the issue in capitals, such as Bratislava or Bucharest, where his team was 
consistently confronted with severe concerns regarding the recognition.705 
 
As the extensive discussions with EUMS as part of the Troika process went on it 
became evident that there would most likely not be a consensus at EU level. EUMS 
insisted on their concerns being taken into consideration for recognition and but also 
desired an overall agreement within the Union. Above, I have demonstrated that for 
German Members of Parliament a common EU position was very important. 706 
 
At the end of the Troika negotiation, the question on the future EU mission remained. 
Details of the debates and negotiations around the deployment of the mission are 
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beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the EU presence represented an important 
justification for German recognition: I will therefore review the process briefly. As 
described above, the Council and Commission had prepared different options from a 
lighter technical mission to a more robust deployment. During the Troika negotiations 
the Council argued that a separate Security Council resolution would legally not be 
necessary to enable the mission.707 The result of continued Council commitment to the 
mission on the one hand and division over the status among Member States on the 
other resulted in a compromise. Facing the risk of the international community losing 
influence in Kosovo after the UDI, the EUMS agreed to support a technical mission.708 
The consensus on this was, however, decoupled from the status question. The non-
recognising states would therefore support the mission but not change their position 
on Kosovo’s status. The new mission would be operating under UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244. The approach of the EU mission would therefore be ‘status neutral’: 
it would provide technical assistance on establishing institutions and the rule of law 
without affecting the status of Kosovo, to some extent similarly to the original mandate 
of UNMIK.709 Already during the Troika negotiations this process was initiated by 
states who were likely to not recognise Kosovo, mainly Slovakia had advocated this 
approach.710 The development of this solution was finalised just weeks before the UDI 
in February 2008.711  
 
This status neutral approach of the EU also became evident in the Council of Ministers 
declaration following the UDI, which stated explicitly that recognition was a matter 
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for each EUMS to decide.712 UNMIK would also continue to be deployed in Kosovo, 
although in a reduced capacity. The EU mission was also endorsed by the UN 
Secretary General. He reported to the Security Council throughout the year on the 
European Partnership Action Plan between the UNMIK and the EU and the intentions 
of the EU to deploy the mission. In November 2008 the President of the Security 
Council accepted this deployment and collaboration with the EU.713  
 
Thus, the process focused efforts of the Troika chair to emphasise that all options had 
been explored allowed for enabling the EU mission despite disagreement on Kosovo’s 
status. Among EU Member States was a commitment to the involvement of the EU in 
Kosovo and the risk of losing its central role would have had also affected the EU’s 
position in the Western Balkans generally. As discussed in Chapter Two, in this period, 
so-called enlargement fatigue had begun among Member States, however the Council 
and Commissions had continued with a significant presence in the region overall and 
the prospect of EU enlargement was considered the key incentive for progress in 
negotiations on policy reforms. The dispute over the Kosovo status risked escalating 
this division even further, however the division of the issues of status and EU mission 
assured greater EU intervention. For the Troika, the division among EUMS was 
evident from the start and, as described above, the aim of the process was to gain as 
much support as possible from member states, although a consensus was unlikely to 
be reached. For Germany, a common EU position was essential due to domestic 
pressure. Below, I will now discuss how the outcome of the Troika, without an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
712 European Union (2008b) ‘Council Conclusions on Kosovo’ 2851st External Relations Council 
meeting, Brussels, 18 February 2008, available at 
http://www.eu2008.si/si/News_and_Documents/Council_Conclusions/February/0218_GAERC5.pdf 
(last accessed 25 September 2016). 
713 United Nations (2008a) UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo S/2008/211, 28 March 2008; United Nations (2008b) UN 
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Mission in Kosovo S/2008/354, 12 June 2008; United Nations (2008c) UN Security Council Report of 
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S/PRST/2008/44, 26 November 2008. 
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agreement among the conflict parties, nor a new UNSC agreement or EU consensus, 
was perceived. 
 
4.5  The German domestic position during the Troika negotiations 
In the Bundestag debate prior to the Troika process most political parties had insisted 
on a new Security Council resolution on the status before a recognition and for a united 
EU position. For some parties, especially the Social Democrats, it was important to 
keep Serbia engaged in the process and to provide inclusive negotiations. As the 
Troika negotiations proceeded and a clear position from the Security Council or the 
European Union became less likely, it was the Troika who had to communicate the 
difficulty of reaching an agreement to the Members of the Bundestag.  
Coalition and opposition parties had called for a multilateral settlement, ideally backed 
by the UN SC. This had not been achieved and therefore the reality of Germany having 
to take a position, despite the unresolved issue, became clear.  The Troika had to 
demonstrate that it had, indeed, used all possible multilateral avenues to reach a 
solution, reiterating the ‘no stone left unturned’ motto. This was particularly necessary 
to hold the grand coalition together. The coalition parties had been divided over what 
kind of multilateralism was sufficient to legitimise a decision to support an 
independent Kosovo. Whereas for the CDU, the long standing involvement of the 
international community and the collaboration with key western allies was sufficient, 
the SPD sought a more inclusive approach so as to not alienate Russia and Serbia. This 
tension links back to the question of what kind of multilateralism Germany should 
pursue and the changing nature of multilateralism among western allies, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. To some extent, the Troika had to persuade parliamentarians, especially 
from the SPD and the opposition parties, that an acceptance of a UDI would not 
resemble, to use von Oudenaren’s term, ‘dysfunctional multilateralism’. 
 
Unity in the coalition had to be reached before Germany could make a commitment to 
support the UDI. The military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, agreed by a CDU-FDP 
government and executed by its SPD-Green successors, remained a controversial 
policy. Thus, in the aftermath, parliamentarians and policy makers sought to 
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demonstrate an approach that was inclusive of all parties in the Kosovo conflict. After 
the failed multilateral efforts and deadlock on the issue, German political parties had 
to justify and rationalize moving on without a multilateral consensus.  
 
In its plenary session, the Bundestag did not discuss the Troika negotiations as they 
unfolded. However, Ischinger regularly met the Foreign Affairs Committee and 
specific political parties throughout the process. Based on reports from the EU 
delegation, the responses from the German parliament were quite supportive of the 
efforts made by the Troika. This included the opposition parties, the Greens and Free 
Democrats. The Troika delegation continued to brief political parties regularly and met 
specifically with the Social Democrats due to their role in the government coalition. 
In late November 2007, it became evident that the concerns of the political parties had 
been responded to sufficiently and that, although not enthusiastically, independence 
for Kosovo could be accepted. Here, it was essential that the Troika chair had engaged 
with the German political parties that had expressed concerns, thus demonstrating that 
all possible options in the eyes of the negotiator had been explored and that there was 
no viable alternative. The outcome convinced most of those who had originally been 
critical of a UDI, except for Die Linke,. Nonetheless, the debate demonstrated how the 
decision to recognise remained a difficult one for all parties and the justifications 
provide evidence on the changing approaches towards German multilateralism among 
some parties. 
 
4.5.1   Position of Political Parties in the Bundestag after the Troika process 
Once the negotiations were considered to have failed, the debate returned to the 
Bundestag. A shift in the positions of the parties in relation to a possible UDI became 
evident as most parties approached the question then in a different light. The speakers 
of the coalition parties made many references to Ischinger’s efforts, often stressing 
that ‘every possibility had been exhausted’. Chancellor Merkel, in her speech on the 
28 November, emphasised the difficulty of the new situation, a lacking EU consensus 
and deadlock between the two conflict parties, and the importance for a European 
solution. Similarly, Foreign Minister Steinmeier emphasised that Germany had played 
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an essential role in the EU, both when holding the presidency and then in the Troika. 
He also stressed the incompatibility of the US versus Russian positions and the 
importance of encouraging the conflict parties to keep peace in the region.714 His party 
colleagues emphasised the leading role of the EU in the conflict and the importance of 
bringing peace and a European solution after the conflict parties and the international 
community had failed.715  
 
The narrative from the Social Democrats turned, therefore, towards managing this 
moment of crisis in which the talks had yielded no result and the conflict between 
Serbia and Kosovo remained. To resolve this dilemma, SPD parliamentarians 
emphasised the role of the European Union. The underlying expectation was that 
greater integration of the Western Balkan region into the EU would provide incentive 
for Belgrade and Pristina to co-exist peacefully, and the Kosovo conflict could be 
resolved. 
 
The foreign policy speaker for the Christian Democrats, Andreas Schockenhoff, 
quoted Javier Solana, saying that a unilateral declaration would ‘not be the end of the 
world’. Ultimately, the Christian Democrats stressed that there was no viable 
alternative to independence and that independence would be ‘supervised’. The CDU 
accepted sui generis as a clear justification and as a response to the legal question.716 
 
Thus, within the government coalition parties the position towards recognising a 
possible UDI changed considerably in the public debate. The Christian Democrats had 
previously always pushed for the greater involvement of Germany and for a swift end 
to the negotiations. They had previously also supported a new UN Security Council 
resolution. The Social Democrats had to accept that a solution involving Russia was 
not going to be possible and that the alienation of their Serbian partners in the   Social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 Deutscher Bundestag (2007e) Plenarprotokoll 16/132. Stenographischer Bericht. 132. Sitzung 16. 
Wahlperiode. Berlin, 12 December 2007, p. 13578. 
715 Deutscher Bundestag (2007e) p. 13817. 
716 Deutscher Bundestag (2007e) p. 13581. 
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Democrat sister party, DS, would have to be contained through promises of European 
integration. 
 
From the opposition the Green party highlighted the pressure on the negotiations by 
both the US and Russia and emphasised the role of the EU and the need for a more 
united EU foreign policy on Kosovo as an absolute priority.717 The Free Democrats 
raised legal concerns on the hand over from UNMIK to an EU mission without a new 
UN resolution. While this party was in support of greater EU involvement, it also 
called for clarity and transparency in this process.718 Die Linke continued to accuse 
the Christian Democrats of supporting violations of international law by supporting a 
unilateral independence.719 Thus, the opposition parties, while in principle supportive 
of a greater role for the EU (particularly the Free Democrats had pushed for this), 
raised legal concerns. It was essential to the opposition that although there may not be 
unity on the status question, the EU would need a clear mandate for its mission. 
 
A role for the EU had been essential for German parliamentarians in the management 
of the conflict. In previous debates, a common EU position on the status and the role 
of a future EU mission were conditions for the involvement of Germany in the Kosovo 
conflict. The EU’s disunity on the status question represented a particular obstacle for 
German politicians and the AA. For Ischinger personally, the fact that the non-
recognisers had come to their positions due to domestic issues and not because of the 
conflict in Kosovo, made disagreement on status acceptable.720 The hope was that this 
would allow some form of compromise between Serbia and Kosovo rather than 
leading to new stalemate in the EU.721 Ultimately, the EU Troika delegation members 
realised that an EU consensus may be approaching, but was still not possible within 
the given timeframe of 120 days. Simultaneously, German parties became more 
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719 Deutscher Bundestag (2007e) p. 13583. 
720 Comments to the author, interview with Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, February 2015. 
721 Ibid. 
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understanding of the situation among the political parties.722 From the perspective of 
the AA, the disagreement at EU level became acceptable once it was, in the words of 
one interviewee, ‘no longer harmful’. As long as there was a solid majority agreement 
internationally and agreement with key partners, such as the United States, Germany 
was able to move forward and recognise the contested UDI.723 
 
Within the Green party it became evident after the Troika negotiations that there were 
some concerns regarding the process pursued by the EU in light of the lack of legal 
clarity over the possible status of an EU mission and recognition of independence. A 
travel report by two Green Party MdBs who went to Pristina and Belgrade in 
December 2007 stressed the importance of the role of the EU in leading the process of 
independence and that neither the influence of Russia or the United States should stop 
the EU from doing so. Thus, there was a sense of inevitability in regards to 
independence. However, there were severe concerns in regards to the potential 
response from Serbia. While the MdBs appeared assured that there would be no 
military response, issues such as the cutting off of energy or water supply to Kosovo, 
attacks towards the Serbian minority in Kosovo or increased nationalism in the 
upcoming Serbian elections were of great concern. Trust in Serbian political parties 
does not appear to have been particularly strong. In meetings with the opposition and 
civil society, the coalition parties DS and DSS, who participated in the negotiations, 
have been described mainly as instrumentalising the Kosovo question for party 
political purposes.724 
 
In the period between the end of the Troika talks in December 2007 and the declaration 
of independence in February 2008 the opposition parties brought the Kosovo status 
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issues back on the agenda of the Bundestag as independence became imminent. The 
questions raised by the Free Democrats focused on the validity of UNSC Resolution 
1244 after a possible independence.725 The Green party expressed concern about a 
German recognition without the safeguards provided in the Ahtisaari Plan on the 
protection of minority rights and without the control of an EU mission. The 
disagreement within the Council was therefore considered a risk to the stability of a 
future independent Kosovo.726 
 
4.5.2   Germany’s position on the Troika 
During the Troika negotiations, the German foreign office considered possible 
responses from the German government toward the UDI. Although the pressure from 
some EU partners and the US was strong, the Troika team and the foreign ministry 
still believed that there was a genuine possibility of solving the conflict without a 
unilateral declaration and that this was a worthy effort to pursue. However, as the 
process appeared to fail to deliver on the resolution of the conflict or an agreement at 
UNSC or EU level, the AA had to prepare for alternative solutions. Within this 
process, managing the political backlash domestically and internationally was the 
priority and this was also reflected in the work of the Troika. The arguments from 
those states opposing independence were famed in a legal context as well as with 
political reasons. As discussed in Chapter Two, Germany’s participation in contested 
multilateral action was often challenged legally by Die Linke, and also by sections of 
the Social Democrats, particularly in regards to the use of force. 
 
4.5.3   Final Bundestag debate on Recognition  
The parliamentary discussion on the recognition of Kosovo followed the cabinet 
discussion on recognition on 20 February 2015. The act of recognition, as mentioned 
previously, did not need an approval from the Bundestag, hence the discussion was 
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simply an ‘Aussprache’, or debate, on the topic. Nonetheless, this debate received 
significant attention from most parties, highlighting key aspects with which most 
parliamentarians struggled, and conflicts between party lines became evident.  
 
The most striking aspect of the debate is that no party referred to the independence of 
Kosovo as a success. All parties, including the coalition, used cautious language, and 
referred to specific legal or political concerns that each party had expressed previously. 
The debate between parties erupted, however, mostly on discussion of past party 
relationships with the Milosevic regime versus the involvement of the NATO 
operation in 1999. The debate, thus, highlighted how each party presented itself in 
regards to their foreign policy outlook, in relation to the issue of self-determination 
and the contested statehood of Kosovo.  
 
The declaration by foreign minister Steinmeier on the recognition of Kosovo, which 
had just been decided in a cabinet meeting, was strikingly different from the positive 
announcements from fellow Quint countries. Introducing the debate to the floor of the 
Bundestag, his speech was full of caveats referring to the fact that the declaration of 
independence had not been welcomed by all and emphasising again the 9 years of 
international efforts for reconciliation. He also highlighted the agreement on the 
EULEX mission as a success for the 27 member states. The main reason he cited for 
Germany’s recognition was the need for rule of law and stability in the region. He also 
referred directly to the Russian leadership and emphasised the German role in 
establishing and leading the Troika negotiations.727 Steinmeier received support along 
the same lines from Social Democrat MdBs, who acknowledged the particular 
difficulty of the decision for the government and the importance of striving against 
instability in the region. They also supported the sui generis approach to the case and 
the importance of acknowledging the human suffering of Kosovans under Milosevic. 
One MdB also expressed regret for the Serbian leadership and acknowledges the role 
in defeating Milosevic, while at the same time accusing the Die Linke of engaging 
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with Milosevic during the war.728 This was also an occasion for the Social Democrats 
to distance themselves from the position of Die Linke and to explain previous position 
in which the SPD had appeared to be defensive of the Serbian government. Die Linke 
had rejected the German Kosovo policy since the 1990s, always insisting on the 
principle of the territorial integrity of the FRY and they continued to do so now 
regarding Serbia on the question of recognition. The Social Democrats accused Die 
Linke then of having an unreasonable policy of appeasement toward the Serbian 
leadership both during the Milosevic regime and again in regards to the recognition. 
Despite their closer relationship with the Serbian leadership and unease about the UDI, 
the Social Democrats thus argued for the recognition, demonstrating a pragmatic 
approach and commitment to the EU and European integration.729  
 
The response of the Christian Democrats was more diverse than that of the Social 
Democrats. Speaker on Foreign Affairs Andreas Schockenhoff presented open support 
for recognition that was far less apologetic than Steinmeier’s speech. He restated all 
the reasons for accepting the sui generis case, the exhaustion of negotiations and the 
importance for economic and political development in the region. Most interestingly, 
Schockenhoff, however, referred back to the term coined by the Ahtisaari Plan on the 
‘supervised’ nature of this independence, arguing that Kosovo had not been given full 
independence.730 His party colleagues provided a slightly different analysis, 
emphasising the influence of the United States, which according to MdB Gunther 
Krichbaum made independence inevitable, and the difficult position of the current 
Serbian leadership and the need for a vision of Serbia in Europe.731 Before the Troika 
negotiations, the CDU had accepted that there would not be a resolution between 
Pristina and Belgrade but had insisted on a new Security Council Resolution to enable 
the Ahtisaari Plan. After the Troika talks, the party embraced the concept of uti 
possidetis instead. The concept had become predominant among the Quint members 
and had also been increasingly used by the EU. Overall, within the Christian 
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Democrats there were also different degrees of confidence in supporting the legally 
controversial justification of sui generis as well as concerns about the political future 
of the Western Balkans.  
 
A few months earlier the Greens had requested clarification from the government on 
the legality of recognition in case of disagreement among EU members. Within the 
party there was strong support for independence. The speaker Jürgen Trittin referred 
to this as he argued that the recognition was inevitable, that personally he did not 
welcome it but that his party strongly supported the decision of the government. Both 
he and the second Green party speaker on the issue, Marieluise Beck, attacked Die 
Linke accusing them of not acknowledging the atrocities committed by the Milosevic 
regime. 732 
 
Also, the Free Democrats expressed concern about the UDI, as well as the internal 
problems of Kosovo and the risks that laid ahead. Quite openly, Werner Hoyer MdB 
argued that for the FDP this recognition was very difficult and highlighted the mistakes 
that were made in relation to calculating Russia’s behaviour in relation to Kosovo.733 
 
Die Linke continued to reject the process through which Kosovo was becoming 
independent, citing legal concerns. Moreover, it disapproved of how the concerns of 
EUMS that did not recognise Kosovo had been dismissed. It further highlighted the 
democratic process in Serbia in contrast to the weak state, which it claimed Kosovo 
would become. Finally, it rejected the legal basis of the EU mission and thus the 
deployment of German personnel which would form part of it. Therefore, it decided 
to bring a case against the mission to the constitutional court.734 Thus, Die Linke 
continued in its complete rejection of the recognition, calling it a continuation of the 
violations of international law that had begun in the Kosovo war or 1999. It also 
rejected any claims that the recognition would assist the building of a democratic or 
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multi-ethnic state in Kosovo instead arguing that the democratic government of Serbia 
had been undermined. 
  
 
The positions of the parties in the Bundestag demonstrate a variety of hesitations in 
regards to the UDI. For the Social Democrats, these stemmed mainly from uncertainty 
regarding the legal perspective, as well as the failure to find a solution with Serbia. 
The Christian Democrats expressed similar concerns but stressed particularly the need 
for a supervised independence with significant international participation. Even for the 
Green Party, who had supported Kosovan independence in the early 1990s, the 
recognition was perceived as controversial due to the breakdown in multilateral 
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Table 3: Overview of political party positions on the question of Kosovo status, 
based on the recognition debate 20 February.735 
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negotiations. The Free Democrats, who for a long time had advocated an EU 
protectorate in Kosovo, lamented the breakdown in international negotiations and had 
to come to terms with a lack of EU consensus. The breakdown in multilateralism was 
the greatest disappointment for the German parties.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, German action remained tied to multilateral 
organisations. Even in the case of the Kosovo war of 1999, there was no support from 
the UNSC but NATO and the EU were united in the military intervention. Even the 
case of the early recognition of Croatia in 1991 by Germany which raised questions 
about its multilateralism after unification, resulted eventually in the EU joining in the 
recognition and Croatia becoming a UN member state. Thus, the failure to reach 
consensus among the conflict parties, the EU or the United Nations Security Council 
in the case of Kosovo’s status was not easily compatible with German foreign policy. 
Trust in the Troika process was very important in allowing the parties to accept a UDI 
despite their reservations. The impression among the parties was that the United States 
had exerted significant pressure on Germany and Europe to recognise. The efforts of 
Ischinger to find a compromise were thus welcome. The approach of the German-
German solution resonated particularly well, as it had represented for German policy 
makers the solution to the greatest stalemate in German foreign policy history. Once 
even this approach had been rejected, the parties accepted that everything had been 
attempted and Germany had to take a stand on the Kosovo question.  
 
An interesting dynamic appears to have developed in which, despite the breakdown of 
all trusted multilateralism efforts and institutions, German parliamentarians 
considered the Troika - led by Ischinger and with an approach defined by a German 
logic towards multilateralism – to be familiar and trustworthy. The failure of 
Ischinger’s approach was perceived to be caused by the various deadlocks at the 
international level. The sense of ownership that German Parliamentarians had 
developed toward the European integration process of the Western Balkans, which had 
been largely initiated by Germany, also provided confidence that the continuation of 
this process would eventually resolve the differences among EU members and between 
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the conflict parties. Those parliamentarians that had previously called for greater 
multilateralism, and then accepted that no resolution had been found, still advocated 
for a multilateral solution in the longer term. All parties, apart from Die Linke, had 
been involved with the military intervention in Kosovo, either by approving it or by 
executing it. The intervention had been controversial even within those parties. In their 
speeches in the final discussion of Kosovo’s status, the SPD and the Greens responded 
to criticism from Die Linke, which had made a direct link between the lack of 
legitimacy of the Kosovo war and recognising the UDI. The parties stressed the 
violations of the Milosevic regime and the need for international intervention, and 
accused Die Linke of having been complacent and acting as an apologist for human 
rights abuses. Thus, they recalled the justification of ‘never again’ that had been used 
in the Kosovo war, and while they did not explicitly justify recognition because of 
human rights abuses, they reject the narrow legalistic critique and interpretation of 
multilateralism by Die Linke. 
 
Striking are also the justifications for Kosovan independence provided in the debates 
in the Bundestag. All parties, except Die Linke, acknowledged the desire for 
independence due to the human rights violations by the Milosevic regime.736 There 
was no reference to a universal principle of self-determination, as it had been in the 
case of Croatia or in the early 1990s in reference to Kosovo. Instead there were 
frequent references to the need for Kosovans to leave the Serbian state due to a 
breakdown in trust. Despite the stalemate between Pristina and Belgrade as well as the 
disagreement in the EU, the parties still stressed EU integration to be the long term 
resolution for the region and to improve relations between Pristina and Belgrade.737 
The justifications for the independence were therefore mostly aligned with the sui 
generis argument; the particular recent historical experience for Kosovo of prosecution 
justified its wish for independence. The conventional international legal approach 
towards claims of self-determination based on the persecution of minorities allows for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736 for example, Ibid, Krichbaum MdB (CDU) p. 15199 and Marie Louise MdB (Greens) p. 15202. 
737 Kolbow MdB(SPD) Schockenhoff MdB(CDU)Hoyer MdB(FDP) in ibid p. 15198-9. 
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some intervention by the international community. 738 However, in the case of Kosovo 
the argument from those opposing recognition was that the new government could not 
be held accountable for the actions of the Milosevic regime and that it was not 
persecuting the Albanian population. The sui generis argument was contested by Die 
Linke and initially also by sections of the Social Democrats. However, its was 
gradually embraced by all parties.  
 
4.6  Conclusion 
In the introduction of this thesis I discussed how the speech of German Foreign 
Minister Steinmeier on the recognition of Kosovo was full of caveats and 
hesitations.739 For Germany, the lacking agreement between the conflict parties, the 
split among EU members and the deteriorated relationship with Russia were all 
opposite to the hopes expressed by the government and MdBs during the ongoing 
negotiations. Nonetheless, Germany did recognise Kosovo’s UDI. In this chapter, I 
traced Germany’s position from the Ahtisaari process, through the summer of 2007 
and the Troika negotiations, until German recognition in February 2008. In the process 
of moving toward the recognition of Kosovo, this period shows a significant shift in 
the domestic position at parliamentary level while within ministerial circles 
recognition was considered a more likely outcome from the start of that period.  
 
In this period can be seen the continued German multilateral engagement on the 
question of recognition both internationally and at EU level. As described in Chapter 
Three, Germany held the EU presidency just prior to the Ahtisaari process and had 
been involved in the first attempts at finding a consensus among Member States. 
Previously, also at international level, Germany had been a member of the Contact 
Group. Through the appointment of German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger as Chair 
of the Troika, Germany took a central role in the negotiations. This position allowed 
the negotiator as well as the political leadership in the foreign ministry to change 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
738 See Åland Islands and Quebec case discussed in Chapter One, 1.3.1 Internal and External Self-
Determination. 
739 See Introductory chapter of this thesis. 
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aspects of the previous international negotiations, which they believed had contributed 
to the failure of the Ahtisaari process. Thus, the central outcome of the Troika 
negotiations was to create more trust in the international process. This delaying tactic 
was acceptable to the US and Russian positions, although for different reasons. 
Germany however, also intended to discuss alternative proposals to make sure that all 
possible options had been considered by the Troika and the conflict parties. 
 
The recognition by Germany was ultimately a decision within the cabinet. However, 
the engagement of domestic political and EU actors demonstrates the multifaceted 
implications recognition of a new state had for the German government. I do not argue 
that Germany was unique in this regard. However, Germany took a leading role in 
comparison to other Member States and Contact Group Members. This allowed for 
greater influence in the domestic discussion in regards to the German position. 
Therefore, this chapter has highlighted the shift in the German position at party 
political level as exhibited in parliamentary debates. Here, particularly the shift in the 
position of the speeches in the Bundestag from the end of the Ahtisaari process and 
the debate in regards to the recognition are particularly striking. While in the summer 
of 2007 all parties expressed concerns about considering a possibly unilateral 
declaration of independence, by February 2008, all but Die Linke accepted such a 
move. Those recognising still made qualifying comments, such as desiring a 
‘supervised’ independence, accepting that the UDI was not ideal, and accepting that 
much progress would be needed for democratisation in Kosovo and Serbia. However, 
the ‘no stone left unturned’ approach of the Troika had a significant influence on this 
outcome. Ischinger attributed this change particularly to his efforts and to the German 
coalition government in demonstrating that all possible options had been discussed 
and that the new stalemate was no longer tenable or could not be resolved from the 
conflict parties. The Ahtisaari process had been criticised for not taking the Serbian 
side sufficiently into consideration, and the Troika process was to remedy this distrust 
in the international community. Among the different proposals discussed at the Troika 
talks was the AA’s German-German proposal, which was considered domestically in 
Germany to be a constructive and promising solution. It is striking however that for 
the conflict parties this proposal did not represent a desirable solution. Because this 
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proposal also failed, the international level negotiations were presented to the domestic 
constituency to have arrived at a final stalemate. The situation was also framed as 
polarised between, on the one hand, the promise for independence by the United States 
and, on the other hand, the denial of cooperation from Russia. Some political parties, 
including the Social Democrats, the Greens, and Die Linke had argued for greater 
engagement with Russia before the Troika process. However, the Troika efforts were 
considered by the majority of the parties to have shown sufficient good will to reach a 
resolution. Therefore, the failure to reach a new Security Council resolution or achieve 
Russian support for a UDI was accepted domestically.  
 
A united EU position on the status question had also been a key requirement for most 
German political parties. Similarly to the German situation, in many other EUMS the 
continued efforts by Ischinger within the space between the polarised positions of the 
US and Russia led many to agree to a recognition as the only way out of the stalemate. 
This increased the number of recognising states considerably to twenty-two. The 
justification of the five non-recognisers (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and 
Spain) were accepted as domestic political issues based on domestic secessionist 
movements. The non-recognition was thus not based on a conflict of these member 
states with Kosovo. Hence, the disagreement on the status was acceptable for most 
political parties in Germany. Nonetheless, the Green Party, although very supportive 
of recognition and the role of the EU in the Western Balkans, raised several concerns 
about the legality of the process. 
 
Ultimately, the extension of the Kosovo status negotiations through the Troika did not 
satisfy the two conflict parties or the UN Security Council; it satisfied the EU only 
partly but sufficiently to bring full agreement within the German government and a 
large majority in the Bundestag. External pressures, such as strong US support for 
Kosovan independence, or the ongoing preparation for an EU mission, which had been 
prepared with the expectation of a successful Ahtisaari process, and the possibility of 
a powerless UNMIK in a new Kosovan state, raised too many potential security risks. 
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The independence of Kosovo was directly linked to the EU rule of law mission and 
the wider EU enlargement to the region. The influence the EU was to have in the future 
was considered fundamentally beneficial to Kosovo. In Germany, most parties, except 
for Die Linke, saw the EU as a good force for development and stability in the region. 
Even those for parliamentarians who supported the independence most openly, mainly 
the CDU, the supervised aspect of the independence was very important. A leading 
role for the EU in Kosovo was considered a guarantee for peace prospects.  
 
In Chapter Two discussed the debate in the literature on Germany’s multilateralism 
and approach to  EU foreign policy.740 Authors have argued that Germany was 
increasingly less likely to ‘participate in long winded negotiations’ to reach a 
consensus within the EU. It is noteworthy that in this case the call for longer 
negotiations was supported strongly by the Germans, despite facing opposition from 
other Quint members. This commitment to longer negotiations was due to the 
disagreement on status at domestic, EU and international level. Since the international 
level and EU disagreements were not fully overcome but agreement was achieved 
domestically, it could be argued that domestic disagreement was the main incentive 
for the German government and that at multilateral level the support for independence 
was considered ‘sufficient’. The length of these negotiations can be understood as an 
attempt to re-engage with those who were not in agreement with the UDI, under 
pressure of recognition from the United States. Within the Troika, Germany did 
encourage the discussion of a variety of different proposals. However, its main 
proposal of the German-German treaty model would have not represented a departure 
from enabling independence per se. Instead it would have been a way to allow Serbia 
to remain engaged with the international community. Thus, Germany saw a contested 
UDI as the most likely outcome and worked towards promoting domestic acceptance 
of this reality. The AA was open to consider alternative options but these would have 
had to be accepted by all parties involved.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740 See particularly 2.5.3 Continuity or Change? The Academic Debate on Intervention and 
Multilateralism in German Foreign Policy 
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In this chapter I have traced the development of the German position towards the 
recognition of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. In Chapter One, 
I identified three aspects for the consideration of the case of Germany’s recognition of 
Kosovo based on the literature on Germany’s early recognition of Croatia: Firstly, the 
German domestic approach towards self-determination, secondly, Germany’s 
understanding of the conflict and, thirdly, the multilateral role of Germany in the 
process. In Chapter Three and in this chapter, it became evident that, firstly, the 
argument of self-determination was not brought forward by domestic German actors, 
and, secondly, the interpretation of the conflict was a stalemate between two conflict 
parties. The Serbian government of the time was not considered an aggressor as 
Milosevic had been earlier in regards to Kosovo and in the case of Croatian 
independence. Finally, Germany’s multilateral role was perceived as collaborative by 
its closest partners and the conflict parties. The following concluding chapter will 
bring this empirical evidence into the overall context of this thesis, which aims to 
consider the recognition within the concept of recognition as an interventionist act. 
Here, I will discuss in more detail the use of recognition by the German government 
for conflict management. I will discuss particularly Germany’s approach to 
multilateralism and intervention and its role in EU foreign policy.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that Germany was hesitant to recognise Kosovo due to 
domestic divisions and the unease about the international division over the status. 
Germany recognised Kosovo due to its long-standing involvement in the intervention 
in the conflict and due to concerns that an unresolved status would bring greater 
instability to the Western Balkans. Since the conflict had not been resolved after many 
years of international involvement, Germany’s recognition was built on a rationale of 
continued conflict management and expectations of an increased role of the European 
Union in this process. EU accession prospects were to contain the conflict and avoid 
escalations. However, German parliamentarians were clear that a resolution of the 
conflict was not considered possible without a significant shift in the position of the 
conflicts parties. 
 
Germany’s decision to recognise Kosovo was taken amidst international controversy. 
Although Germany had been a leading actor in the negotiations on Kosovo and in EU 
policy towards the Western Balkans, domestic positions in Germany were split over 
the status issue. In the early 1990s Germany’s early recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia had resulted in significant criticism of its policy and led to a backlash from 
its close allies, thus making recognition politics in Germany particularly controversial. 
In the case of Kosovo, Germany did not stand out in the same way it had in the case 
of Croatia. Instead, it had become a central actor in the international negotiations and 
a mediator between different actors across the divide over the Kosovo status. Germany 
appeared as a different international actor, with a new standing in its multilateral 
alliances, but nevertheless still battling tensions within its domestic foreign policy 
orientations.  
 
For the purpose of this research the status question for Kosovo was considered as part 
of the dissolution process of Yugoslavia. At the beginning of this process in the 1990s, 
the recognition of Croatia was interpreted by Caplan and Zaum as an intervention to 
manage the conflicts in the former Yugoslav republic. This interpretation of 
recognition focuses on the political and power relationships between recognising states 
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and the seceding territory. Caplan argued that in the case of Croatia the rationale 
behind recognition was to internationalise the conflict and to introduce conditional 
recognition. Germany’s role in this recognition policy towards Croatia, particularly in 
regards to internationalising the conflict, had been central. This thesis aimed to identify 
whether such a rationale existed in the case of Kosovo and to what extent this informed 
Germany’s policy.  
 
The question of recognition by Germany was therefore approached from a foreign 
policy perspective. Here the Civilian Power characterisation of Germany as a foreign 
policy actor was particularly relevant. Within this description, Germany has been 
considered an intrinsically multilateral international actor with a commitment to 
international law and a reluctance to act unilaterally. Such an assumption of Germany 
as a foreign policy actor raised questions over Germany’s use of recognition as a 
conflict management tool in a contested context such as Croatia and Kosovo. 
Therefore, by examining the recognition of Kosovo by Germany this thesis provided 
also an in-depth review of Germany as a multilateral actor in foreign policy generally 
and as an EU member in particular. 
 
In this conclusion, I will combine the empirical findings from the process tracing of 
the German decision with the conceptual assumptions surrounding Germany as an 
international actor and the view of recognition as conflict management.  
 
Recognition as Conflict Management in Kosovo 
Based on the case of Croatia, the concept of recognition for conflict management was 
described as being built on two main elements: the internationalisation of a conflict 
and conditionality on the new state. This thesis has demonstrated that in the case of 
Kosovo that although the application of uti possidetis did not apply in the early 1990s 
new justification were developed by recognising states and within Germany which 
also build on the logic of internationalisation. Furthermore, UN and EU conditionality 
towards Kosovo increased over the past two decades. The case of Kosovo also 
demonstrates the tension between the intensive involvement of the international 
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community since the Cold War on the one hand and the developing stalemate over the 
status question on the other.  
 
Kosovo: Post-Uti Possidetis 
The main controversy around the status of Kosovo arises out of its exclusion of the 
dissolution process of the Yugoslavia and the application of uti possidetis, and the 
difficulty in reaching consensus for new status in the aftermath. As discussed in 
Chapter One,741 a claim for independence exists in the tension between the territorial 
integrity of a state and interpretations of the right to self-determination. In the case of 
Croatia, uti possidetis and conditionality were to balance these two principles by 
providing external self-determination based on previously existing borders and 
internal self-determination by imposing minority rights through conditionality. 
However over the following seventeen years, as internal self-determination provision 
for Kosovo were rejected by its population, support for external self-determination for 
Kosovo grew.742 Thus new legal justifications to allow for a secession of Kosovo were 
developed, most prominently the sui generis argument, which was vehemently 
opposed by non-recognising countries as illegal. From this attempt to create a new 
legal framework, tensions emerged among recognisers and non-recogniser, which also 
affected Germany’s foreign policy decision to recognise Kosovo.743 
 
The Law and International Relations literature discusses different approaches to justify 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
741 See Chapter One, 1.3. Territorial Integrity, Self-determination and Secession. 
742 An in-depth discussion of the legal concepts can be found in Milanovic, M. and Wood, M. (eds) 
(2015) The Law and Politics of Kosovo of the Advisory Opinion, Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
French, D. (eds.) (2013) Statehood and Self-determination – Reconciling tradition and Modernity in 
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
743 After the unilateral declaration of independence, the government of Serbia decided to go to the 
International Court of Justice seeking an opinion on the legality of the declaration, which was published 
in 2010, International Court of Justice (2010) Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration Of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf (last 
accessed 25 September 2016). Thus some of the justifications either for or against recognition were 
developed and refined in greater detail after the declaration. See Milanovic, M. (2015) Arguing the 
Kosovo case’ in Milanovic, M. and Wood, M. (eds) The Law and Politics of Kosovo of the Advisory 
Opinion, Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 21-22 for a detailed discussion. However, this chapter 
focuses primarily on the justifications used in the recognition by states at the time of the UDI. 
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Kosovo’s independence. Justifications have included sui generis, ‘earned sovereignty’ 
and ‘remedial secession’. The central justification for supporters of Kosovan 
independence was the ‘sui generis’ argument, which saw Kosovo as a special case due 
to its recent history and, therefore, it would not provide a precedent for other cases.744 
There are two sides to this argument: firstly, it seeks to place Kosovo in the post-
Yugoslav recognition framework beyond uti possidetis and, secondly, it seeks to 
undermine concern that it may count as a precedent and cause a possible domino effect 
in the region and globally. 
 
The origins of the argument of Kosovo as ‘sui generis’ are difficult to identify but the 
concept was used increasingly after the Kosovo war of 1999 and the establishment of 
the UNMIK mission under UN resolution 1244, which established de facto UN 
governance of Kosovo territory. While the term may have been used informally by 
some diplomats and politicians, Martti Ahtisaari, the UNSG Special Envoy on the 
future status of Kosovo, publically referred to the case as sui generis from 2003 
onwards.745 The term became central to the justification of recognition and in response 
to the UDI in 2008 the EU stated the following:  
 
“The Council reiterates the EU's adherence to the principles of the UN 
Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, inter alia the principles of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity and all UN Security Council resolutions. It 
underlines its conviction that in view of the conflict of the 1990s and the 
extended period of international administration under SCR 1244, Kosovo 
constitutes a sui generis case which does not call into question these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744 Almqvist, J. (2013) The politics of recognition; the question about the final status of Kosovo, in. 
French, D. eds. (2013) Statehood and Self-determination – Reconciling tradition and Modernity in 
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 195-186, p. 175. 
745 Merikallio, K. and Ruokanen, T. (2015) The Mediator: A Biography of Martti Ahtisaari London: 
Hurst, p. 356; Summer, J. (2011) Kosovo: A Precedent - The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory 
Opinion and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, Leiden, Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 49; See also Weller (2009) p. 222 has also discussed the efforts by 
Ahtisaari and the Contact Group to bring the sui generis argument in and present it to Russia, which 
failed. This was discussed in detail in Chapter Three.  
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principles and resolutions.”746  
 
The use of sui generis is here particularly striking as the European Union was split on 
the status of Kosovo and although five member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, 
Slovakia and Spain) did not recognise Kosovo, they were still willing to support the 
use of sui generis.  
 
In a detailed analysis of the recognition declarations, Almqvist outlines the arguments 
of those who recognised Kosovo. Strikingly, many states, including Germany, made a 
direct connection between an independent Kosovo and peace and security in the 
Western Balkan region. This shows that certain recognising states considered the 
recognition to be a tool for conflict management.747 Other states made a less explicit 
appeal to conflict management by arguing that the current status quo for Kosovo was 
untenable and hence independence was necessary to gain clarity and closure to the 
status limbo.748 Still other states made clear reference to the recognition of Kosovo as 
being part of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, thus representing the ‘closure’ of this 
process.749 Finally, some used the lengthy international negotiations and the failure to 
reach agreement to justify a new kind of settlement.750 The United States justified the 
sui generis argument particularly with the historical context, the ethnic conflict, and 
the long-term UN involvement.751 Thus, conflict management considerations were 
central to the recognition justification for many states. However, the recognising states 
did not fully agree on a clear legal framework. Instead, recognisers used similar 
language, coordinated statements and similar arguments, often adapting these for their 
own position.752  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
746  European Union (2008b) ‘Council Conclusions on Kosovo’ 2851st External Relations Council 
meeting, Brussels, 18 February 2008, available at 
http://www.eu2008.si/si/News_and_Documents/Council_Conclusions/February/0218_GAERC5.pdf 
(last accessed 25 September 2016). 
747 Almqvist (2013) p. 173. Refers to the declarations of Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, and France. 
748 Ibid. Cites particularly Austria, Hungary and Luxemburg at this stage. 
749 Ibid. The United Kingdom, Samoa and Albania are cited for this argument. 
750 Ibid. p. 175. Germany, Hungary, Sweden, The United States, Canada, Colombia and France among 
others. 
751 Ibid. 
752 Ibid. 
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In the aftermath of the UDI, the legal implications of the new concepts and 
justifications were debated in the literature. Remedial Secession is one such concept. 
Bolton and Visoka have described this concept as involving the following 
justifications for recognition of independence:  
 
“a) violations of autonomy agreements by the host state; b) unjust 
annexation of territory; c) human rights abuses perpetrated by the host 
state; d) international intervention to mediate a status outcome; e) support 
of powerful countries; f) exhaustion of negotiations; [and] g) a 
commitment from the seceding entity to uphold minority rights.”753  
 
To some extent, the recognition of a territory that has experienced these from the so-
called ‘parent state’ represents the non-recognition of this parent state and a sanction 
against such behaviour. Those who oppose the concept of remedial secession argue 
that while there should be a response to violations by a host state against the minority 
of its population, secession should not be the solution.754 
 
A related approach is that of Earned Sovereignty, which places the onus on the 
seceding territory. The process to ‘earn’ sovereignty therefore goes via ‘shared 
sovereignty’, as, for example, with the governance of a territory under international 
supervision for a limited period; it would then be followed by a period of institution 
building and eventually a determination of the ‘final status’ of a territory.755 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 Bolton, C. and Visoka, G. (2010) Recognizing Kosovo’s independence: Remedial secession or 
earned sovereignty? South East European Studies at Oxford, Occasional Paper No. 11/10 October 
2010, p. 6. 
754 This argument is discussed in detail by Del Mar, K. (2013) ‘The myth of remedial secession’ in 
French, D. eds. (2013) Statehood and Self-determination – Reconciling tradition and Modernity in 
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 79-108, specifically p. 107. 
755 For a review on the literature on remedial secession and earned sovereignty see Bolton and Visoka 
(2010); Ker-Lindsay (2012) The foreign policy of counter secession: preventing the recognition of 
contested states, Oxford: Oxford University Press; French (2013); Vidmar, J. (2009) International Legal 
Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42, 3, 
pp. 779–851; Roseberry, P. (2013) ‘Mass violence and the recognition of Kosovo: suffering and 
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development in the practice of recognition, but also in the justification of recognition, 
demonstrates a clear continued intertwining of attempts of conflict management and 
recognition.756 
 
These concepts and justifications are however highly contested by those states who do 
not recognise Kosovan independence and reject arguments of sui generis, remedial 
secession or earned sovereignty. Those who opposed the independence refer to the 
UDI as illegal under International Law more generally, but particularly towards the 
territorial integrity of Serbia. Additionally, non-recognising states highlight the role of 
the United Nations but, unlike those who recognise Kosovo, they do not stress the 
presence of the UNMIK mission but rather focus on the need for unity in the Security 
Council. Finally, they reject sui generis, maintaining that it might still set a dangerous 
precedent for other independence movements.757  
 
The recognisers and non-recognisers particularly contested the following: Firstly, the 
application of international law: those who recognised consider the question of 
recognition a so-called ‘grey area’ in law, which thus requires a more creative and 
flexible approach, such as by appeal to ‘sui generis’.758 Those opposing focused 
instead on the territorial integrity of Serbia and upheld this as the most fundamental 
legal principle, referring back to the framework agreed by the EU under uti possidetis 
in the early 1990s. Secondly, the multilateral aspect of the Kosovo issues: recognisers 
saw the UN’s involvement as diminishing Serbia’s de facto sovereignty over the 
territory. Those not recognising focused instead on the need for agreement by the P5 
in the Security Council on the new status. Finally, the recognisers proposed the 
argument for using recognition as conflict management in the conflict to stabilise the 
region. On the other side, some non-recognisers criticised the geo-political 
intervention of Western states in the region.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
recognition, Europe-Asia Studies, 65: 857; Wolff, S. and Rodt, A.P. (2013) Self-determination after 
Kosovo’ Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 65, No. 5, July 2013, 799–822. 
756 Almqvist (2013) p. 177-178. 
757 Ibid. 
758 Ibid, p. 175. 
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In analysis of the EU’s recognition of Croatia as conflict management, both Zaum and 
Caplan have highlighted uti possidetis and policy conditionality as two aspects that 
acted as means for conflict management. As I have demonstrated in the case of 
Kosovo, uti possidetis was not upheld but no new concept was agreed upon by the 
international community either. Alternative justifications were thus used by 
recognising states and included the involvement of the international community in the 
governance of the territory. These arguments show a continuation of the close 
connection of conflict intervention and recognition policy. Thus internationalisation 
in the case of Croatia was considered the means to allow for greater interventionism 
while in the case of Kosovo it was partly argued internationalising should be a 
consequence of the high level of interventionism. After having discussed the issue of 
conflict management through internationalisation, I will now turn to conditional 
recognition.  
 
Conditionality and Recognition of Kosovo 
In the process of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the conditionality 
established by the Badinter Commission was central to the recognition policy of the 
EU as it used recognition to manage the conflict.759 Regarding Kosovo, conditionality 
became an even greater aspect of European policy and international policy towards 
statehood. 
 
Since the 1990s, and particularly in the early 2000s, EU policy developed a dual 
strategy of state building and European integration. This involved a variety of 
international actors, not only the EU, and affected several countries in the region, 
including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo. Over the 
years, conditionality towards statehood had become tied to EU conditions for 
accession. Bieber has described this as a shift from direct to more indirect intervention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
759 See Chapter One, 1.6.2 Conditional Recognition. 
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or ‘long-distance’ state building.760 This was possible as the EU linked statehood 
conditionality increasingly with EU accession promises.761  
 
The conditionality towards Kosovan statehood became most evident with the 
Standards before Status policy of the United Nations, which was supported strongly 
by the UN Security Council and the European Union. The UN Secretary General's 
Special Representative and the UNMIK mission oversaw the policy, which had eight 
key areas and a particular focus on rule of law and the building of democratic 
institutions.762 The implementation of these standards was to be connected with the 
revision of the status of Kosovo and hence work as a conditionality for Kosovans.763 
Zaum has referred to these practices as ‘state building without a state’. Although the 
future status of Kosovo was not determined, the standards became central to ‘state-
building’.764 The Standards before Status policy failed, however, and the status 
question re-emerged.765 The UN led talks under Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari 
resulted in the ‘Comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’ in 2007.766 
At the end of this process, Ahtisaari recommended a supervised independence for 
Kosovo. He also suggested specific provisions for governance, minority rights, 
political structure, the economy and security, all of which were very much in line with 
the more general standards and conditions put forward by the UN and the EU.767 
 
The UN’s conditions were closely linked to the EU’s efforts in the Western Balkans 
as well. The EU’s policy and presence in Kosovo was also defined by its enlargement 
policy and conditionality. This had been initiated in the 2003 Thessaloniki Council, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
760 Bieber, F. (2011) Building impossible states - State building strategies and EU membership in the 
Western Balkans, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol 63, no 10, December 2011, 1783-1802, p. 1791. 
761 Noutcheva, G. (2009) Fake, partial and imposed compliance: the limits of the EU's normative power 
in the Western Balkans, Journal of European Public Policy, 16:7. 
762 Ker-Lindsay (2009) p. 149. This policy was discussed in Chapter Three 3.7 The early UNMIK years. 
763 Weller (2008) p. 19. 
764 Zaum (2007) p. 127. 
765 Weller (2008) p. 21. 
766 United Nations (2007a) UN Security Council, Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the Security Council (Report of the Special Envoy of the 
Secretary-General on Kosovo's Future Status) S/2007/168, 26 March 2007. 
767 Ibid. 
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which provided the Western Balkans with a ‘European perspective’, including 
Kosovo, in the ‘European Partnership’ for the Western Balkans and the EU 
Commission’s 2005 initiative of ‘a European future for Kosovo’.768 These established 
standards for Kosovo’s economic, financial, and institutional development, as well as 
for its integration in the wider region, were to give Kosovo a European perspective 
along with its regional neighbours under the Stabilisation and Association Process.769 
Also, the EU’s increasing institutional presence prepared its clear state building role 
in Kosovo from the early 2000s onwards.770 The effectiveness of state building 
activities is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, the influence of the international 
community’s conditionality framework on an independent Kosovo was significant. 
This is also evident from the fact that some recognising states in 2008 stressed the 
supervised nature of Kosovo’s independence and the importance of the international 
presence in the state building of Kosovo.771 
 
The overall conditionality regime by the EU towards the Western Balkans has been 
described as highly interventionist by some authors.772 An understanding of further 
European integration and its relation to conflict management has also been discussed 
by Belloni. He argues that managing the consequences of the Yugoslav war developed 
into management of integrating the Balkans and criticises the assumption of greater 
stability through integration.773 The EU policy to reduce and contain secessionism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768 European Union (2004) Council Decision of 14 June 2004 on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as 
defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 (2004/520/EC) 
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769 Ibid. 
770 See Papadimitriou, D. et al (2007) To Build a State: Europeanization, EU Actorness and State-
Building in Kosovo, European Foreign Affairs Review, 12, 2, 2007, pp. 331, 230 discussed in Chapter 
Three, 3.8 Violence of 2004 and Eide Report. 
771 Almqvist (2013) p. 176. 
772 Pippan, C. (2004) The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process for 
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p. 243. 
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through uti possidetis and conditionality failed according to Biermann. He argues that 
secessionism has not been undermined by EU conditionality: while the EU has tried 
to make secessionism taboo, it has continued to emerge as an issue.774 In the case of 
Montenegro’s independence in 2006, although it qualified under uti possidetis and a 
process had been agreed with Serbia, the EU still tried to maintain the union of the 
FRY. The EU had hoped to avoid secessions from Serbia through EU enlargement 
prospects. The Thessaloniki Council meeting of 2003 and the establishment of the 
Stability and Association Agreement were supposed to be important aspects of this.775 
These efforts failed however and Montenegro became independent.776 
 
The difficulties encountered by the EU in the Western Balkans has led authors to argue 
that the EU is simply not fit as a state builder and unable to stop secessionism. Börzel 
argues for examples that by seeking to uphold existing states and achieve agreements 
in line with EU integration for the sake of regional stability, the EU risks propping up 
undemocratic regimes.777 If EU integration and Europeanisation only focus on elites 
who play along with ‘fake compliance’,778 the EU will find itself in a vulnerable 
position, creating instability in the region in the long term. Obradović-Wochnik and 
Wochnik support this argument by stating that the Kosovo question has not been 
‘Europeanised’ away for Serbia.779  
 
The interventionism of the international community in the Western Balkans since the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia has been increasing and was also evident in the rationale for 
recognition. For many recognising states an independent Kosovo had to be supervised 
by the international community and the EU in particular. This implied also applying 
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conditionality towards Kosovo prior and after its declaration of independence. I will 
now review how this embedded interventionist aspect of the recognition of Kosovo 
affected the policy by Germany and its position towards the status. 
 
Germany and the Recognition of Kosovo as Conflict Management 
Germany’s policy to use the recognition as intervention in conflict stirred a debate in 
the literature in regards to Croatia. This perceived break with multilateralism was 
considered incompatible with the German Civilian Power role.780 The concept of 
Civilian Power, which had been coined in regards to Germany by Maull, described 
Germany as committed to multilateralism and international law and its rejection of 
military power. As Germany’s recognition of Croatia was considered a break from 
multilateralism, this played into the debate in the literature on a possible return to 
German Realpolitik after unification.781 Those who were less critical of Germany’s 
role in the recognition process point at the final agreement over Croatia, as it was 
recognised by all EU member states and also joined the UN.782 In the case of Kosovo 
however this resolution was not reached, therefore raising the question of how the 
interventionist approach towards recognition was approached by actors in German 
foreign policy. Therefore, in this thesis, I have approached the German position on the 
status of Kosovo particularly in regards to how domestic actors considered the issue 
of intervention and multilateralism and how Germany acted in the international 
negotiations.  
 
Germany’s domestic position on recognition 
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The role of the domestic actors in the decision to recognise Kosovo has been a focus 
of this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, as described in Chapter Two domestic political 
actors play a significant role in German foreign policy. This is due to the committed 
foreign policy outlook of political parties, the effect this has on the government 
coalition, and the role of the Bundestag as a forum for discussion.783 The role of 
domestic actors in regards to the question of recognition had been highlighted in the 
literature in regards to the recognition of Croatia in the early 1990s.784 The consensus 
among political parties for independence was considered to have exerted considerable 
pressure on the government at the time to support early recognition. In the case of 
Kosovo, Germany appeared less committed to independence. Thus, the position 
among domestic actors was likely to be more diverse or more likely to be against 
recognition. From tracing the position of domestic parties in Chapters Three and Four, 
it became evident that the domestic position in Germany shifted several times since 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia and that until the last few months of negotiations there 
was no consensus in support of recognising a UDI of Kosovo among parliamentary 
parties. At the same time, it appears that within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there 
was greater acceptance at an earlier stage that a recognition would be likely, 
particularly in light of pressure from international actors and the preparation of the 
future EU mission in Kosovo.785 
 
In the period since the dissolution of Yugoslavia until the UDI in 2008 there were three 
different coalition governments in Germany. Until 1998 the Christian Democrats and 
Free Democrats mainly oversaw the policy of recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. The 
Social Democrats and Greens came to power in the fall of 1998 and remained until 
2005. This government was defined by the military intervention in Kosovo and its 
aftermath. The German Green Party Foreign Minister Fischer sought to increase 
Germany’s role with the Fischer Plan, which was to promote new negotiations and a 
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Legislative in this thesis. 
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political solution to the conflict. After the establishment of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 and UNMIK and the subsequent regime change in Serbia, domestic 
actors in Germany began to develop differing positions on the status of Kosovo. From 
2005 onwards a grand coalition was in place under Chancellor Merkel of the Christian 
Democrats and with Steinmeier as minister of foreign affairs. This government 
oversaw the final negotiations for the Ahtisaari Process and the Troika negotiations. 
Here, particularly the relationship of the SPD becoming junior partners influenced the 
position of Germany and the return of the CDU to the government also left a mark.786 
 
In the early 1990s, some sympathies for Kosovan claims for independence existed 
among German politicians in different political parties. However, the backlash from 
the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia resulted in Germany following international 
policy more closely and not pursuing a greater support for Kosovan independence.787 
This also indicates that the principle of uti possidetis, as it was applied by the Badinter 
Commission on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, was not considered a fundamental 
principle among German actors but rather a way of managing the conflict between 
Serbs and Croats. While German diplomats made attempts to raise the issue of 
Kosovan independence during the 1990s, the international negotiations were 
dominated by the United States and the United Kingdom’s effort to contain 
Milosevic.788 When it came to the war of 1999 the debate in Germany was focused on 
the military intervention rather than the status question. In the aftermath, the Social 
Democrat-Green government supported the status neutral approach of the international 
community while the Christian Democrats in opposition pressured the government to 
reinitiate new status talks.789 The Social Democrats were keen on the talks to create a 
solution which could be accepted by the Serbs while the Christian Democrats criticised 
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again the slow progress. After the end of the Ahtisaari talks the international consensus 
fell apart with Russia rejecting the Ahtisaari Plan and EU members expressing openly 
their consternation about a possible UDI.790  
 
In light of this new conflict over the future status, German domestic actors all 
responded with a rejection of recognising a possible UDI by Kosovo. However, the 
expectations for future policy differed between parties. Few had the expectation of 
resolving the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia at this stage. Instead the focus was 
on the international response. The Christian Democrats sought a new UN resolution 
by putting significant pressure on Russia. The Social Democrats on the other hand 
sought an extension of the negotiations and emphasised the need to take Russian and 
Serbian positions into consideration. The CDU, SPD, Greens and especially the Free 
Democrats were keen on reaching a common EU position.791 After the Troika 
negotiation however none of the conditions set out by the different parties were 
reached in the talks. Neither a new UN Security Council resolution nor a common EU 
position had been achieved. At this stage the CDU came out more openly in support 
of recognising a UDI and embraced the sui generis justification by those states which 
were keen to recognise Kosovo. Most parties, except Die Linke, considered the need 
for a common EU position or policy essential. Nonetheless, some opposition parties, 
the Greens and the FDP raised concerns about the new planned EU mission for 
Kosovo. In the discussion in the Bundestag following the recognition of Kosovo only 
Die Linke opposed this policy. The acceptance from the parties differed however. All 
expressed concerns over the risk of the UDI and the failed international negotiations. 
The tenor of the discussion was that all possible options had been discussed and 
negotiations had been exhausted. Again, here only Die Linke called for further 
negotiations. Similarly, to the speech of the German foreign minister Steinmeier that 
I cited in the introduction of this thesis, MPs used careful language. Even the CDU, 
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who would have been most supportive of independence overall, stressed repeatedly 
the importance of the supervised nature of this independence, the role of the European 
Union and the wider international community in overseeing this process.792 
 
Germany’s position, therefore, had changed since the early 1990s when some actors 
included Kosovo in the arguments for self-determination for the people in the former 
Yugoslavia through independence. This self-determination argument however was not 
put forward by German politicians in 2008. Instead, in the 2000s and during the new 
status negotiations, the arguments used in support of recognition were focused on 
conflict management. The concern was regional stability, the importance of EU 
integration and a resolution for both Serbia and Kosovo. Striking in comparison with 
the case of Croatia is the fact that for a long time there was no clear consensus among 
parties for or against recognition.  
 
Within the conflict management approach, the fall-out with Russia was considered 
major obstacle and was addressed by the parliamentary parties. All parties had 
significant concerns, although these differed from one to the other. While the CDU 
stressed repeatedly the delay and the risk or an unresolved status, the SPD was focused 
more on the importance of finding a solution which would be accepted by Serbia and 
Russia.793 In contrast to the period in the early 1990s when the Cold War had just come 
to an end and supporting self-determination was considered a support for democracy 
and integration into the West, this was not the case in 2008. The new regime in Serbia 
was considered democratic and legitimate. Prime Minister Koštunica was recognised 
as having brought change to Serbia although his position on Kosovo was 
uncompromising. The opposition parties, both the FDP and the Greens who had 
supported Croatian independence very strongly and were also sympathetic to Kosovan 
independence in the early 1990s were sceptical of the way a UDI was coming into 
being and the risks of a legal uncertainty for a future EU mission. Thus, domestically 
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in political parties the position on the status of Kosovo was less certain or committed 
this therefore affected the behaviour of the government. 
 
The diverse and inconsistent position on the internationalisation of the Kosovo conflict 
among German political parties is partly based on their understanding of the conflict. 
In the case of Croatia, the conflict with Serbia had been considered an ethno-political 
conflict with the Milosevic regime seen as an aggressor against Croatia. In Kosovo, 
by the 2000s, the interpretation of the conflict parties was more diverse. Most German 
policy makers considered the new Serbian leadership an ally for a democratic 
transition. The uncompromising position of Prime Minister Koštunica was interpreted 
as being tied to a specific party policy. The position of President Tadic was interpreted 
as more lenient towards Kosovo and raised hopes in Germany, and the international 
community, that a future Serbian government would be willing to accept a Kosovan 
independence.794 The deadlock on the question of Kosovo was therefore considered a 
party political issue rather than in terms of a nationalist or potential ethnic conflict. 
From a German perspective and among other members of the international 
community, the support for the leadership in Pristina was also rather pragmatic. After 
the war of 1999 German MPs were reluctant to engage politically with the leadership 
of the KLA. In the early 1990 German politicians considered Kosovan independence 
to support of Rugova’s pacifist movement. By the time of the UDI, Germany had come 
to terms with the continued political involvement of the former paramilitary group. 
However, this more complex relationship to the Kosovan leadership led to an even 
greater interventionist approach for the future governance of Kosovo, to avoid the 
emergence of undemocratic structures.795 
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The positions of the political parties stood in contrast to the position which had 
developed in the Foreign Office. Due to the involvement of German diplomats and 
civil servant in the Contact Group negotiations and the UNMIK mission they were 
aware of the the inclination towards accepting a future Kosovo independence within 
the Quint, mainly under pressure from the United States. Although the Bundestag did 
not have a vote on the issue of recognition, the government considered potential 
political divisions in the coalition and among parties as a risk for the coalition 
government. In regards to Kosovo, divisions could also lead to difficulties for the 
future EU mission. Therefore, to the government, the Troika negotiations were an 
opportunity to involve domestic actors in Germany more in the international 
negotiations and generate greater support for recognising a UDI.796 Although Germany 
had been part of the Contact Group, the Troika gave the opportunity to the chief 
negotiator Wolfgang Ischinger to meet with the political parties and explain the 
progress of the negotiations. Here, particularly within the Social Democrats, MPs were 
keen to see a genuine effort in engaging Serbia and responding to concerns from 
Belgrade. The use of the international negotiations from the perspective of the Foreign 
Office was to convince domestic actors to accept a policy path which had been 
prepared internationally.797 
 
There were, therefore, clearly diverging approaches among the executive and 
legislative actors in Germany to the recognition and the willingness to use such 
recognition in response to the unresolved conflict. For political parties, it was 
important to demonstrate that the recognition was not enforced from outside, mainly 
from the United States or other recognisers, but instead that it had been proven to be 
the only remaining solution. This is very striking in comparison to the Croatian case, 
when it was Germany who was perceived as pushing others towards intervention. By 
2008, the increasing interventionism and the contestation of military intervention in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as the debate on the Iraq war, appeared to have led 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
796 See Chapter Four, 4.3.1 The role of the Troika Chair specifically based on interviews. 
797 Ibid. 
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to a reluctance by some domestic actors to embrace more interventionism in contested 
situations.798 
 
Germany’s Multilateral Role	  
Chapter Two reviewed the literature on Civilian Power Germany and Civilian Power 
Europe.799 I discussed the Civilian Power role in the context of role theory and 
particularly multilateralism . In regards to Germany’s Civilian Power role, I pointed 
out that in Germany there was not one homogenous approach to what kind of 
multilateralism Germany should pursue. Policies such as Ostpolitik were highly 
contested domestically.800 After the Cold War, Germany’s multilateralism was 
questioned and re-evaluated at different stages including around the recognition of 
Croatia, the contribution to the military NATO campaign in Kosovo and the Iraq war. 
This debate around Germany’s multilateralism was related also to the emergence of 
military intervention in the late 1990s and early 2000s.801 The debate in the literature 
therefore focused on firstly whether Germany remained an intrinsically multilateral 
actor and how it was developing in relation to its close allies and to the institutions it 
had been strongly committed to including the UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE. The 
most controversial use of Germany’s military force remains the Kosovo war as it had 
no UNSC approval and was the first out of area operation. As German troops remained 
stationed in Kosovo with KFOR, the military component of Germany’s multilateral 
presence affected Germany’s position on Kosovo as well.802 
  
In regards to the status of Kosovo, at a multilateral level, Germany’s role had evolved 
significantly since the early 1990s. Although Germany was involved in the Contact 
Group from its inception, its role in the international negotiations was limited and it 
was often excluded from the main negotiations in the lead up to the NATO intervention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
798 Chapter Two, 2.5.1 Military Interventions: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
799 2.3 Civilian Power Germany provides an introduction and 2.4.5 Post-War Germany – More than a 
Civilian Power provides a more detailed analysis in regards to Germany.  
800 See Chapter Two 2.4.2.1 Domestic and International Debate over Brandt’s Ostpolitik. 
801 Chapter Two 2.5.2 Continuity or Change? The Academic Debate on Interventions and 
Multilateralism in German Foreign Policy. 
802 Chapter Two, 2.5.1 Military Interventions: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
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of 1999. In the aftermath, Germany combined its role in the Contact Group, the G8 
and the EU to gain more weight in the negotiations. Germany was also increasingly 
considered a mediator with Russia within the Contact Group and had therefore 
developed a distinct role. It was also central to establishing the institutional presence 
of the international community in Kosovo. Its role with German diplomats heading 
UNMIK, such as Michael Steiner, and the German government as the driving force 
behind EU enlargement policy towards Kosovo made Germany increasingly a central 
actor in Kosovo. It was mainly its position as the chair of the final Troika negotiations 
representing the European Union that gave Germany a central function in the 
coordination of the international talks on the status of Kosovo.803 
 
These developments took place simultaneously with the changes of the role of 
Germany internationally. In this period, Germany was also very involved in 
establishing greater conditionality for the Western Balkans. In the case of Croatia, 
Germany had been considered to have undermined the conditionality established by 
the European Union, as it prematurely recognised Croatia and Slovenia. In contrast, in 
relation to Kosovo, Germany was essential in establishing conditionality. It was a 
strong supporter of the Standards before Status policy, which was overseen by the 
German UNMIK head, Michael Steiner. Following UN Resolution 1244, the wait-and-
see approach of this policy was also in line with Germany’s attempt to balance US and 
Russian interests. However, the conditionality for Standards before Status was later 
considered to have generated contempt among Kosovans, as the lack of progress in 
governance reforms and economic development fuelled the conflict again. More 
prominently, however, Germany was key in establishing the EU enlargement policy 
with which significant conditionality was associated. Germany’s role in establishing 
and enforcing conditionality for EU enlargement and its belief in this policy 
underpinned a commitment to EU integration through greater intervention.804 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803 The development of Germany’s role in Kosovo is described in detail Chapter Three, 3.4 German 
multilateral diplomacy and the Fischer Plan, 3.7 The early UNMIK years.  
804 3.7 The early UNMIK years and specifically Weller (2009) p. 185 for a discussion of the failure of 
the Standards before Status policy. 
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The recognition of Kosovo was coordinated from the Ahtisaari Process onwards 
mainly within the Contact Group, the G8 and the European Union. For Germany, the 
multilateral coordination of the recognition was key. The literature, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, has indicated a change in Germany’s behaviour towards multilateralism. 
While the Civilian Power role implies a strong commitment to multilateralism, I have 
also outlined how after German unification a new approach to multilateralism can be 
described. Germany was more likely to use different international alliances and 
institutions and appeared more open to acting outside a consensus while within ad hoc 
multilateral alliances.805  
 
In the recognition of Kosovo there was therefore a clear tension: on the one hand, the 
many multilateral aspects of managing the recognition and Germany’s central role in 
these negotiations reflect Germany’s commitment towards multilateralism and seeking 
consensus. On the other, however, Germany accepted the lack of consensus and 
recognised Kosovo nonetheless. Thus, Germany’s behaviour was in line with the 
description of Germany acting still as a multilateral actor although unlikely to engage 
in overly long negotiations until a consensus was found. Germany did extend the 
negotiations for longer than some of its close allies would have wished. The United 
States, the United Kingdom and France in the Contact Group would have been willing 
to recognise Kosovo after the failed Ahtisaari Process.806 The Troika Chair, Wolfgang 
Ischinger, put all his efforts into demonstrating that the Troika talks were the ‘last ditch 
effort’ in which all possible remaining solutions to the conflict were being discussed. 
It was an opportunity to re-establish trust by Serbia and also by Russia in the 
international process on the status of Kosovo. The breakdown of the consensus on the 
talks during the Ahtisaari Process was criticised by many in Germany as well as by 
many non-recognisers as being pre-determined pro-independence with little 
opportunity for Serbia’s concerns to be heard or alternative proposals to be considered. 
Within the German foreign office and Chancellery, the multilateral negotiations were 
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Foreign Policy see Aggestam, L. (2000) Germany, in Manner, I and Whitman, R. eds. The Foreign 
policies of European Union Member States, Manchester: University Press, p. 71 for a clear synopsis of 
tensions in the literature. 
806 See Chapter Four, 4.2.1 Position in the Auswärtige Amt. 
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used to generate more support for recognition although a consensus was unlikely. 
Above I have highlighted how the extended negotiations allowed for a greater 
consensus among German domestic parties. At international level, for Germany, the 
Troika negotiations were also an opportunity for further mediation with Serbia, 
between Russia and the United States and finally for the European Union member 
states. The result of these talk was however a continued rejection of the UDI from 
Serbia and from Russia and still no agreement among EU members.807 
 
The conflict parties, as was discussed in Chapter Four, did not change their position 
towards the status conflict. Kosovo remained committed to not accepting anything less 
than independence while Serbia would suggest different setups of autonomy just short 
of independence. However, the Troika negotiations were a vehicle to partly de-escalate 
tensions between Serbia and Kosovo and to regain the trust of Serbia in the 
international negotiations. The extent of this engagement was however limited and the 
Troika negotiations did not lead to a settlement. They did however generate a closer 
collaboration with Serbian politicians and led to a more optimistic approach towards 
a possible future recognition by Serbia.808 
 
The setup of the Troika allowed Germany to take a much more significant role than it 
had in the past in the Contact Group. In chairing the talks, the German ambassador 
was working directly with his United States and Russian counterparts. The 
commitment to US recognition of a future UDI defined the talks and Germany’s 
approach. Germany therefore sought to generate more support for independence 
internationally before being put in the position of having to recognise Kosovo as a 
contested state.809 The tension of Germany’s role as mediator with Russia in the 
Contact Group on the one hand and the newly restored transatlantic relationship on the 
other was also reflected in Germany’s behaviour. As described in Chapter Two, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807 This ‘leaving no stone unturned policy’ is discussed in great detail in Chapter Four, particularly in 
4.3.3 Troika Proposals. 
808 See Chapter Four 4.3.2 Positions of the Serbian and Kosovan delegations and 4.3.4 End of the Troika 
negotiations. 
809 Expressed repeatedly in Comments to the author, interview with Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, 
February 2015. 
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transatlantic relationship had been strained in the early 2000s and especially during 
the administration of President George W. Bush and the Iraq war and it remained tense. 
At the time, the United States had considered Germany’s refusal to collaborate in the 
Iraq war as a breach of its multilateralism.810 It became clear that from the states 
involved in the Iraq war, especially the United States, Germany’s multilateralism was 
interpreted differently than from some German domestic actors: the focus was not on 
multilateralism generally but on a commitment to the West in particular. Washington 
was aware of the delays caused by Germany’s reluctance, however, it was willing to 
agree to the extended talks if this meant greater support within Europe overall.811  
 
The Russian position was perceived as increasingly non-collaborative at the end of the 
Ahtisaari Process.812 Within the Troika the German delegation was hesitant to add to 
the alienation of Moscow. Russia appeared to consider the talks as a genuine attempt 
for mediation between the conflict parties.813 Thus, due the more positive 
developments and hoping to reach a solution, the German Foreign Office developed a 
proposal based on the German-German treaty (the Grundlagenvertrag). This proposal 
was modelled on the agreement between the two Germanys during the Cold War, who 
did not recognise each other but agreed not to disrupt each other's membership of 
international organisations and to cooperate on specific policy issues.814 However, 
Russia, although initially interested, rejected the proposal. However, instead of 
declaring the talks as failed by the end of the three month period, Russia encouraged 
longer negotiations and did not accept the ‘no stone left unturned’ rhetoric by the 
Troika chair.815 Germany, at the time of the Troika, seemed to be operating particularly 
multilaterally. Although from the United States this was partly considered to be 
holding back the agreement in the Quint, still its engagement with all actors was 
considered central to the progress of the negotiations. The split between the United 
States and Russia was significantly different from the recognition negotiations on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
810 See Chapter Two, 2.5.1 Military interventions Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.  
811 The US position is discussed in greater detail in 4.3.3 Troika Proposals. 
812 Chapter Three discuss particularly the break down in relation to the missile defence system in Eastern 
Europe in 3.9.5 The Ahtisaari Proposal.  
813 In Chapter Four 4.4 Searching for consensus within the EU. 
814 See 4.4 Troika Proposals. 
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Croatia. In the early 1990s, the Soviet Union was undergoing a similar process of 
dissolution to that of Yugoslavia and it had little influence on the dispute among EU 
members and the United States on the management of the process. By 2008, Russia 
had re-established itself as an international actor and the relations with the West had 
deteriorated over the missile defence programme in Eastern Europe. The relationship 
between Russia and the West had been strained already in regards to the Kosovo 
NATO operation in 1999 when Russia blocked the UN approval in the Security 
Council, however, Russia had also been central in negotiations after the end of the 
Kosovo war. In regards to the position of Germany between these two powers, the US 
and Russia, it was balancing a new geopolitical reality for Europe which would 
develop further the same year with the war in Georgia. In light of the re-emergence of 
tensions between Russia and the West after the Cold War, Germany’s response of 
mediating and proposing a format coming from the Cold War, the German-German 
treaty is also telling of the difficulty for Germany to re-adapt to this new geopolitical 
situation.  
 
Germany and the role of the EU  
Maintaining harmony within the European Union was a central aspect to the 
multilateral efforts for the German Troika chair. The confidence in the Ahtisaari 
Process had been such that a separate negotiation on the future status of Kosovo among 
EU members was not considered necessary. As the consensus in the UN Security 
Council broke down however, and each member state would need to take a decision 
on the UDI, greater coordination between member states became a necessity. As 
described in Chapter Four, Ischinger’s role was significantly about overcoming 
disagreements among EU member states.816 German political parties had also stressed 
the importance for a common EU position.817 Thus, the prioritisation of the positions 
of the EU member states was in line with the German policy to generate greater unity 
among EU members. Here again Germany appeared more willing to engage in 
extended multilateral negotiations in comparison to other Quint members. Some EU 
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817 See Table 2. in Chapter Four. 
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members referred specifically to the role of Ischinger and the evidence of efforts to 
find a resolution for the conflict.818 In Chapter Two, I discussed the debate in the 
literature of Germany’s de-Europeanization or decreasing commitment to facilitating 
a consensus between EU members.819 In the case of Kosovo, a continuous effort to 
generate greater consensus was clearly evident. However, while the exact number of 
non-recognisers was not clear until long after the UDI, full agreement among all 
twenty-seven member states was considered very unlikely at the beginning of the 
Troika talks. For the German foreign office, it was thus necessary to reach a higher 
number of recognisers, which would be considered sufficient to justify a recognition 
of the UDI from Germany.820  
 
Another significant aspect was the operational preparation for the EU mission and I 
have outlined the interventionist implications above in this chapter. German domestic 
actors considered the presence of the EU after the UDI a guarantee for greater stability 
and security in the region.821 The hopes for EU interventionism were also a response 
to the unease of German policy makers about the contingent of German troops still 
stationed in Kosovo. A return to violence in the Western Balkans would have 
potentially meant an engagement of these German troops. This would have been 
significant for Germany, since, as discussed in Chapter Two, any military intervention 
in Kosovo remained controversial.822 Germany’s interventionism in Kosovo after 1999 
took the form of a dual policy of military and civilian intervention. KFOR remains the 
largest Bundeswehr contingent for Germany abroad. While this continued to raise 
attention in the German policy debate, the government was keen to stress the civilian 
aspects of Germany’s policy particularly in regards to the EU enlargement policy. Also 
Germany’s leading role in the EU effort for greater integration of the Western Balkans 
enforced the civilian nature of the EU policy. For Germany, a successful mission 
represented some degree of guarantee for stability which would also avoid any further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
818 Discussed in 4.4. Searching for Consensus within the EU. 
819 2.5.3 Continuity or Change? The Academic Debate on Intervention and Multilateralism in German 
Foreign Policy 
820 4.4 Searching for Consensus with the EU. 
821 See Table 2 and related debate in Chapter Four, 4.2.2 Positions of the Political Parties in the 
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822 Chapter Two 2.5.1 Military intervention: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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German military action. Germany’s role in the EU Troika delegation showed a 
continued commitment to reaching more agreement to be able to support such a 
mission and future EU engagement in the region, despite a divided EU on the status 
question. Thus, EU integration continued to be considered the solution to the conflict 
between Serbia and Kosovo in principle by most domestic actors. 
 
A compromise was reached among EU members to de-couple the status question from 
the EU mission deployment. This demonstrated to German domestic actors that while 
there was a division among member states on the status question, the commitment of 
the EU towards the region remained and EU integration was still to be an aspect of the 
future of the region. This also allowed domestic actors in Germany to accept that the 
status question would be unresolved. To some extent, for domestic actors, the EU 
presence overrode the issue of the status dispute. For German foreign policy, the 
European aspect of the conflict management over the status of Kosovo was therefore 
essential and was pushed significantly within the domestic discourse and also 
considered a prospect for stability in the region. In the case of the status of Kosovo, 
Germany relied heavily on the EU as an international actor and considered it the only 
institution through which the conflict could be managed.  
 
Germany’s approach towards the recognition of Kosovo was fundamentally a 
multilateral endeavour. Different from most other Quint members, it pursued a wider 
coordination on recognition especially in regards to engaging Russia and within the 
EU. However, this case also shows that Germany was not willing to extend 
negotiations endlessly; only a small minority party, Die Linke, supported this. The 
notion that there had to be sufficient rather than full agreement on recognition shows 
that Germany was trying to achieve enough of a majority to reduce the controversy of 
the recognition. It also convinced the European Union that the UDI was the only option 
left and that all possible alternatives had been explored. Germany, therefore, framed 
is recognition as a multilateral effort and was able to recognise without a consensus in 
any of the main fora in which the negotiations had taken place, the Contact Group or 
the EU. Germany’s role within the EU was strikingly different this time than in the 
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case of Croatia, where Germany had been perceived as coercing other EU members 
into recognition. In the case of Kosovo, Germany was considered more 
accommodating than the other Quint members and more willing to consider and assess 
the situation in other EU member states. However, unlike in the early 1990s in 2008, 
the Union, albeit much larger this time, did not reach an agreement on the status.  
 
The controversy around Germany’s recognition stems firstly from its acceptance of 
disagreement among its key allies in regards to the recognition of Kosovo and secondly 
from the disagreement among domestic actors on the recognition. By framing the 
status question of Kosovo in terms of conflict management, I have been able to 
highlight how much of the domestic tension derived from an unease regarding the 
increasing interventionism and the new geopolitical divide among Germany’s close 
allies. I have also highlighted divisions among political parties towards intervention 
and the greater commitment of the executive to support the conflict management 
aspect of recognition. Finally, however, this general policy was accepted by most 
parties with minor objections. Despite these internal divisions and the hesitant 
recognition speech by the German minister with which I began this thesis, Germany 
was firmly among the first to recognise Kosovo in 2008. The debates among German 
domestic actors and among Germany’s international partners show the continuing 
tensions on questions of more fundamental issues for German foreign policy, such as 
intervention and multilateralism, which continue to exist and continue to develop. 
 
Avenues for Future Research 
In this research, I have examined specifically the recognition question of Kosovo by 
focusing on Germany. By doing this, I was able to explore domestic debate within a 
recognising state and the arguments for and against recognition. This has also allowed 
me to explore the concept of recognition as conflict management through a specific 
recognition by one specific EU member state. However, with this approach comes the 
limitation that little analysis of other member states was provided in detail, member 
states who may have taken similar or very different positions.  
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Further, in regards to the negotiations on Kosovo, the declaration should not be seen 
as a cut off point for the international community’s involvement. Instead, 2008 marked 
the beginning of intensified European Union involvement. Talks between Serbia and 
Kosovo began a few years later, this time under the auspices of the European Union 
rather than the United Nations.823 Germany’s role in the Western Balkans in general 
and in Kosovo in particular also continued to evolve in relation to the status question. 
Therefore, there is particular scope for more research into how the conflict 
management approach of recognition and the compromise on the EU mission, has 
developed since 2008. Kosovo remains contested, although more countries have 
recognised since its declaration and it has been able to join some international 
institutions. However, five EU member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia 
and Spain) as well as Russia and China, continue not to recognise it. Thus, the 
expectations of recognition to manage or resolve a conflict have not been met. Instead, 
the literature has been increasingly critical of the clumsy recognition process and the 
continued limbo in which Kosovo still finds itself.824 Nevertheless, the EU mission 
succeeded in being fully deployed and is now firmly present. The role of the EU has 
grown significantly in comparison to the remaining international community. The 
Belgrade-Pristina dialogue mediated by the European Union has reached some 
agreements on specific policies, however the status remains unresolved.825 Also, after 
the compromise in deploying the EU mission EULEX, continuous compromises have 
had to be reached among recognising and non-recognising states. Germany’s presence 
within this process has increased and its relationships with the conflict parties, Serbia 
and Kosovo, have evolved.826 The concept of the recognition process as conflict 
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824 Kolliaraki, G (2015) Recognition as a Second-Order Problem in the Resolution of Self-
Determination Conflicts in Daase, C., Fehl, C., Geis, A. and Kolliarakis, G. Recognition in International 
Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 178 and Economides, S. (2011) The making of a failed 
state: the case of Kosovo, European View, 10 (2) are examples that document the difficulty of Kosovo 
existing as a contested state.  
825 Ibid.  
826 ‘Germany's Angela Merkel ties Serbian EU hopes to Kosovo ‘BBC NEWS 23 August 2011 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14631297(last accessed 25 September 2016); ‘Merkel seeks 
to strengthen EU ties to Western Balkans’ EurActiv , 19 August 2014, 
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management in the conflict with the hope for further EU interaction is therefore 
relevant after the UDI and the partial recognition from member states. The 
developments post-UDI therefore offer the opportunity for further analysis of how 
Germany has developed vis-a-vis the contested statehood and the European Union’s 
and other actors’ developing multilateral engagement with the conflict. 
 
Finally, the conceptual approach of considering recognition as a form of conflict 
management can be explored further. Here, it would be relevant to examine cases of 
contested statehood in the Western Balkan region but also beyond. In this thesis, the 
concept has been considered mainly in regards to the practice of the European Union, 
its member states and the United States. Therefore, there is further scope for an 
analysis of recognition practices in relation to conflict management to internationalise 
a conflict and impose conditionality onto new states. 
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4 Kurzbericht Reise nach Mazedonien und Kosovo 26. 28.7.99  
 
Ziele Die Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen hat seit Oktober 1998 die Politik der NATO 
Staaten gegenüber der Regierung Milosevic und den Einsatz der NATO zur Beendigung der 
Vertreibungen der Kosovo Albaner politisch unterstützt. Inzwischen ist der Krieg im Kosovo 
beendet, die UN Resolution vom 13. Juni wird durchgesetzt und die Bundeswehr ist im 
Rahmen von KFOR im Kosovo stationiert. Jetzt sollte mit Rezzo Schlauch als Ko 
Vorsitzendem der Fraktion und Angelika Beer als verteidigungspolitischer Sprecherin durch 
einen Besuch hochrangiger Vertreter der Fraktion die aktuelle Lage vor Ort eingeschätzt und 
ein Zeichen der Solidarität mit den Menschen im Kosovo, dem in den letzten Monaten 
wesentlich von den Auswirkungen des Krieges betroffenen Nachbarstaat Mazedonien und 
nicht zuletzt mit den im Krisengebiet eingesetzten Soldaten der Bundeswehr gesetzt werden.  
 
Lage im Kosovo und Einsatz der Bundeswehr  
 
Die Situation im Kosovo die Delegation konnte sich einen Überblick über den deutschen 
Sektor um Prizren verschaffen - ist gekennzeichnet durch Zerstörungen unterschiedlichen 
Grades, eine akute Notlage großer Teile der zurückgekehrten Bevölkerung und einen völligen 
Zusammenbruch der administrativen und ökonomischen Infrastruktur, In manchen Gebieten 
des deutschen Sektors sind die Dörfer nahezu vollständig zerstört, in anderen zum Teil, die 
Städte hingegen weisen nur einen geringen Zerstörungsgrad auf. Den Berichten der 
verantwortlichen Bundeswehrangehörigen zufolge kommt es täglich zu Übergriffen von 
Albanern gegen die verbliebene serbische Zivilbevölkerung Brandstiftungen, Plünderungen 
und Besetzungen der von Serben verlassenen Häuser sind an der Tagesordnung. Ein Großteil 
der serbischen Bevölkerung ist geflohen, andere verstecken sich in von KFOR bewachten 
orthodoxen Klöstern. Aber auch auf die orthodoxen Kirchen finden vermehrt Anschläge statt. 
Bedroht fühlen sich ebenso die Sinti und Roma, die wie die serbische Minderheit zunehmend 
nach Fluchtmöglichkeiten aus dem Kosovo suchen. Es besteht zudem die Gefahr der 
Ausbreitung organisierter Kriminalität. Die UCK versucht, sich nahezu flächendeckend 
unabhängig von Legitimationen seitens KFOR und der im Aufbau befindlichen 
internationalen Verwaltung UNMIK - als lokale Macht zu etablieren. Es bleibt unklar, 
welchen Grad an Organisiertheit und Koordination die UCK aufweist. Trotz Erfolgen bei der 
Demilitarisierung muß befürchtet werden, daß sie einen erheblichen Teil ihrer Waffen 
zurückhält. Das Auffinden eines bislang nicht gemeldeten Verstecks schwerer Waffen durch 
die Bundeswehr am 27. Juli zeigt dies deutlich. Gesprächs partner wiesen auf vermutete 
Waffenlager der UCK im Norden des nach wie vor instabilen Albanien hin. Vor dem Beginn 
der gezielten Vertreibung im Kosovo verwurzelte Strukturen mit positiver Wirkung für den 
Aufbau von ziviler Verwaltung wie die LDK sind durch die Dominanz der UCK offenbar 
massiv behindert und unfähig, ein Gegengewicht zu ihr zu bilden. Der Einsatz internationaler 
und anderer ausländischer NGos, ebenso der UNMIK, ist noch im Anfangsstadium. Die 
KFOR Truppen außer der Bundeswehr im deutschen Sektor gegenwärtig vor allem 
niederländische Einheiten sowie erste russische und türkische Kontingente - sehen sich 
verpflichtet, neben der militärischen Sicherung humanitäre Hilfe zu leisten, polizeiliche und 
kriminalistische Aufgaben zu übernehmen sowie die administrative und technische 
Infrastruktur wiederaufzubauen, Die Erfahrungen mit den In der Regel von der UCK 
gestellten lokalen Partnern sind dabei sehr unterschiedlich. Die Bundeswehr leistet hier 
durchweg hervorragende Arbeit und zeigt enormes Engagement. Die Improvisationskunst und 
Einsatzbereitschaft der Soldaten und Offiziere, gerade bei der Lösung von Aufgaben, für die 
sie nicht ausgebildet sind, verdient höchstes Lob. Sie reicht von der täglichen 
Nahrungsversorgung in abgelegenen Bergdörfern, Mine Awareness und Minenräurnung über 
die Organisierung des Gefängnisses in Prizren bis zum Bau eines Spielplatzes für die Kinder 
in Suva Reka, Die CIMIC Gruppe hat begonnen, die Zerstörungen im deutschen Sektor zu 
kartieren, Mnihenpläne zu erarbeiten pnd geuhöfe einzurichten, um bis zum ersten 
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Kälteeinbruch Ende September in den zerstörten Gebäuden zumindest provisorische 
Wohneinheiten herstellen zu können. Gespräche mit der KFOR-Einsatzleitung, mit THW und 
UNHCR vermittelten den Eindruck guter Koordinierung dieser Institutionen untereinander. 
Die allein im deutschen Sektor derzeit 60 anwesenden NG0s sollen über den UNHCR 
koordiniert werden. Dennoch muß gesagt werden, daß die Fülle der anstehenden dringlichen 
Aufgaben die Möglichkeiten des Bundeswehrkontingents sowohl qualitativ als auch 
quantitativ überfordert. Der dringend notwendige Schutz der serbischen Bevölkerung, vieler 
Klöster, Kirchen und Denkmäler serbischer Geschichte ist angesichts der Gesamtsituation 
nicht zu garantieren, Trotz größter Bemühungen kann ein so schrecklicher Vorfall wie der 
Mord an 14 serbischen Bauern euch im deutschen Sektor nicht ausgeschlossen werden. Umso 
wichtiger ist es, daß UNMIK und OSZE mit internationaler Polizei, Medien und Verwaltung 
schnellstmöglich implementiert werden.  
 
Gespräche mit Vertretern von Regierung und Parlament Mazgdonions  
 
Die im Dezember vorigen Jahres neu gewählte Regierung Mazedoniens hat in der 
Krisensituation seit dem Frühjahr, als nahezu 300000 albanische Flüchtlinge ins Land kamen, 
große Umsicht und Souveränität bewiesen. Angesichts der Tatsache, daß in Mazedonien selbst 
eine Minderheit von gegenwärtig über 30 Prozent Albanern lebt, stellte diese Flüchtlingszahl 
nicht nur ein enormes ökonomisches, sondern auch politisches Problem dar. Hinzu kamen die 
riesigen ökonomischen Schäden infolge der geographischen Lage und historisch begründeten 
Orientierung auf die BRJ, die durch den Krieg im Kosovo für Mazedonien entstanden. 
Außenminister Dimitrov fordert deshalb jenseits der ausdrücklichen Würdigung des 
beschlossenen Stabilitätspaktes und der Rolle der Bundesregierung bei dessen 
Zustandekommen Entschädigungen sowie einen Sofort Fonds für die ökonomische 
Stabilisierung des Landes von der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft, Neutrale Beobachter 
wie die ECMM befürchten angesichts der gegenwärtigen Situation in dem rohstoffarmen und 
strukturschwachen Staat Mazedonien soziale Unruhen und ein neuerliches Aufflammen 
nationalistischer Gefahren.  
 
Empfehlungen  
 
Als erste Schlußfolgerungen aus der Reise können folgende Empfehlungen und Forderungen 
formuliert worden, Eine dauerhafte politische Lösung für das Kosovo kann nur im Rahmen 
eines demokratisierten und in den Stabilitätspakt eingebundenen Jugoslawien gefunden 
werden. Eine entscheidende Voraussetzung dafür ist die Überwindung des Regimes Milosevic 
und seiner politischen Grundlagen. Jede andere, internationale Grenzen verändernde Option 
enthält die Gefahr der Mobilisierung neuerlicher nationalistischer Ambitionen für die gesamte 
Region.  
 
Die internationale Verwaltung im Kosovo muß forciert flächendeckend aufgebaut und 
ausreichend personell ausgestattet werden, um eine durchsetzbare Alternative zu den UCK 
Strukturen zu entwickeln. Bei der Partnersuche müssen auf albanischer Seite alle gemäßigten 
und zu konstruktiver Zusammenarbeit bereiten Kräfte gestärkt und unterstützt Werden, 
darunter die LDK.  
 
Personalstärke, Ausstattung und Einsatzfähigkeit der internationalen Polizei im Kosovo 
müssen massiv verstärkt werden, Nur so können die Grundlagen für Rechtssicherheit gelegt 
und auch der serbischen Bevölkerung ein Mindestmaß an Vertrauen für ein gesichertes 
Überleben in ihrer Heimat garantiert werden.  
 
Die Bundeswehr und darüber hinaus die KFOR insgesamt müssen so schnell wie möglich von 
ausbildungsfremden Aufgaben entlastet werden, um sich voll auf die Herstellung von 
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militärischer Sicherheit konzentrieren zu können. Hierzu gehört nicht zuletzt die konsequente 
Demilitarisierung der UCK. 
 
Die Implementierung humanitärer Hilfe und dringender Wiederaufbaumaßnahmen muß nach 
den Erfahrungen in Bosnien weitaus unbürokratischer und koordinierter organisiert werden. 
Dazu gehört der schnellstmögliche Aufbau einer EU - Agentur vor Ort, die mit hinreichender 
Entscheidungskompetenz für die Mittelvergabe ausgestattet sein muß. Finanzierungsmodelle 
und Abrechnungsverfahren müssen jenseits nationalen Prestigedenkens und EU interner 
Verfahren an der Effizienz der Leistung orientiert werden. Besonderes Augenmerk muß 
hierbei auf das Leistungsvermögen und die Flexibilität von NG0s gelenkt werden. Den vom 
Krieg im Kosovo besonders betroffenen Nachbarstaaten des Kosovo muß seitens der 
internationalen Staatengemeinschaft ungeachtet der langfristigen Perspektiven des 
Stabilitätspaktes für Südosteuropa unmittelbare Unterstützung in verstärktem Umfang 
geleistet werden. Dazu gehört die Anerkennung von Entschädigungsforderungen in 
angemessener Höhe wie auch die schnelle ökonomische Unterstützung politischer 
Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen.  
 
Die freiwillige Rückkehr der Vertriebenen ins Kosovo und deren Bereitschaft, sich für den 
Wiederaufbau zu engagieren, ist zu unterstützen. Eine zwangsweise Rückführung 
träumatisierter Menschen oder jener, deren ökonomische Existenz zerstört ist, wäre nicht 
verantwortbar und ist abzulehnen.  
 
Initiativen in Deutschland wie die Übernahme von Patenschaften für Schulen und 
Kindergärten und deren Wiederaufbau werden von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen unterstützt.  
 
Rezzo Schlauch  
Angelika Beer  
Fraktionsvorsitzender Verteidigungspolitische Sprecherin  
Reinhard Weißhuhn Wiss. Mitarbeiter 
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Annex II 
 
 
Travel and Meeting Log of EU Troika delegation 30 July - 12 December 
2007 
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Annex III 
 
 
Travel report of German Green Party Members of the Bundestag 
to Serbia and Kosovo December 2007 
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